PROFESSIONAL PLANNING SERVICES, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
SUNSHINE STAFF LEASING, INC., ETC., APPELLEE
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Professional Planning sued Sunshine in Orange County for breach of contract and tortious interference. The trial court transferred the entire case to Highlands County based on a contractual venue provision. The appellate court affirmed, holding that venue agreements bind breach of contract claims and that transfer of related tort claims is within the trial court's discretion.
The court held that contractual venue agreements are binding as to all breach of contract counts regardless of additional tort counts in the same complaint, and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in transferring the tortious interference count when it involved the same or similar facts as the breach of contract counts and a related action was already pending in the agreed venue.
[1] Parties to a contract may agree to the venue of any action to enforce the contract, and such an agreement is binding as to all counts for breach of contract, even if the…
[2] When venue over one count of a complaint is transferred to another county, the trial court has discretion in determining whether to transfer venue over the remaining coun…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When such an agreement exists, it is binding as to all counts for breach of contract, notwithstanding the existence of any additional counts alleging a tort which are included in the same complaint.”
Establishes the central holding that contractual venue provisions control breach of contract claims even when tort claims are joined in the same complaint.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceProfessional Planning and Sunshine entered into a contract whereby Professional Planning would provide marketing services and refer employee leasing c…
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ANTOON, Judge.
Professional Planning Services, Inc. (Professional Planning) appeals the trial court’s nonfinal order transferring venue of its lawsuit against Sunshine Staff Leasing, Inc. (Sunshine) for breach of contract and tortious interference with a business relationship from Orange County to Highlands County. We affirm because (1) the parties’ contract provided that venue for any breach of contract action lies in Highlands County, and (2) the decision to transfer venue for the tortious interference claim was within the trial court’s discretion.
Professional Planning and Sunshine entered into a written contract under which Professional Planning agreed to provide marketing services and to refer employee leasing clients to Sunshine, and in return Sunshine agreed to pay Professional Planning commissions. Professional Planning’s principal place of business is in Orange County, while Sunshine’s principal place of business is in Highlands County. With regard to venue, the contract provided that “[i]t is agreed that venue and jurisdiction shall be the Circuit Court, County of Highlands, State of Florida.”
A dispute between the parties arose, and, as a result, both parties filed suit. Professional Planning sued Sunshine in Orange County, alleging two counts of breach of contract and one count of tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship. A short time later, Sunshine sued Professional Planning in Highlands County for breach of contract. Sunshine then filed a motion to transfer venue of Professional Planning’s lawsuit from Orange County to Highlands County, citing the venue provision set forth in the parties’ contract. The trial court granted the motion. Professional Planning challenges this ruling, arguing that, as to the tortious interference count, venue was not controlled by the terms of the contract. According to Professional Planning, the trial court could have thereby properly maintained venue over the entire case in Orange County because venue in Orange County was proper as to the tort claim. We disagree.
Parties to a contract can agree to the venue of any action to enforce a contract. Southeastern Office Supply and Furniture Co., Inc. v. Barley, 427 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). When such an agreement exists, it is binding as to all counts for breach of contract, notwithstanding the existence of any additional counts alleging a tort which are included in the same complaint. Derrick & Associates Pathology, P.A. v. Kuehl, 617 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Here, the trial court properly recognized that it was required to transfer venue of Professional Planning’s breach of contract counts to Highlands County pursuant to the terms of the parties’ contract.
Professional Planning also contends that, even if the trial court was required to transfer venue over the breach of contract counts, it was error to transfer venue over the tortious interference count. Again, we disagree.
When venue over one count of a complaint is transferred to another county, the determination whether to transfer venue over the remaining counts is within the discretion of the trial court. Ezell v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 415 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Here, there has been no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in transferring venue over Professional Planning’s tort claim. Rather, the trial court properly recognized that Sunshine’s request for a transfer was proper since Professional Planning’s tortious interference count involved the same or similar facts as its breach of contract counts, and Sunshine had already filed a related lawsuit in Highlands County.
AFFIRMED.
COBB and GOSHORN, JJ., concur.
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Celistics, LLC v. Gonzalez, 22 So. 3d 824 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…e right to select and agree on a forum in which to resolve future disputes.” Golden Palm Hospitality, Inc. v. Stearns Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 874 So. 2d 1231, 1234 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); see also Prof'l Planning Servs., Inc. v. Sunshine Staff Leasing, Inc., 695 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (“Parties to a contract can agree to the venue of any action to enforce a contract.”). There is, however, a distinction between mandatory and permissive forum selection clauses. See Regal Kitchens, 894 So. 2d at 290. As the…
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Jenne v. Church & Tower, Inc., 814 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…ere “not put into promissory words with sufficient clarity,” so that a fact finder would be required to “examine and interpret the parties’ conduct to give definition to their unspoken agreement.” Commerce P’ship 8098 Ltd. v. Equity Contracting Co., 695 So. 2d 883, 385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The very nature of this contract precludes the Sheriff from assuming third-party beneficiary status. The Broward County/Church & Tower contract involved the construction of a public facility funded by the County. The contr…
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Regal Kitchens, Inc. v. O'Connor & Taylor Condo. Constr., Inc., 894 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…nue for the enforcement” of the contract held mandatory); Mgmt. Computer Controls, Inc., (clause providing actions “shall be initiated and prosecuted” in Tennessee courts held mandatory); Prof'l Planning Servs., Inc. v. Sunshine Staff Leasing, Inc., 695 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (provision where parties “agreed that venue and jurisdiction shall be the Circuit Court, County of Highlands, Florida” held mandatory); Mercedes Homes, Inc. v. Osborne, 687 So. 2d 840, 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (court held mand…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Se. Off. Supply & Furniture Co., Inc. v. Barley, 427 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Derrick & Assocs. Pathology, P.A. v. Gary V. Kuehl, M.D., 617 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Franz Alexander Arango v. Arango, 415 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Gale Glass Ezell and Sheldon Ezell v. State, 415 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)