DAVID HUFFMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1996-12-13
No. 96-01595
PARKER, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and FULMER, JJ., concur.
693 So. 2d 570 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1996) Caution
Cited by 28 cases

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Synopsis

David Huffman appealed the trial court's denial of his petition to set aside a 1986 conviction and sentence on the grounds that the petition was untimely, successive, and an abuse of process. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling and upheld an order restricting Huffman from filing further pro se attacks on his conviction, finding no denial of due process because the restriction was limited to that specific conviction and did not bar access to the court on other matters.


Holding

The trial court properly denied the petition as untimely, successive, and an abuse of process. The order restricting further pro se attacks did not violate due process because it applied only to attacks on that specific conviction and sentence, did not bar access to the court on other matters, and did not restrict the right to file for rehearing or appeal.


Headnotes

[1] A petition to set aside a conviction and sentence may be denied as untimely, successive, and an abuse of process.

[2] A trial court may prohibit a party from filing further pro se attacks on a specific conviction or sentence when the party has repeatedly presented the same issues over an…

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Key Quotes

“The issues Huffman raised in his petition have been repeatedly presented to the trial court over a span of almost ten years. The trial court's order recites eighteen visits Huffman made back to the trial court or to this court in his unending attempts to attack the conviction and sentence.”

Establishes the pattern of serial filings that constitutes abuse of process and justifies the restriction.

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Facts & Procedural History

Huffman filed a petition to set aside his 1986 conviction and sentence. Over approximately ten years, Huffman made eighteen visits to either the trial…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

[*571] PER CURIAM.

David Huffman challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition to set aside a conviction and sentence. The trial court denied the petition based on a finding that it was untimely, successive and an abuse of process. The trial court also prohibited Huffman from filing any further pro se attacks on his conviction or sentence. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that the petition was untimely, successive and an abuse of process. Webber v. State, 662 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). We also affirm the trial court’s order restricting further attacks on the conviction or sentence.

The issues Huffman raised in his petition have been repeatedly presented to the trial court over a span of almost ten years. The trial court’s order recites eighteen visits Huffman made back to the trial court or to this court in his unending attempts to attack the conviction and sentence. There is no question that Huffman has abused his constitutional right of access to the court and interfered with the effective administration of justice. And, there is no doubt that the volume of judicial labor which has been expended on Huffman's pro se efforts delayed the disposition of other cases with justiciable issues filed by well-meaning litigants. Therefore, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the time has come to prohibit any further pro se attacks by Huffman on his 1986 conviction and sentence.

We have considered whether the trial court should have afforded Huffman notice and a right to be heard prior to issuing its order. See Martin v. Circuit Court, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 627 So. 2d 1298, 1300 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). While we can envision some circumstances in which prior notice and an opportunity to be heard would be required, we find no denial of due process in this case. On this point we deem it significant that the restriction imposed by the trial court applied only to further attacks on a specific conviction and sentence. It did not bar Huffman’s access to the court on other matters. Nor did it restrict his right to file for a rehearing or this appeal. Consequently, the restriction imposed did not rise to the level that requires the due process safeguards discussed in Martin.

Affirmed.

PARKER, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and FULMER, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (14 total)

  • State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999)
    …PARIENTE, J. We have for review the opinion in Spencer v. State, 717 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), which certified conflict with the opinion in Huffman v. State, 693 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The relevant facts are set forth in the opinion below: Spencer appeals from an order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of C…
  • Spencer v. State, 717 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
    …lawsuits, petitions, and appeals,” the fourth district held that the circuit court could not issue such an order without first giving the pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard. See id. at 1299-1300. Nevertheless, in Huffman v. State, 693 So. 2d 570, 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), the Second District Court of Appeal, after acknowledging the procedural due process rights of a pro se litigant recognized in Martin, held that a trial court could prohibit a prisoner from filing further pro se attacks on a…
  • Huffman v. Singletary, 696 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …PER CURIAM. We deny on the merits this petition and amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed by David Huffman, alleging ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. In Huffman v. State, 693 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), this court affirmed a trial court order restricting further attacks on his convictions and sentences imposed in 1986. In doing so, this court observed the following: The issues Huffman raised in his petition have been repeatedl…

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