SUSAN H. JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID PHILIP JONES, APPELLEE
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The Florida appellate court dismissed an appeal because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a final order adjusting the supplemental judgment while an appeal was already pending regarding a related non-final order. The decision reinforces that trial courts are divested of jurisdiction to enter final orders disposing of a case during pending appellate review.
The trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter the final order while the appeal was pending. Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(f), the trial court is divested of jurisdiction to enter a final order disposing of a case during the pendency of appellate review of a non-final order. The order rendered in violation of this rule is a nullity.
[1] A trial court is divested of jurisdiction to enter a final order disposing of a cause while an appeal of a non-final order in that cause is pending.
[2] An order rendered by a trial court during the pendency of an appeal of a non-final order is a nullity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“during the pendency of a review of a non-final order, the lower tribunal may proceed with all matters, including trial or final hearing; provided that the lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the cause pending such review.”
Establishes the core jurisdictional rule that trial courts cannot enter final orders while an appeal of a non-final order is pending.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSusan H. Jones and David Philip Jones divorced, and the trial court distributed their marital assets. Former Wife moved to set aside the asset distrib…
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from the trial court’s order on Former Husband’s motion to adjust the parties’ supplemental final judgment for distribution of marital assets and liabilities. The parties divorced, and the trial court distributed their assets. Former Wife moved to set aside the distribution, and the trial court denied the motion; Former Wife appealed. Pending that appeal, the trial court granted Former Husband’s motion to adjust the supplemental judgment on distribution.
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter a final order granting Former Husband’s motion to adjust the supplemental judgment on distribution during the pendency of Former Wife’s appeal from the trial court’s non-final order denying the motion to set aside the supplemental judgment.
We hold that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to render the instant final order while an appeal was pending in this court on the trial court’s previously rendered non-finál order. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(f) provides that “during the pendency of a review of a non-final order, the lower tribunal may proceed with all matters, including trial or final hearing; provided that the lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the cause pending such review.” Under subsection (f), therefore, the “lower tribunal is divested of jurisdiction to enter a final order disposing of the case” while an appeal is pending. Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(f)(Committee Notes).
See, e.g., Napoleonic Soc. of America, Inc. v. Snibbe, 696 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(appellate court sua sponte dismisses appeal of final order because “[rule] 9.130(f) prohibits the trial court from rendering a final order during the pendency of appellate review of a nonfinal order” — an order rendered in violation of rule 9.130(f) is a “nullity”); Soles v. Soles, 536 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)(this court quashed order modifying and clarifying order already on appeal because second order “directly addressed the substance of the matter appealed”).
Because the instant order on appeal is a nullity, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
BOOTH and WOLF, JJ., and CARITHERS, Associate Judge, concur.
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Kessler v. City OF Naples, 779 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…l court, therefore, was without jurisdiction to enter a final order dismissing this case while appellants’ first appeal was still pending in this court. See Napoleonic Soc’y of Am., Inc. v. Snibbe, 696 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Jones v. Jones, 703 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Since the order dismissing this case was entered without jurisdiction, it is a nullity. See Snibbe, 696 So. 2d 1243. We, therefore, vacate the final order dismissing this case and dismiss this appeal. Final order vacated; ap…
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Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Scylla Props., 946 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…ME Hosps., Inc., 791 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (citing the Committee Note to Rule 9.130(f) in ruling that the lower court loses jurisdiction to enter final judgment as long as an appeal from a non-final order is pending); Jones v. Jones, 703 So. 2d 501, 501 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“Under subsection (f), therefore, the ‘lower tribunal is divested of jurisdiction to enter a final order disposing of the case’ while an appeal [of a non-final order] is pending. Fla. R.[]App. P. 9.130(f)(Committee Notes).”…
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Garrison v. Vance, 103 So. 3d 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…not a party to this appeal. . We affirm the other jurisdictional issue raised by Ms. Garrison without further comment. . See, e.g., Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Scylla Props., LLC, 946 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). . See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 703 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Soles v. Soles, 536 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). . See Connor Realty, Inc. v. Ocean Terrace N. Condo. Ass’n, 572 So. 2d 4, 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) ("[A] trial court may proceed in a cause pending a non-final appeal and dispose…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Soles v. Soles, 536 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- The Napoleonic Soc'y OF Am., Inc. v. Snibbe, 696 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)