HILLIARD R. SIEGEL, APPELLANT,
v.
CHRISTINE M. SIEGEL, APPELLEE
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In a post-dissolution contempt proceeding, the court held that a former spouse's individual retirement account (IRA) may be considered by a trial court when determining whether the spouse has the present ability to pay a purge amount, despite the statutory exemption of IRAs from creditor claims under Florida law.
A trial court may properly consider a former spouse's IRA account in determining present ability to pay a purge amount in a contempt order. The statutory exemption for IRAs from creditor claims does not shield IRA assets from court orders to pay Chapter 61 obligations, because Chapter 61 demonstrates a legislative intent to treat retirement accounts as marital assets subject to division and to satisfy family support obligations.
[1] A trial court may consider an individual retirement account (IRA) when determining a former spouse's present ability to pay a purge amount in a post-dissolution contempt…
[2] Statutory exemptions for IRA accounts from claims of creditors do not shield IRA assets from court orders to pay obligations arising under Chapter 61, Florida Statutes.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court is not limited to the amount of cash immediately available to the contemnor; rather, the court may look to all assets from which the amount might be obtained.”
Establishes the broad discretion of trial courts in determining ability to pay, requiring consideration of all available assets, not just liquid funds.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe former husband was ordered to pay a purge amount in a contempt order arising from non-payment of Chapter 61 obligations (family support obligation…
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GROSS, Judge.
We affirm the post-dissolution contempt order. Of the issues raised by the former husband, we write to address only one— whether the trial court was precluded by statutory exemption from considering individual retirement accounts in determining whether the former husband had the present ability to pay the purge amount set forth in the contempt order. In a Chapter 61 contempt proceeding a trial court may properly look to a former spouse’s individual retirement account to determine whether that spouse has the ability to pay a purge amount in a contempt order. Contrary to appellant’s argument, the section 222.21(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), exemption of an IRA account from “all claims of creditors” does not shield IRA assets from a court order to pay Chapter 61 obligations.
Chapter 61 demonstrates the intent to pour IRA accounts into the family pot for division or to meet obligations imposed by the chapter. Section 61.076(1), Florida Statutes (1995), declares “all ... funds accrued during the marriage in retirement ... plans” to be marital assets subject to equitable distribution. Section 61.30(2)(a)7, Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), requires that pension, retirement or annuity payments be included as gross income in determining child support obligations.
In Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274, 1279 (Fla.1985), the supreme court stated that in determining whether a eontemnor possesses the ability to pay a purge amount, “the trial court is not limited to the amount of cash immediately available to the contemnor; rather, the court may look to all assets from which the amount might be obtained.” Under Chapter 61 and Bowen, an IRA is not a safe haven where a former spouse can hoard assets while, at the same time, argue that he does not have the present ability to pay a purge amount in a contempt order arising from the non-payment of obligations due under the chapter. Because a person can obtain access to funds in an IRA account, a trial court may properly look to that account as a source of funds to satisfy a purge amount in a contempt order. In a similar context, this court has affirmed a trial court’s order requiring a former spouse to sell a residence to meet alimony obligations, even though the home qualified as a homestead under Article 10, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution. Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 582 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). In its reasoning, Gepfrich quoted the following language from Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So. 2d 652 (Fla.1950), which recognizes that exemption statutes are not generally construed to defeat obligations for family support:
The Courts have taken the view that inasmuch as the purpose of the exemption statute is to protect not only the husband but also his family from destitution and becoming a public charge, the exemption statute will not, unless the contrary intention is clearly shown, be construed to enable the husband to claim its benefit against the very persons to whom he owes the obligation of support and maintenance, and that to construe the statute otherwise would, at least in part, defeat its avowed object.
Id. at 655.
For these reasons, the statutory exemption in section 222.21(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), does not apply in this case.
GLICKSTEIN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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Spector v. Robert L. Spector, Robert L. Spector, P.A., 226 So. 3d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…argues that a fourth exception, alimony creditors, has long been recognized. We agree. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1950); Wilbur v. Wilbur, 981 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Partridge, 912 So. 2d at 649; Siegel v. Siegel, 700 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 582 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). The exception relating to alimony creditors is founded upon our supreme court’s conclusion more than one hundred years ago that the homestead protections “should not be…
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Walters v. Walters, 96 So. 3d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…rt also found that the Former Husband made a unilateral decision not to pay the Former Wife the full amount of alimony due, despite several financial accounts that held ample funds to make the payment. Under this court’s holding in Siegel v. Siegel, 700 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), a court has the authority to look at all the assets from which an alimony amount may be obtained to determine if the former spouse had the ability to pay. Id. at 415. In this case, the trial court looked at all of Former Husband…
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Jackson v. Jackson, 98 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…g that the Husband did not have access to the Vanguard account to pay the Wife the support it had ordered.3 In addition to the Vanguard account, the court could have found that the Husband has access to the $70,500 in his IRA, see Siegel v. Siegel, 700 So. 2d 414, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“Because a person can obtain access to funds in an IRA account, a trial court may properly look to that account as a source of funds to satisfy a purge amount in a contempt order.”), and the $46,500 in his annuity, see Koll…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Eugenia Bowen & the Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1985)
- Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1950)
- Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 582 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)