WILLIAM K. ARCHER, JR., PETITIONER,
v.
KAREN B. ARCHER AND CLAUDIA HUGHES, RESPONDENTS
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The court denied certiorari, finding that the petitioner failed to establish a departure from the essential requirements of law on the record presented.
[1] An order denying a motion to strike a lis pendens may be reviewed by a petition for writ of certiorari when not directly appealable as a non-final order.
[2] Review of an order denying a motion to strike a lis pendens by writ of certiorari requires a showing of a departure from the essential requirements of law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA wife's attorney filed a lis pendens based on a charging lien against a warehouse held by a corporation, which the court found to be marital property…
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KLEIN, Judge.
Appellant has taken a non-final appeal from an order denying a motion to strike a lis pendens. The appellee, in her brief, asserts that such an order is not reviewable as a non-final appeal under rule 9.130, but acknowledges that this court has treated non-final appeals of such orders as petitions for common law certiorari. Cooper Village, Inc. v. Moretti, 383 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).1 We treat the appeal as a petition for certiorari.
The lis pendens in this case was filed by the wife’s attorney, based on a charging lien. It was recorded against a warehouse which was held in the name of a corporation, but was found by the court to be marital property. We deny certiorari because the petitioner has failed to establish, on the record presented, a departure from the essential requirements of law.
GUNTHER, C.J., and DELL, J„ concur. . In Munilla v. Espinosa, 533 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), the third district treated a petition for certiorari from an order refusing to dissolve a lis pendens as a non-final appeal, acknowledging in a footnote that the other four districts have reviewed these types of order by certiorari. See Lennar Florida Holdings, Inc. v.
First Family Bank, 660 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Stinnett v. Dodson, 575 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); First S. Dev. Corp. v. Chandler and Assocs., Inc., 472 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev. dismissed, 482 So. 2d 348 (Fla.1986). The third district stated that the "preferred method” of reviewing these orders should he by non-final appeal.
We agree with the third district that that would be the preferred method; however, we find no authority in rule 9.130 which authorizes it. Our appellate rules committee may wish to consider whether this type of order should be reviewable under rule 9.130. Under the present state of the law an aggrieved party would automatically be entitled to review in the third district, but would have to demonstrate a departure from the essential requirements of law and no adequate remedy by appeal from final judgment in the other districts, including this one, in order to get review.
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Katarina Loidl v. I & E Grp., Inc., 927 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…e Panamericano of S.D., Inc. v. Suncoast Bay Dev., Inc., 829 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Thus, we are not called upon to determine whether that situation requires any different method of review. . We distinguish this case from Archer v. Archer, 692 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), where although a lis pendens was filed against a' warehouse held in the name of a corporation, the trial court found that the warehouse was marital property. The corporation did not attempt to intervene in the trial court and di…
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Hopo Corp. v. Keller, 798 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…PER CURIAM. Petitioner, HOPO Corporation, seeks certiorari review of an order denying its motion to dissolve a lis pendens. See Archer v. Archer, 692 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Based on our decision in Marbin v. Cohen, 789 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), we grant the petition as HOPO Corporation has not been joined as a party in the pending dissolution of marriage action. We quash the trial court’s or…
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Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cooper Vill., Inc. v. Moretti, 383 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Munilla v. Evelio S. Espinosa and Henry Betancourt, 533 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Lennar Fla. Holdings, Inc. v. First Fam. Bank, 660 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- First S. Dev. Corp. v. Chandler & Assocs., Inc., 472 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Stinnett v. Dodson, 575 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)