COCONUT GROVE CIVIC CLUB, A FLORIDA NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION, W. TUCKER GIBBS, AN INDIVIDUAL, AND JOHN WOODRUFF, AN INDIVIDUAL, APPELLANTS,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, A FLORIDA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, AND BUNKERS OF MIAMI, INC., A FLORIDA JOINT VENTURE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the agreement was a management agreement, not a lease, and therefore did not require a referendum for approval.
The City of Miami entered into a management agreement with Bunkers for a city-owned golf course after Bunkers submitted the only response to a request…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Standing To Sue cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The Coconut Grove Civic Club and two voters appeal an adverse summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action. We affirm.
The City of Miami has entered into a management agreement with appellee Bunkers of Miami Joint Venture for the management of the city-owned Mel Reese Golf Course. Bunkers submitted the only response to the city-issued Request for Qualifications, pursuant to which the City sought to identify a qualified firm which could manage the golf course.
Appellants contend that the management agreement is, in substance, a lease of the golf course to Bunkers. Under the City Charter, the City can enter into a lease of city-owned property without a referendum only if the City has received a minimum of three competitive bids. See Miami, Fla., Charter § 29(b). If there are less than three competitive bids, then the lease transaction must be approved by referendum. See id.
Appellants brought a declaratory judgment action, contending that the management agreement is, in substance, a lease which must be submitted to the voters for approval by referendum. From an adverse summary final judgment, this appeal has been lodged.
Although the City and Bunkers argue to the contrary, for present purposes we assume that the individual appellants have standing to pursue their claim.*
On the merits, however, we affirm. We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the agreement at issue here is, as stated, a management agreement rather than a lease. We have carefully considered appellants’ arguments to the contrary but are not persuaded thereby. Appellants’ unhappiness with the agreement is an issue which appellants must pursue with the appropriate city authorities, or otherwise in the political process.
Affirmed.
*
Appellants reason that refusal to submit a required item to referendum impairs the individual appellants' constitutionally protected right to vote. But see Smith v. City of Pinellas Park, 336 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Reid v. State, 799 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…idence. The State’s closing remarks were supported by the record, made in fair response to the comments made by appellant’s counsel during trial, or constituted harmless error. See Pino v. State, 776 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Jackson v. State, 703 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); see also Reyes v. State, 700 So. 2d 458, 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Craig v. State, 510 So. 2d 857 (Fla.1987). In his fourth point, appellant contends that the guilty verdicts on Counts I and II, attempted second degree murder of…
-
Johnson v. State, 801 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…’s attack on the officer’s credibility by reminding the jury that no one had shown any reason why the officer would lie. In fact, Johnson’s closing argument attacking the credibility of Officer Sanchez invited the state’s response. Jackson v. State, 703 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In any event, we deem any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986); Reyes, 700 So. 2d at 461. As our reasoning applies equally to both comments made by the state, we do not addr…
-
J.A.S. v. State, 952 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…of the backyard,” and fled when alarm sounded); M.S. v. State, 774 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (inferring intent through statutory presumption of stealthy entry where defendant ran from back exit of apartment late at night); Jackson v. State, 703 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (stating the “jury could have reasonably concluded that [defendant’s] unauthorized and unannounced entry into the victim’s house coupled with his immediate flight from the house, without explanation, when seen by the victim consti…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Smith v. City OF Pinellas Park, 336 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)