JULIO BAEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A mistrial declared solely on a jury note about a juror drinking beer, without any inquiry into the juror's actual condition, was an abuse of discretion and not supported by manifest necessity.
[1] A mistrial may be declared only if there is a manifest necessity to do so, after an assiduous inquiry into the possibility of other courses of action.
[2] A trial court cannot declare a juror incompetent to proceed solely on the basis of a note from the jury without conducting an inquiry into the juror's condition.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring a D.U.I. trial, the jury sent a note stating one juror admitted to having beers at lunch and questioning his qualification. The trial judge dec…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
In the course of Baez’s D.U.I. jury trial in the Monroe County Court, the jury returned to the courtroom at 1:30 p.m. after a lunch recess which began at noon. After further proceedings, it retired to deliberate at 4:15 p.m. An hour later, the trial judge reported as follows:
THE COURT: All right. I have a question from the jury, and I quote — you better sit down.
“One of the jurors has admitted to having a couple of beers at lunch. Is he qualified to help make a decision?”
What would you like to do?
Solely on the basis of the content of this note and without examining either the alleged beer drinker or any other jury member, the trial judge declared him incompetent to proceed and, after the defendant refused to stipulate to a five person jury, declared a mistrial over Baez’s objection. He then took prohibition in the circuit court to preclude a subsequent trial on the D.U.I. charge on double jeopardy grounds. The circuit court denied prohibition but we reverse.
It is established that the court may appropriately declare a mistrial on its own or a prosecution motion only if, after an assiduous inquiry into the possibility of another course of action, there is a “manifest necessity” to do so. Thomason v. State, 620 So. 2d 1234 (Fla.1993); Snow v. Fowler, 662 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 671 So. 2d 788 (Fla.1996); Cohens v. Elwell, 600 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Spaziano v. State, 429 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Ostane v. Hickey, 385 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). That condition was obviously not satisfied in the county court if only because, without any inquiry into the precise condition of the allegedly impaired juror, there could be no showing that he was not competent to deliberate with the consequence that he need not have been excused at all. See Gamble v. State, 44 Fla. 429, 33 So. 471 (1902); Langston v. State, 212 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968). Compare Goldring v. Escapa, 338 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 346 So .2d 1248 (Fla.1977) (obviously intoxicated juror acting irrationally in open court).
Reversed.
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Citator
Cited By
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Rodriguez v. State, 719 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…ves. See Thomason, 620 So. 2d at 1239; Wilson v. State, 693 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); C.A.K. v. State, 661 So. 2d 365, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). This necessarily requires an investigation into the viability of the alternatives. See Baez v. State, 699 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Cohens v. Elwell, 600 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Here, the trial court entertained the possibility of a continuance, but rejected it as unfair to the jurors. We cannot fault the court’s desire not to inconvenience the juro…
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Alonso v. Ford Motor Co., 54 So. 3d 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…alcohol at night. Rather, the court determined that the collective result of all three points on appeal and the entire record was the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Both parties also briefed this Court’s decision in Baez v. State, 699 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In that case, a jury-in a Monroe County D.U.I. trial sent out a note to the trial judge during deliberations: “One of the jurors has admitted to having a couple of beers at lunch. Is he qualified to help make a decision?” The tri…
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Dwaine Merchant v. State, 201 So. 3d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…he course of the trial. The trial court erred in failing to conduct any inquiry and, by relying instead on assumption, inference and speculation, abused its discretion in concluding that a mistrial was justified by manifest necessity. Baez v. State, 699 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d. DCA 1997), is on point. In that case, the jury sent a note to the court during deliberations. The note stated: “One of the jurors has admitted to having a couple of beers at lunch. Is he qualified to help make a decision?” Solely on the ba…
Authorities Cited
- Thomason v. State, 620 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1993)
- Spaziano v. State, 429 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Cohens v. Honorable Thomas Elwell, 600 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Gamble v. State, 44 Fla. 429 (Fla. 1902)
- The Foremost Ins. Co. & Osteopathic Gen. Hosp. v. Hartford Ins. Grp., 385 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Gale J. Stern v. Indus. Relations Comm'n, 338 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Barney Goldring v. Escapa, 338 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Major Langston v. State, 212 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)
- Snow v. The Honorable Richard J. Fowler, 662 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)