CHRISTOPHER MERRITT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1997-04-11
No. 96-2257
PETERSON, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur.
691 So. 2d 62 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1997) Negative Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Christopher Merritt was convicted of attempted battery on a law enforcement officer after kicking at an officer without making contact during an arrest. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that attempted battery on a law enforcement officer is a valid offense under Florida's general attempt statute, contrary to authority from another district.


Holding

Attempted battery on a law enforcement officer is a valid offense under Florida's general attempt statute (section 777.04). The Legislature's enhancement of penalties for battery on a law enforcement officer does not eliminate the applicability of the general attempt statute to that offense.


Headnotes

[1] The general attempt statute applies to the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer.

[2] An attempted battery on a law enforcement officer is a cognizable offense, even if the statute specifically enumerating offenses enhanced when committed against a law enf…

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Key Quotes

“Because there is an offense of "battery on a law enforcement officer," we can see no logical reason why the general attempt statute (section 777.04) does not apply to that offense.”

Establishes the core reasoning that the attempt statute applies to battery on law enforcement officers

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Facts & Procedural History

During an arrest attempt, Christopher Merritt kicked at a law enforcement officer but did not make contact. He was charged with and convicted of attem…

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Opinion of the Court
HARRIS, Judge.

HARRIS, Judge.

When a officer attempted to arrest Christopher Merritt for striking a woman, Merritt kicked at the officer without making contact. He challenges his conviction for attempted battery on a law enforcement officer, claiming that the offense does not exist. For this proposition, Merritt relies on Fredericks v. State, 675 So. 2d 989, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), in which the court stated:

Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1993) reclassifies certain enumerated offenses and enhances the penalties for those offenses when the victim is a law enforcement officer. By its terms, the statute does not reclassify or enhance the penalty for the offense of attempted commission of the enumerated offenses. As explained by this court in Crumley v. State, 489 So. 2d 112, 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ... “by enacting the enhancement statute, section 784.07, the legislature merely provided for a felony punishment when the victim [of one of the enumerated offenses] ... is a law enforcement officer.” Thus, because the statute does not include the offense of attempted aggravated assault among the enumerated offenses to be enhanced when the victim is a law enforcement officer, the offense of attempted aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer is a non-existent offense.

We do not agree that the Legislature’s action in enhancing the penalty for either an assault or a battery if committed on a law enforcement officer somehow does away with the offense of attempted assault or battery on a law enforcement officer. Because there is an offense of “battery on a law enforcement officer,” we can see no logical reason why the general attempt statute (section 777.04) does not apply to that offense. Clearly, Merritt’s errant kick meets the criteria of section 777.04(1). He was “[a] person who attempts to commit an offense prohibited by law and in such attempt does any act toward the commission of such offense, but fails in the peipetration or is intercepted or prevented in the execution thereof....” He therefore committed the offense of criminal attempt. We certify conflict with Fredericks but affirm.

AFFIRMED.

PETERSON, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Merritt v. State, 712 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1998)
    …WELLS, Justice. We have for review Merritt v. State, 691 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), which certified conflict with Fredericks v. State, 675 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We quash the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in this case and approve the…
  • Brulfer v. State, 711 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
    …ent officer. He had been originally charged with aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer,1 and the trial judge concluded that the attempt offenses were lesser included offenses encompassed in the assault charges. We affirm. Merritt v. State, 691 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), rev. granted, 699 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.1997). We acknowledge a conflict with Fredericks v. State, 675 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Brulfer also argues that the trial judge erred in giving the jury an additional instruction conce…

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