STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES GRAPSKI, APPELLEE
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The trial court lacked the authority to order the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to reinstate a driver's license without requiring the driver to complete the statutorily mandated substance abuse education course.
[1] A trial court lacks discretion to waive a statutorily mandated driver improvement or substance abuse education course required for reinstatement of a driver's license fol…
[2] Revocation of a driver's license for DUI is an administrative remedy for public protection, not punishment, and mandatory statutory requirements for reinstatement are adm…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharles Grapski's driver's license was revoked for DUI. The trial court released him from the mandatory alcohol abuse program, and later ordered the D…
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GROSS, Judge.
This is an appeal of a final order directing the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to reissue a driver’s license to Charles Grapski, whose license was revoked for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Grapski was convicted of DUI1 on September 29, 1993. His driver’s license was suspended for six months and he was or dered to attend an alcohol abuse program. In October 1994, the circuit court entered an order releasing Grapski from attending the program, without indicating its reasons.
In January 1995, Grapski filed an affidavit in his criminal case stating that he had presented the Department of Motor Vehicles with the court order releasing him from the DUI school requirement, but the department refused to abide by the order and informed him that he was nonetheless required to take the course.2 Following a hearing in which the department did not participate because it was not a party and had received no notice, the trial court entered an order requiring the department to issue Grapski a driver’s license, or to send a response showing cause why the department was not complying with the order. Even though the department was not a party to the action, to comply with the court’s order, it filed a response stating that: 1) pursuant to section 322.291, Florida Statutes, Grapski was statutorily required to present proof of enrollment in a department approved substance abuse education course prior to reinstatement of his driving privilege; and 2) even if the statutory DUI program requirement could be waived, Grapski was ineligible for license restoration because an indefinite suspension remained in effect for failing to comply with Florida’s financial responsibility laws.
In May 1996, Grapski filed a motion arguing that the department had refused to obey the court’s order compelling the reissuance of Grapski’s license. The motion requested that the court enter another order directing the department to reissue the license. Following a hearing in which the department participated, the court clarified the prior order to read that if Grapski was otherwise qualified for a license, failure to attend DUI school was not to be an obstacle. The court then ordered the department to issue Grap-ski a driver’s license if he was otherwise qualified. It is this order that the department appeals.
Section 322.291(l)(a)l, Florida Statutes (1993),3 provides that when a driving privilege has been revoked for driving under the influence, before the privilege may be reinstated, the driver must “present to the department proof of enrollment in a department-approved advanced driver improvement course or substance abuse education course.” The language of the statute is obligatory and does not vest discretion in the trial court to waive the course requirement.
Revocation of a driver’s license for DUI is not regarded as punishment of the offender; rather “it is an administrative remedy for the public protection that mandatorily follows conviction for certain offenses.” Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla.1957); State of Florida Dep’t. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Vogt, 489 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). When made mandatory by statute, revocation of a license is an administrative function, as opposed to the imposition of a criminal sentence involving at least some exercise of judicial discretion. In revoking the license, the judge merely follows the mandate of the statute as an administrative representative of the department, without any discretion to exercise. Smith, 93 So. 2d at 107; accord Vogt, 489 So. 2d at 1170; see also Crawford v. State, 651 So. 2d 731, 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Likewise, when a requirement for reinstatement, such as enrollment in a DUI course, is made mandatory by statute, reinstatement is an administrative function over which the trial court has no discretion. Cf Smith, 93 So. 2d at 107; Vogt, 489 So. 2d at 1170.
The declared legislative intent of Chapter 322 is to protect the public. § 322.263, Fla. Stat. (1993). The chapter is to be liberally construed “to the end that the greatest force and effect may be given to its provision for the promotion of public safety.” § 322.42, Fla. Stat. (1993). The legislature has determined that, for the protection of the public, a person convicted of DUI must participate in a driver improvement or substance abuse course before being permitted to return to the roads. Allowing the courts to waive the statutory course requirement would undermine the legislative decision that a mandatory educational course will protect the public. It is the duty of the courts and the department to follow the provisions of Chapter 322. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Bender, 497 So. 2d 1332, 1334 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
We reverse because the trial court lacked the authority to order the department to reinstate Grapski’s license without requiring him to enroll in the statutorily required advanced driver improvement or substance abuse education course. See Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Degrossi, 680 So. 2d 1093, 1096 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Vogt, 489 So. 2d at 1171.
GLICKSTEIN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. . Grapski was originally charged with a felony, battery on a law enforcement officer, and misdemeanor DUI. The state entered a nolle prosequi on the battery charge and Grapski was sentenced on the DUI only.
. The affidavit indicated that on "numerous occasions,” Grapski had attempted to enroll in the DUI school, only to he refused by unhelpful bureaucrats. Grapski did not seek administrative relief by appealing under the Florida Administrative Code or by filing a complaint with the department’s Bureau of Driver Improvement.
. The 1993 version of the statute was in effect at the time of Grapski’s conviction and application to the court for reinstatement. The 1995 amendment to the statute does not affect this case. The 1995 version of the statute deletes the language "in addition to passing the complete driver's license examination.” § 322.291, Fla. Stat. (1995).
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Freeman Daniels v. State, 716 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…prior to accepting the plea, the trial court was required to determine that the defendant understood that he was subject to the section 322.055(1) suspension. The state’s reliance on State Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Grapski, 696 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), is misplaced. The point of that ease was to demonstrate that a trial court did not have the power to tinker with the terms of a driver’s license suspension that was made mandatory by statute. Grapski did not deal with the necess…
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Whipple v. State, 789 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…22 is to protect the public. Thus, the chapter is to be liberally construed “to the end that the greatest force and effect may be given to its provision for the promotion of public safety.” State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Grapski, 696 So. 2d 950, 951-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). It is the duty of the courts and the department to follow the provisions of Chapter 322. See id. at 952. [*1137] In this case, section 322.28(2)(a)2 specifically provides that upon a second conviction within a period of…
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Lescher v. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 946 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…2d 469, 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), rev. denied, 872 So. 2d 899 (Fla.2004), the court explained: The administrative revocation of a driver’s license for DUI is not “punishment” of the offender. See Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Grapski, 696 So. 2d 950, 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Rather “it is an administrative remedy for the public protection that mandatorily follows conviction for certain offenses.” Id. (quoting Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1957)); see also Dep’t. of High…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Smith v. City OF Gainesville, 93 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1957)
- State v. Vogt, 489 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- State v. Degrossi, 680 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Miller v. Reinhart, 497 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Crawford v. State, 651 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)