THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
NORRIS H. LESLIE, APPELLEE
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The State appeals the trial court's order discharging defendant Leslie under Florida's speedy trial rule. The court affirmed the discharge, holding that the State's filing of charges 177 days after custody—two days beyond the 175-day speedy trial period—violated the speedy trial rule, and that defendant's motion for continuance after the period expired did not preserve the State's right to prosecute.
The court held that defendant was entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule. The State's filing of the information two days after the 175-day speedy trial period expired violated the rule, and defendant's subsequent motion for continuance and personal waiver did not cure this violation or provide grounds to deny discharge.
[1] The speedy trial period begins to run when an accused is first taken into custody and continues to run when the State voluntarily terminates prosecution before formal cha…
[2] A defendant's motion for a continuance made after the speedy trial period has expired, but before a motion for discharge is filed, does not affect the defendant's right t…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the speedy trial time begins to run when an accused is first taken into custody and continues to ran when the State voluntarily terminates prosecution before formal charges are filed and the State may not file charges based on the same conduct after the speedy trial period has expired”
Establishes the fundamental rule that the speedy trial period begins at custody and the State cannot file charges after expiration, even if prosecution was initially terminated.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant Leslie was taken into custody. The State initially announced it would bring no action, then later filed an information on the 177th day afte…
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COPE, Judge.
The State appeals an order discharging defendant under the speedy trial rule. After defendant-appellee Norris H. Leslie was taken into custody, the State announced that it would bring “no action.” See Genden v. Fuller, 648 So. 2d 1183, 1183 (Fla.1994). Later, the State changed its position and, on the 177th day after defendant was taken into custody, filed an information. Defendant filed a notice of expiration of the speedy trial period, and the court scheduled a trial date within the window period. On the day of the trial, defendant moved for a continuance. At that time, defendant personally waived his rights under the speedy trial rule, so that the defense would have time to take further discovery.
Thereafter, defendant moved for discharge under the speedy trial rale. The trial court granted the motion, and the State has appealed.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that “the speedy trial time begins to run when an accused is first taken into custody and continues to ran when the State voluntarily terminates prosecution before formal charges are filed and the State may not file charges based on the same conduct after the speedy trial period has expired.” Genden v. Fuller, 648 So. 2d at 1185. The speedy trial period expired, without demand, at the end of the 175th day. See Fla. R. Crim P. 3.191(a); see also State v. Agee, 622 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla.1993). The information in this case was filed two days after the expiration of the 175-day speedy trial period and defendant was entitled to discharge under Genden v. Fuller. The question arises, however, whether defendant’s motion for continuance and on-the-record personal waiver of the speedy trial time requires a different result. We conclude that it does not. This court considered a similar issue under the prior version of the speedy trial rule. See Muller v. State, 387 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). In that case,
after the ... speedy trial period had run, but prior to the filing of his motion for discharge, defense counsel moved for a continuance on the ground that “defense counsel will be on vacation.” The State argues that this motion, pending when the motion for discharge was filed, evidenced the defendant’s unreadiness for trial and thereby authorized the denial of discharge. The motion for continuance, however, was made five days after the speedy trial time had run. Such a motion does not affect Muller’s right to discharge.
Id. at 1039 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Here, too, the defendant requested a continuance after the speedy trial period had expired, but before the motion for discharge was filed. Under the reasoning of Muller, we conclude that the defendant was entitled to discharge. That being so, it is unnecessary to reach the trial court’s alternative ground for discharge.*
Affirmed.
GERSTEN and SHEVIN, JJ., concur. *
The trial court reasoned alternatively that the late filing of the information by the State had prejudiced the defendant in his ability to prepare for trial.
SHEVIN, Judge,
specially concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion, but write separately simply to clarify further that under the circumstances of this case, once the 175 day speedy trial period expires, the defendant’s discharge is mandated, and there is no recapture window. See State v. Agee, 622 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla.1993).
“We approve the decision of the district court below, disapprove Dorian, and recede from Zabrani v. Cowart, 506 So. 2d 1035 (Fla.1987) and Bloom v. McKnight, 502 So. 2d 422 (Fla.1987), to the extent they suggest the fifteen-day window of recapture applies in such cases.” Agee, 622 So. 2d at 476 (emphasis supplied).
COPE and GERSTEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Nelson, 26 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 2010)…after the filing of a notice of expiration without affording the State the opportunity to bring the defendant to trial during the recapture period. We do not address those circumstances today. The court below primarily relied upon State v. Leslie, 699 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), as the authority for its decision. In Leslie, the Third District Court of Appeal applied the nullity principle when the State filed the charging documents two days after the expiration of the default period. The Leslie court dete…
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Villavicencio v. State, 719 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…cessor speedy trial rule, once the right to discharge has accrued, a subsequent motion for continuance does not waive the right to discharge. See Muller v. State 387 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), and cases cited therein; cf. State v. Leslie, 699 So. 2d 832, 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (later decision applying rule). We next turn to the First District decision in Agee itself. In Agee, the State filed an information, and the defendant filed a demand for speedy trial. See 588 So. 2d at 602. The State entered…
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Ryan v. State, 768 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…ing brought to trial). Defendant’s request for a continuance does not mandate a different result, where, as here, defendant sought the continuance after the speedy trial period had expired and before filing his discharge motion. See State v. Leslie, 699 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Muller v. State, 387 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Cf. Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla.1986)(when a defendant requests a continuance before expiration of the “applicable speedy trial time period” for the charged crim…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Agee, 622 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1993)
- Genden v. Fuller, 648 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1994)
- Bloom v. McKNIGHT, 502 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1987)
- Iqbal Zabrani v. Cowart, 506 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1987)
- Muller v. State, 387 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)