MARK STEPHEN WADDELL, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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Mark Waddell was convicted of burglary, attempted first-degree murder, and robbery after a jury trial. The trial court subsequently granted a judgment of acquittal on a false imprisonment conviction (lesser included offense of kidnapping), but the appellate court reversed this acquittal, finding the Faison test for kidnapping did not apply to charges involving intent to terrorize.
The Faison test for determining whether kidnapping occurred with intent to facilitate another felony does not apply when the charge alleges kidnapping with intent to inflict bodily harm or terrorize the victim. The trial court erred in granting the judgment of acquittal on false imprisonment because sufficient evidence supported a conviction under the terrorize provision of the kidnapping statute.
[1] A judgment of acquittal for false imprisonment is improperly granted when evidence supports a conviction for kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm or terroriz…
[2] The Faison test for determining whether a kidnapping is incidental to another crime applies only to kidnapping charges with the intent to commit or facilitate a felony, n…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court's reliance upon Faison, however, was misplaced in this case because Faison adopted a test only for a determination of whether a kidnapping had taken place with the intent to commit a felony pursuant to section 787.01(l)(a)(2)”
Establishes that the Faison test applies only to kidnapping charges under a specific subsection, not to all kidnapping charges
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWaddell was charged with burglary of an occupied structure, attempted first-degree murder with a destructive device, robbery with a weapon, and kidnap…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Mark Stephen Waddell, was charged by amended information with burglary of an occupied structure, attempted first degree murder with a destructive device or bomb, robbery with a weapon and kidnapping with a weapon. After a trial by jury, he was convicted of the burglary, attempted first degree murder, and robbery counts as charged, but was found guilty of false imprisonment as a lesser included offense of the kidnapping count. The trial court, however, subsequently granted a judgment of acquittal as to the false imprisonment conviction finding that the victim’s detention was incidental to the robbery. Waddell appeals his remaining convictions on various grounds and the state cross-appeals the judgment of acquittal entered on the false imprisonment count.
Although Waddell has raised numerous issues on his main appeal, we find that he has made no showing of reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm his convictions and sentences for the burglary, attempted first degree murder, and robbery counts.
As to the cross-appeal, we agree with the state that the trial court erred when it granted Waddell’s motion for judgment of acquittal on his false imprisonment conviction. In Count IV of the amended information, the state charged Waddell alternatively with kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony pursuant to section 787.01(l)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) and/or kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim pursuant to section 787.01(l)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). There was evidence at trial to establish, and the trial court so found, that Wad-dell had confined the victim with an intent to terrorize the victim. Relying upon the analysis set forth in Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963, 966 (Fla.1983), the trial court, however, concluded that the victim’s confinement was merely incidental to the robbery and granted the judgment of acquittal. The trial court’s reliance upon Faison, however, was misplaced in this case because Faison adopted a test only for a determination of whether a kidnapping had taken place with the intent to commit a felony pursuant to section 787.01(l)(a)(2)1. Where, as here, there was evidence to sustain a conviction for kidnapping with the intent to “[i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim” under section 787.01(l)(a)(3), the Faison test has no applicability. See Bedford v. State, 589 So. 2d 245, 251 (Fla.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1009, 112 S.Ct. 1773, 118 L.Ed.2d 432 (1992); see also Chaeld v. State, 599 So. 2d 1362, 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (Faison jury instruction has no application when the charges alleged that the defendant kidnapped the victim with any of the other specific intentions identified in sections 787.01(l)(a)(l), (3) or (4)). We therefore reverse the judgment of acquittal entered on the false imprisonment conviction and remand for resentencing on this charge.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
. Specifically, the supreme court in Faison
adopted the following test to determine whether a kidnapping had taken place under section 787.01(l)(a)(2):
[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement:
(a)Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime;
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Carter v. State, 762 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…nflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim, The Faison test does not apply to that part of the kidnapping statute. See Bedford v. State, 589 So. 2d 245, 251 (Fla.1991); Biggs v. State, 745 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Waddell v. State, 696 So. 2d 1229, 1229-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Chaeld v. State, 599 So. 2d 1362, 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Thus, the motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied with regard to the charge under paragraph three. Although that conclusion is, sufficient to disp…
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Simmons v. State, 790 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…endant’s motion and reduced the charge of kidnaping to false imprisonment. During the same general conversation,7 the prosecutor returned to the issue of the kidnaping charge and handed the court a copy of this Court’s decision in Waddell v. State, 696 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). The prosecutor then briefly explains the holding of Waddell, and the court announces that it would “rule on it after we finish the testimony.” After the defense rested, the court returned to the issue and advised both sides that…
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Sutton v. State, 834 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…victim be confined against her or his will with the intent to “[ijnflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person.” The standard adopted in Faison does not apply to offenses charged under section 787.01(1)(a)3. Waddell v. State, 696 So. 2d 1229, 1229-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (noting that “Faison adopted a test only for a determination of whether a kidnapping had taken place with the intent to commit a felony pursuant to section [*335] 787.01(1)(a)2.,” and thus is inapplicable to convictions u…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983)
- Bedford v. State, 589 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1991)
- Chaeld v. State, 599 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Marino v. United States, 503 U.S. 1009 (U.S. 1992)
- Bedford v. Florida, 503 U.S. 1009 (U.S. 1992)