PATRICK EDWARD BELLAMY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Patrick Bellamy was arrested based on a BOLO (Be On Lookout) description of a drug suspect that the court found far too general to provide probable cause. The court reversed the conviction and suppressed the evidence, holding that the vague description and Bellamy's observed conduct did not establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop or arrest him.
The BOLO description was far too general to provide probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify the stop or arrest. The trial court erred in denying Bellamy's motion to suppress because the encounter was not consensual and lacked founded suspicion or probable cause to justify the initial detention.
[1] A BOLO description that is too general, lacking specific details, cannot alone establish probable cause for a stop or arrest.
[2] Observed activities, when combined with a general BOLO description, may not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity if the activities do not specif…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We conclude that the BOLO description here was far too general to provide probable cause.”
Establishes the central legal holding that the vague description was insufficient to justify the stop.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Buchanan received a BOLO around 10:00 p.m. describing a black male wearing dark pants, a black and white shirt, and a jacket who had allegedly…
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ROSMAN, JAY B., Associate Judge.
Patrick Edward Bellamy appeals a final judgment and sentences for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and possession of cocaine. We agree with his contention that the trial court erred in its denial of his motion to suppress the evidence and, therefore, reverse.
Officer Buchanan received a BOLO around 10:00 p.m. that a black male wearing dark pants, a black and white shirt and a jacket had sold drugs to an undercover officer near the corner of 23rd Street and 3rd Avenue in Tampa. A few minutes later at the corner, Officer Buchanan saw the appellant wearing clothes that matched the description, but he was uncertain whether the appellant was the person who sold the drugs. Buchanan observed the appellant speaking to the occupant of a car, but he never saw anything exchanged between the appellant and the vehicle’s occupant. Instead of approaching then, he waited, thinking that the appellant was involved in another drug transaction. After the appellant spoke with the individual in the car, Buchanan heard the appellant tell the occupant to drive around the corner. The appellant then walked over to the corner of an abandoned house, reached under the house and removed something. As he stood up, marked and unmarked police units drove into the area, someone yelled “police,” and the appellant started running. Buchanan gave chase, grabbed and handcuffed him. A subsequent search of the appellant produced cocaine. Officer Buchanan then returned to the house and found more cocaine under the house. He found no money on the appellant. After the arrest, the undercover officers who had radioed the BOLO advised Buchanan that the appellant was not the man who sold them drugs.
The trial judge concluded that without the BOLO, any stop of the appellant would have been inappropriate and anything seized would be suppressed. He also found that the totality of the circumstances made it a reasonable stop because this was the same location, the description was similar and the appellant was conducting suspicious drug activities. He, therefore, denied the motion to suppress.
We conclude that the BOLO description here was far too general to provide probable cause. The State’s reliance on State v. Joseph, 593 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), is misplaced because the BOLO there is described as “very detailed.” Similarly, the BOLO description in Blanco v. State, 452 So. 2d 520 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S.Ct. 940, 83 L.Ed.2d 953 (1985), is far more specific than the description in this case. In contrast, the suspect’s proximity in place and time was held sufficient to provide probable cause in State v. Varnedoe, 443 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), where the BOLO described the individual as a 5'6" to 5'7" dark-skinned black male, 130-140 pounds wearing a white shirt and blue jeans and having “teeth like a weasel.” As in Ross v. State, 419 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), where the BOLO described a black male with short cropped hair, wearing a white tee shirt and blue jeans, the description here could have fit many people in the area at a time when many people were on the street.
We do not agree with the judge that the BOLO description sufficiently bolstered the officer’s suspicion such that he had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The appellant’s observed activities fall short of supplying the officer with a reasonable suspicion that he was committing a criminal offense. See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). Probable cause to arrest exists only when the totality of the circumstances more likely than not points to the commission of a crime. Doney v. State, 648 So. 2d 799, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), review denied, 659 So. 2d 272 (Fla.1995). There was no observed exchange between the appellant and the occupant of the vehicle. Messer v. State, 609 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Because the encounter between the appellant and the officer was not consensual, and there was no founded suspicion or probable cause to justify a stop or an arrest, we conclude that it was error to deny the appellant’s motion to suppress.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and WHATLEY, J., concur.
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State v. Malone, 729 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…azer might be involved. It was a good hunch, but it was only a hunch — a mere suspicion. Popple [v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla.1993) ] and numerous other cases hold that a hunch is not sufficient to justify a police stop. See e.g., Bellamy v. State, 696 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) and Sanders v. State, 666 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA 19[9]6). Under the circumstances, therefore, this Court grants the Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized by police from the Blazer subsequent to the stop. We agree…
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Conyers v. State, 164 So. 3d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…of the circumstances would allow a reasonable person in the officer’s position “to believe that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed.” Id. (quoting League v. State, 778 So. 2d 1086, 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)); see also Bellamy v. State, 696 So. 2d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Without any extensive discussion and as an alternative holding, this court has previously held that the plain feel of a crack pipe during a lawful patdown can provide probable cause to arrest. State v. M.J., 685 So. 2d 135…
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Riley v. State, 722 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…h of her person. We have repeatedly recognized that the existence of probable cause to believe that a person is carrying contraband and thus may be searched without consent depends on the totality of the circumstances. See Parker; Bellamy v. State, 696 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); State v. Ellison, 455 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). But, here, the only relevant circumstances were that while officers were searching appellant’s home, she attempted to conceal an unidentified object from their view. The mere s…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Blanco v. State, 452 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1984)
- Woodward v. Texas, 469 U.S. 1181 (U.S. 1985)
- Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Laffey, 469 U.S. 1181 (U.S. 1985)
- Doney v. State, 648 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Ross v. State, 419 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- State v. Joseph, 593 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- State v. Varnedoe, 443 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Messer v. State, 609 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- In the Interest of G.F., 609 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)