GEORGE W. SMITH AND WILDA SMITH, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
CITY OF PINELLAS PARK, FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Residents and taxpayers of Pinellas Park challenged a city council ordinance that shifted the appointment of police and fire chiefs from the city manager to the city council, arguing it altered the city's form of government without a required referendum. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had no immediate legal interest or present practical need for declaratory relief.
The residents and taxpayers lack standing to seek declaratory judgment because they have no real, immediate legal interest in such a declaration nor a present, bona fide practical need for it. While the ordinance may pro tanto alter the city's form of government, only those directly affected—such as the city manager or the chiefs of police and fire departments—would have justiciable claims.
[1] A declaratory judgment action requires a justiciable controversy, meaning a real, immediate legal interest and a present, bona fide practical need for the declaration.
[2] The mere possibility of future injury is insufficient to establish standing for a declaratory judgment.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the mere possibility of injury at some indeterminate time in the future does not support standing to seek a declaratory judgment”
Establishes the legal standard for standing in declaratory judgment actions—requires present injury, not speculative future harm.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePinellas Park operates under a City Council-Manager form of government established by city charter. The charter vests executive authority in the city …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants appeal the dismissal with prejudice of their action seeking a declaratory judgment. We affirm.
Appellee city is governed by what is known as a “City Council-Manager” form of government and the city charter so stipulates. Under the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, Ch. 166, F.S.1973, this form of government cannot be changed without referendum.1
Additionally, the charter vests the executive authority of the city in the city manager and the legislative authority in the city council. It also expressly gives the city manager the authority to appoint, hire and fire the chiefs of the police and fire departments. Notwithstanding these charter provisions, the city council enacted a civil service ordinance under which the “chiefs of the police and fire departments shall be appointed by the city council and shall be directly responsible to the city council with respect to duties and responsibilities.” No referendum was provided either to enact the ordinance or to ratify it after passage.
Appellants, as “residents, taxpayers, freeholders and electors” of the city, instituted this action seeking a declaratory judgment attacking the validity of the ordinance in that it has the net effect of altering “the form of government” of the city without the approval of the electors in a referendum as aforesaid.
We need not decide now whether the assailed ordinance materially alters the “form of government” of the city,2 although it clearly does so pro tanto to the extent that it changes the distribution of powers as between the city manager and the city council in the appointment of chiefs of the police and fire departments. Because of this pro tanto change we have serious doubts as to the validity of the ordinance and its enforceability.
But we must nevertheless agree with the trial judge that in the present posture of the matter there is no justiciable controversy between appellants and the city. The law is clear that the mere possibility of injury at some indeterminate time in the future does not support standing to seek a declaratory judgment.3 The city manager may have a right to complain of the ordinance, his appointing powers having been impaired; or the respective chiefs of the police or fire departments may have a right to have their duties and responsibilities thereunder judicially declared. But appellants have no real, immediate legal interest in such a declaration nor a present, bona fide practical need therefor.4 Along with those similarly situated, they would appear to be relegated to their remedies at the polls at the next ensuing election of the incumbent city council.
In view whereof, the order appealed from dismissing appellants’ petition for declaratory judgment should be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
McNULTY, C. J., and BOARDMAN and SCHEB, JJ., concur. . Section 166.021(4), F.S.1973.
. Out of fourteen administrative departments of the city, only the police and fire departments are affected by the ordinance in question.
. Cf. Williams v. Howard (Fla.1976), 329 So. 2d 277; Jack Eckerd Corp. v. Michels Island Village Pharmacy, Inc. (Fla.App.2d, 1975), 322 So. 2d 57.
. Id.
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Apthorp v. Detzner, 162 So. 3d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…, Inc. v. L & W Supply Corp., 790 So. 2d 539, 544 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“A court will not issue a declaratory judgment that is in essence an advisory opinion based on hypothetical facts that may arise in the future.”); Smith v. City of Pinellas Park, 336 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (“The law is clear that the mere possibility of injury at some indeterminate time in the future does not support standing to seek a declaratory judgment.”). Our conclusion that no case or controversy exists in this case nece…
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Coconut Grove Civic Club v. City OF Miami, 703 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…rities, or otherwise in the political process. Affirmed. * Appellants reason that refusal to submit a required item to referendum impairs the individual appellants' constitutionally protected right to vote. But see Smith v. City of Pinellas Park, 336 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).…
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Sumter Cnty. v. Davis, 356 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…d direct interest in the result sought by the action. In addition, the dispute must be justiciable in the sense that it be based upon some definite assertion of right. 9A Fla.Jur., Declaratory Actions § 13 (1972). In Smith v. City of Pinellas Park, 336 So. 2d 1255 (Fla.2d DCA 1976) the court held that plaintiffs had no standing to seek a declaratory judgment attacking the validity of an ordinance where no justiciable controversy existed. The court held that plaintiffs/appellants “have no real, immediate legal…
Authorities Cited
- J. H. "Jim" Williams v. Howard, 329 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1976)
- Jack Eckerd Corp. v. Michels Island Vill. Pharmacy, Inc., 322 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)