STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
KEITH R. SHORETTE, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed the dismissal of two aggravated assault counts against Shorette, arguing that the state had established a prima facie case. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that because aggravated assault requires specific intent to do violence and the undisputed facts showed only reckless conduct from a car accident, the state failed to establish the requisite intent.
The trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss because although aggravated assault requires proof of specific intent to do violence to the person of another, the undisputed facts showed only general intent or reckless disregard. The state failed to establish the requisite specific intent necessary to constitute the offense charged.
[1] Aggravated assault requires proof of specific intent to do violence to the person of another.
[2] A motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) may be granted when undisputed facts demonstrate the absence of a required element of the charged…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“conviction of aggravated assault now requires proof of a specific intent to do violence to the person of another”
Establishes the critical legal requirement that distinguishes aggravated assault from lesser offenses and is the basis for affirming dismissal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceShorette was driving a car while intoxicated at high speed, failed to negotiate a curve, and struck an oncoming vehicle, injuring its two occupants. T…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
The state appeals from the lower court’s dismissal of two counts of aggravated assault charged against appellee, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). We affirm the dismissal. In his motion to dismiss, appellee alleged that he was driving a car with two passengers, one of whom would testify that he had been drinking and was driving in excess of the speed limit. After failing to negotiate a curve in the road, appellee struck an oncoming automobile, injuring the two occupants of the other vehicle. Both victims would testify they were in fear that appel-lee’s car would collide with them, as they were unable to avoid the accident.
Additional facts were alleged in the state’s demurrer, and appellee agreed to stipulate to them. These facts showed that appellee admitted taking intoxicants, drove at high rates of speed, and after the collision occurred, appellee made no attempt to return to the scene of the accident. Appel-lee moved to dismiss the two aggravated assault counts arguing that the state had failed to establish a prima facie case of his guilt because the undisputed facts clearly demonstrated that the information did not charge defendant with the specific intent necessary to constitute the offense charged. The trial court entered an order granting the motion from which the state appeals.
The state argues that aggravated assault is a general intent crime and cities Dupree v. State, 310 So. 2d 396, 399 (Fla.2d DCA 1975) (“[T]he element of general intent in aggravated assault may be satisfied by proof of wilful and reckless disregard of the safety of others.”). We note that the statute has been amended since that opinion and conviction of aggravated assault now requires proof of a specific intent to do violence to the person of another. §§ 784.-011, 784.021, Fla.Stat. (1979). See State v. White, 324 So. 2d 630 (Fla.1975). See also J.C.M. v. State, 375 So. 2d 873 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); Russell v. State, 373 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
Generally, intent is not an issue to be decided on a (c)(4) motion to dismiss as it it usually inferred from the surrounding acts and circumstances. State v. J.T.S., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). However, since appellee was charged with a specific intent crime and, as it was left as an undisputed fact that the state was relying upon a general intent, appellee therefore did not have the requisite intent to do violence to the accident victims and the trial court properly granted appellee’s motion to dismiss.
AFFIRMED.
SCHEB, C. J., and GRIMES, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Lanier v. State, 443 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…d 1328 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 174 (Fla.1977). Neither assault, § 784.011, Fla. Stat. (1981), nor battery, § 784.03, Fla.Stat. (1981), specific intent crimes, State v. Horvatch, 413 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); State v. Shorette, 404 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Russell v. State, 373 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); J.M.C. v. State, 331 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), embrace the consensual, non-violent conduct which occurred in the present case. Therefore, the instant prosecution of the def…
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Lavin v. State, 754 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…s probative of the Lavin’s state of mind. Aggravated assault requires proof of a specific intent to do violence to the person of another. See §§ 784.011, 784.021, Fla. Stat. (1997); State v. White, 324 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 1975); State v. Shorette, 404 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). But the threats here were more probative of Lavin’s anger over his arrest than of his guilt of the crime charged, which had occurred two hours previously. Furthermore, the witnesses testified not only as to the threats again…
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Ervin Alphonso Bartley v. State, 689 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…egations of appellant’s motion regarding trial counsel’s refusal to investigate and consider a voluntary intoxication defense are legally sufficient to state a claim for relief. Aggravated assault is a specific intent crime. E.g., State v. Shorette, 404 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Voluntary intoxication is a recognized defense to specific intent crimes. E.g., Spivey v. State, 680 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Allegations substantively indistinguishable from those made by appellant have repeatedly been he…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. J. T. S. and G. R. W., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- State v. White, 324 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1975)
- Russell v. State, 373 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Milledge DuPREE v. State, 310 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- In the Interest of J. C. M. v. State, 375 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)