CLIFTON DENSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1997-03-21
No. 96-2857
W. SHARP and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
689 So. 2d 1274 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1997) Caution
Cited by 7 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Clifton Denson appealed his drug conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial court erred by not conducting a Nelson hearing to determine whether counsel should be replaced. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Denson failed to timely and properly object to his attorney's performance and did not present sufficient grounds for a Nelson inquiry.


Holding

The trial court did not err in denying a Nelson hearing because Denson failed to timely and properly object to his counsel's performance before trial commenced, and even if timely, his complaint was inadequate to establish reasonable cause that counsel was ineffective. Nelson hearings address prospective inadequacy of counsel at critical stages, not past ineffectiveness.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court is not required to conduct a Nelson hearing when a defendant's complaint of attorney ineffectiveness is not timely or properly made.

[2] A Nelson inquiry is intended to determine if appointed counsel is currently performing adequately and to facilitate replacement if necessary, not to address past ineffect…

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“if a defendant, before the commencement of trial, makes it appear to the trial judge that he desires to discharge his court appointed counsel ... [and if] ... incompetency of counsel is assigned by the defendant as the reason, or a reason, the trial judge should make a sufficient inquiry of the defendant and his appointed counsel to determine whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that the court-appointed counsel is not rendering effective assistance to the defendant.”

Establishes the requirements for triggering a Nelson hearing, emphasizing the timing must be before trial commences and the inquiry addresses prospective ineffectiveness

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Denson was convicted of possession and delivery of a controlled substance after an undercover police officer testified that Denson sold him cocaine di…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
HARRIS, Judge.

HARRIS, Judge.

Clifton Denson was convicted of possession and delivery of a controlled substance. At sentencing, he complained that his attorney had been ineffective during his trial. The trial judge observed:

I don’t know what you expect your lawyer to do. He is not a magician. The officer testified that you walked up to his car, and you sold cocaine directly to an undercover police officer. I mean, the officer testified that not only did you sell the cocaine to him, but following the sale, that you were arrested at the scene. He came back and reconfirmed that you were the person that sold him the cocaine. I don’t know what you expect your attorney to do with those facts.

The trial court, after making this statement, permitted defense counsel to continue to represent Denson through the sentencing hearing. Denson appeals claiming that the court erred in not conducting a Nelson hearing. We affirm the trial court.

In Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), the court announced the rule that “if a defendant, before the commencement of trial, makes it appear to the trial judge that he desires to discharge his court appointed counsel ... [and if] ... incompetency of counsel is assigned by the defendant as the reason, or a reason, the trial judge should make a sufficient inquiry of the defendant and his appointed counsel to determine whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that the court-appointed counsel is not rendering effective assistance to the defendant.” It is the purpose of the Nelson inquiry to determine if the appointed counsel is performing adequately and if not, to replace such counsel. The Nelson inquiry has no role in past ineffectiveness of counsel.

Denson contends correctly that he is entitled to be represented by competent counsel at all critical stages of his trial. He is further correct in that sentencing is such a stage. But he did not complain to the court that his counsel was not doing something that he should or that he was doing anything that he should not in relation to the sentencing. Even on appeal, Denson does not contend that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing. Denson simply did not either timely or properly make an objection about his attorney that would warrant a Nelson inquiry.

Further, even if his complaint had been timely, it was still inadequate to require a Nelson inquiry. Denson’s only response to the judge’s implied question: “What do you contend that your attorney did or did not do that was ineffective?” was that he had only seen his lawyer twice before trial and that he was brought to trial “with an orange suit on with a big jacket.” The court obviously found in retrospect, proper because of the timing of the objection, that counsel’s preparation was adequate under the circumstances and that the defendant’s attire did not constitute ineffective representation. In short, the court could, and obviously did, find that the complaint did not present “reasonable cause” for a belief that counsel was acting in an ineffective manner. AFFIRMED.

W. SHARP and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Blanding v. State, 939 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
    …he requested discharge must be a claim of incompetence. Smelley v. State, 486 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Third, the alleged ineffectiveness must arise from the current representation by counsel, not past indiscretions. See Denson v. State, 689 So. 2d 1274, 1275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (“It is the purpose of the Nelson inquiry to determine if the appointed counsel is performing adequately and if not, to replace such counsel. The Nelson inquiry has no role in past ineffectiveness of counsel”) (emphasis in…
  • Hodges v. State, 727 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
    …93 So. 2d 198, 203 (Fla.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1210, 112 S.Ct. 3006, 120 L.Ed.2d 881 (1992). The purpose of a Nelson inquiry is to determine “if the appointed counsel is performing adequately and if not, to replace such counsel.” Denson v. State, 689 So. 2d 1274, 1275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Here, prior to trial, the defendant requested that the trial court discharge his court-appointed attorney, claiming that counsel was not operating in the defendant’s “best interests” and that defense counsel had failed [*…
  • Brown v. State, 75 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
    …ounsel.” Appellant did not complain about counsel’s performance at sentencing, where counsel reviewed the sentencing scoresheet and presented the testimony of witnesses and argued vigorously on Appellant’s behalf. As was the case in Denson v. State, 689 So. 2d 1274, 1275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), Appellant “simply did not either timely or properly make an objection about his attorney that would warrant a Nelson inquiry.” AFFIRMED. HAWKES, CLARK, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.…

Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw