PAUL EUGENE RYAN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Paul Ryan challenges a circuit court's denial of his petition for writ of prohibition after the state failed to bring him to trial within the speedy trial period, nol prossed the case, and later filed a new information based on the same conduct. The appellate court reverses, holding that Ryan is entitled to discharge under Florida's speedy trial rules and that the state cannot circumvent those protections by re-filing charges.
Ryan is entitled to discharge under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p). A defendant not brought to trial within the recapture period through no fault of the defendant shall be forever discharged. The state is precluded from circumventing the speedy trial rule by nol pressing and subsequently filing a new information based on the same criminal episode.
[1] A defendant is entitled to discharge if not brought to trial within the speedy trial period or the recapture period through no fault of the defendant.
[2] A defendant's request for a continuance made after the speedy trial period has expired does not negate their right to discharge.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant not brought to trial within the [recapture] period through no fault of the defendant, on motion of the defendant, or the court, shall be forever discharged from the crime.”
Establishes the core rule granting discharge when speedy trial rights are violated
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRyan was arrested on December 12, 1998, for misdemeanor battery. The state failed to bring him to trial within the 90-day speedy trial period. On the …
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SHEVIN, Judge.
Paul Ryan appeals the circuit court’s denial of his petition for writ of prohibition. We reverse.
Ryan was arrested on December 12, 1998, for misdemeanor battery; the state failed to bring him to trial during the 90-day speedy trial period. On the 101st day after his arrest, at the sounding, Ryan requested a continuance which was granted by the trial court. Shortly thereafter, Ryan filed a notice of expiration of the 90-day speedy trial period. Following a hearing, the trial court set the case for trial during the recapture period. On the day of trial, the state entered a nolle prosequi to the charged crime. Four months later, the state filed an information based on the same criminal conduct. The court denied Ryan’s motion for discharge. The circuit court denied Ryan’s petition for writ of prohibition.
Defendant’s motion for discharge was well taken.1 .Although Ryan was continuously available for trial during the speedy trial period, the state failed to bring him to trial during that period or during the recapture period; instead, the state nol prossed the case on the day of trial. Under these circumstances, defendant was entitled to discharge: “A defendant not brought to trial within the [recapture] period through no fault of the defendant, on motion of the defendant, or the court, shall be forever discharged from the crime.” Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(p). See Mercer v. Musleh, 682 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Rivas v. Oppenbom, 605 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)(absent waiver defendant entitled to discharge where the speedy trial time including the 15-day window had lapsed without defendant being brought to trial). Defendant’s request for a continuance does not mandate a different result, where, as here, defendant sought the continuance after the speedy trial period had expired and before filing his discharge motion. See State v. Leslie, 699 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Muller v. State, 387 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Cf. Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla.1986)(when a defendant requests a continuance before expiration of the “applicable speedy trial time period” for the charged crime, defendant waives speedy trial rights for all charges arising from that episode); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(k)(“A person who has not been available for trial during the term provided for herein is not entitled to be discharged.”)(emphasis added).
Finally, the state is precluded from trying defendant on the new information filed several months after expiration of the speedy trial period. The state is not permitted to circumvent the speedy trial rule by nol pressing the charge and subsequently filing a new information based on the same criminal episode. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(o); State v. Agee, 622 So. 2d 473 (Fla.1993). Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the petition and remand the cause to the circuit court to grant the writ of prohibition and to discharge defendant.
Reversed and remanded.
. The state’s contention that defendant was not arrested on December 12 is without merit. The record reveals that defendant was arrested and released when he signed a promise to appear. See Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677 (Fla.1995); Brown v. State, 515 So. 2d 211 (Fla.1987); Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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State v. Nelson, 26 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 2010)…ie, 699 So. 2d at 833 (Shevin, J., specially concurring). However, in Nelson, the State filed the delinquency proceeding within the speedy trial period and was therefore entitled to the recapture window. A similar analysis applies to Ryan v. State, 768 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), which was also relied upon by the court below. In that decision, the defendant requested a post-expiration continuance, which was granted. See id. at 20. Shortly thereafter, the defendant filed a notice of expiration. See id. The…
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State v. Montgomery, 68 So. 3d 342 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…court would not rule on the motion to amend the information until after the jury was sworn. The court rejected the state’s arguments and discharged the defendant. The court gave two reasons for its decision. First, the court, citing Ryan v. State, 768 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), reasoned that the state could not nolle prosse the case during the recapture period and then re-file the case to avoid the speedy trial rule. Second, the court, without the benefit of a transcript, recalled the state saying at th…
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Palmer v. State, 76 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…n court noted the following two decisions holding that the State was precluded from exercising its recapture rights under rule 3.191 and applying the nullity princi- [*1021] pie: State v. Leslie, 699 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), and Ryan v. State, 768 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). See Nelson, 26 So. 3d at 578. The supreme court observed that in Leslie, the defendant’s postexpiration continuance was a nullity because the State had failed to refile charges against the defendant within the speedy trial perio…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1995)
- State v. Agee, 622 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1993)
- Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1986)
- Brown v. State, 515 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1987)
- Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Muller v. State, 387 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- State v. Norris H. Leslie, 699 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Rivas v. Honorable Henry L. Oppenborn, Jr., 605 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Arazo v. State, 682 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Mercer v. Hon. Victor Musleh, 682 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)