LEONARDO KYLES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court reversed the trial court's designation of Kyles as a sexual predator for lack of necessary predicate convictions, but affirmed the revocation of his community control because the alleged error regarding findings was neither preserved nor fundamental.
A defendant cannot be designated a sexual predator under Florida's Sexual Predators Act without the necessary predicate convictions.
[1] A defendant lacks standing to challenge the trial court's failure to make oral pronouncements or written findings regarding specific community control violations when suc…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKyles' community control was revoked, and the trial court designated him a sexual predator. The State conceded on appeal that Kyles lacked the require…
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PER CURIAM.
In this appeal, which stems from the revocation of Kyles’ community control, we have two issues for consideration: the trial court’s designation of Kyles as a sexual predator pursuant to Florida’s Sexual Predators Act and the trial court’s failure to make either an oral pronouncement or written findings as to which of the alleged violations of community control he found Kyles guilty. We reverse the trial court’s order designating Kyles a sexual predator because he does not have the necessary predicate convictions, a fact that the State has conceded on appeal. See § 775.22, Fla. Stat. (1995).1 We affirm, however, the revocation of Kyles’ community control as the alleged error was neither preserved nor fundamental. See § 924.051(l)(b), (3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996).
REVERSED IN PART and AFFIRMED IN PART.
STONE, C.J., and DELL and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. . Florida’s Sexual Predators Act has been amended and sections 775.22, 775.225, and 775.23 repealed. Ch. 96-388, §§ 61-62, at 2366, Laws of Fla. (1996). The statute as amended, however, looks to the now repealed sections 775.22 and 775.23 to define the predicate offenses necessary for classification as a sexual predator with regard to offenses committed on or after October 1, 1993, and before October 1, 1995. See § 775.21(4), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996).
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State v. Ellis D. Colley, 744 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…tions 775.22 and 775.23 to define the predicate offenses necessary to classify an offender as a sexual predator for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1993, and before October 1, 1995. See § 775.21(4), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996); Kyles v. State, 703 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Former section 775.23(2)(a) defines a sexual predator as an offender who is convicted of, or who pleads nolo contendere or guilty to, any capital, life, or first-degree felony violation of chapter 794 or section 847.0145, Florid…
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Moossun v. Orlando Reg'l Health Care, 826 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 2002)…PER CURIAM. We have for review Moossun v. Orlando Regional Health Care, 760 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), based on conflict with the decisions in Charyulu v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), Brown v. Meyers, 702 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), and Samuels v. Palm Beach Motor Cars Limited by Simpson, Inc., 618 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), on the issue of whether a trial court’s order setting a case management confe…1 / 4
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