HARRY K. SINGLETARY, JR., SECRETARY OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLANT,
v.
TOMMY LEE DUNLAP, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This case concerns whether an inmate, compelled to testify in court via subpoena, should be penalized by losing incentive gain time. The appellate court found that the Department of Corrections has exclusive authority over gain time and the trial court erred in ordering its restoration.
Yes, the trial court erred. The Department of Corrections has exclusive authority to award, forfeit, or restore gain time, and the trial court improperly interfered with this authority.
[1] An inmate who is out of the Department of Corrections' custody on out-to-court status is not eligible to receive incentive gain-time for that period.
[2] The authority to award, forfeit, or restore gain-time resides exclusively within the Department of Corrections.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The authority to regulate gain-time resides exclusively within the Department of Corrections pursuant to chapter 944, Florida Statutes (1993).”
This quote establishes the legal basis for the Department's exclusive control over gain time.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTommy Lee Dunlap, an inmate, was subpoenaed to testify in a state case. He was transported from prison to the custody of the Sheriff. Upon his return,…
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DANAHY, Acting Chief Judge.
Tommy Lee Dunlap received a subpoena while he was an inmate serving a sentence in the custody of the Department of Corrections. This subpoena required his appearance in circuit court in Highlands County to testify on behalf of the State in the case of State v. Wooden. He was transported from the custody of the Department of Corrections to the custody of the Sheriff of Highlands County to testify in court. When he was returned to prison following his compliance with the subpoena, the Department of Corrections refused to grant him incentive gain time for the days he had been in the custody of the Sheriff of Highlands County. The Department claims that administrative rule establishes this policy and procedure. See Fla.Admin.Code R. 33-11.0065(5)(b) (“Inmates who are out of the department’s custo dy during the month on escape, out-to-court status, or on furlough shall not be eligible to receive incentive gain-time for that period of the month.”).
Dunlap filed a motion with the trial court in State v. Wooden to require the Department to restore his lost gain time as if he had remained in the Department’s custody.
The trial court granted his motion and filed the requested restoration of gain-time order without notice to the Department.
It may seem unfair for the State to cause the removal by subpoena of an inmate from the custody of the Department to be a State witness and then penalize the inmate by withholding gain time. Regardless of this, the Department had every right to do so, and the trial court erred by interfering with that right by restoring Dunlap’s gain-time. The authority to regulate gain-time resides exclusively within the Department of Corrections pursuant to chapter 944, Florida Statutes (1993). Only the Department has “the ability to award, forfeit, or restore gain-time.” State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925, 927 (Fla.1989); Singletary v. Coronado, 673 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SCHOONOVER and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Gerry B. Greene v. Tucker, 113 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…nal release, it is not required to restore the forfeited gain time; the defendant has no right or entitlement to the restoration. The Department simply cannot be compelled to restore Mr. Greene’s forfeited gain time. See, e.g., Singletary v. Dunlap, 701 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Second, although Mr. Greene demonstrated that the ICT had made one error in applying the Department’s rules to the facts of his case, the ICT articulated additional bases for disapproving Mr. Greene’s request. These other bases…
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Caparro v. State, 151 So. 3d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Singletary v. Dunlap, 701 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-601.101(5)-(6).…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1989)
- Singletary v. Coronado, 673 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)