ELI SCARLETT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1997-10-22
No. 96-4131
WARNER and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
704 So. 2d 615 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1997) Caution
Cited by 20 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Scarlett's conviction for marijuana possession with intent to sell and drug paraphernalia possession. The court held that expert testimony regarding drug quantity and packaging as indicators of intent to sell is admissible, distinguishing it from impermissible testimony about general drug dealer behavioral patterns.


Holding

Expert testimony regarding whether the quantity and packaging of drugs indicate an intent to sell is admissible. Such testimony is not barred by precedent condemning general behavioral pattern testimony about drug dealers, as it provides specialized knowledge not within common juror understanding and serves a legitimate probative purpose rather than placing prejudicial inferences before the jury.


Headnotes

[1] Expert testimony regarding the quantity and packaging of drugs is admissible to assist the trier of fact in determining whether the drugs were intended for sale.

[2] Testimony concerning general behavioral patterns of drug dealers is inadmissible as it may place prejudicial and misleading inferences before the jury.

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Key Quotes

“We have repeatedly condemned the admission of testimony by police officers about general behavioral patterns of drug dealers. "[E]very defendant has the right to be tried based on the evidence against him, not on the characteristics or conduct of certain classes of criminals in general."”

Establishes the rule against impermissible general drug dealer behavior testimony, cited from Wheeler v. State

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Facts & Procedural History

Police discovered eleven individually packed baggies of marijuana on the appellant. A detective testified as an expert witness that the quantity and p…

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Opinion of the Court
STONE, Chief Judge.

STONE, Chief Judge.

We affirm Appellant’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to sell and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by permitting a detective to testify regarding how marijuana is normally packaged for sale, and that the eleven individually packed baggies of marijuana found on Appellant were packaged for sale and not individual use. The detective was qualified as an expert witness in the area of street level marijuana possession and sales.

Appellant claims that this court disapproved of such testimony in Wheeler v. State, 690 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). In Wheeler, we held that the court erred by allowing an officer to testify about the cocaine-selling reputation of the area in which defendant was arrested, and about general drug dealer behavior. The state elicited testimony that people dealing with drugs stand on the corners and street edges, as well as testimony on other procedures common to drug transactions. This court admonished the trial court for allowing such testimony, stating:

We have repeatedly condemned the admission of testimony by police officers about general behavioral patterns of drug dealers. “[E]very defendant has the right to be tried based on the evidence against him, not on the characteristics or conduct of certain classes of criminals in general.” The only purpose of the testimony regarding criminal behavioral patterns “is to place prejudicial and misleading inferences in front of the jury.”

Id. at 1371 [citations omitted]. See also Dean v. State, 690 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (reversible error where court admitted testimony of police detective concerning general behavioral patterns of drug dealers); Thomas v. State, 673 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (reversible error where state elicited testimony from detective that often one individual is actually in possession of the drugs while another person collects the money); Shelton v. State, 654 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (reversible error where officer testified that money marked for identification was not always recovered).

However, these cases do not represent a departure from the general rule that an expert is permitted to testify when “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue.” § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (1995). Courts have long recognized that a police officer, when properly qualified as an expert, may testify regarding whether drugs were intended for personal use or for sale, based on the amount and packaging of the drugs. See Bruce v. State, 616 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (evidence was sufficient to justify the jury’s conclusion that defendant intended to sell the cocaine where defendant had thirteen rocks, individually wrapped in clear plastic baggies, and the state presented the expert testimony of an experienced narcotics officer who stated that the quantity involved indicated that the crack was for sale); Baten v. State, 579 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (evidence was sufficient to support conviction where officer stated that most cocaine users only carry a maximum of three rocks of cocaine on then-person, and officer was convinced that defendant intended to sell them because he had so many rocks in two different baggies, of sale-able, commercial street size); K.J. v. State, 557 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (the large amount of marijuana and the way it was packaged supports the inference that it was not intended for defendant’s personal use but rather for resale); K.M. v. State, 545 So. 2d 464, 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“The state presented evidence — the officers’ expert testimony and the packaging of the drugs— from which the trial court could have concluded that K.M. intended to sell the cocaine _”).

We conclude that expert testimony regarding whether the quantity and packaging of drugs indicate an intent to sell is admissible, as this information is not a matter well within the common knowledge of the jurors, and the purpose of such testimony is not “to place prejudicial and misleading inferences in front of the jury.” Nowitzke v. State, 572 So. 2d 1346, 1356 (Fla.1990). As to Appellant’s second issue on appeal, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion and hereby affirm Appellant’s judgment of conviction.

WARNER and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Lewis v. State, 754 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
    …1998) (experts in street-level narcotics sales were properly allowed to testify about whether cocaine and cannabis confiscated from defendant’s apartment were intended for personal use or for sale, based on amount and packaging); Scarlett v. State, 704 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (detective, who was qualified as expert in area of street-level marijuana possession and sales, was properly allowed to testify regarding whether quantity and packaging of drugs indicated intent to sell, where such information wa…
  • Prescott v. State, 753 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
    …potential place of sale. We also find no abuse of discretion in permitting a properly qualified witness to testify about whether drugs were intended for personal use or for sale based on the amount and packaging of the drugs. See Scarlett v. State, 704 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), rev. denied, No. 92028, 717 So. 2d 537 (Fla.1998); Bruce v. State, 616 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Baten v. State, 579 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). We note that in the instant case Appellant does not question the witnesses…
  • Alphonzo Glenn v. State, 824 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
    …caine rock[s] and not sell them. The court denied the motion. On appeal, appellant claims that there was no evidence, circumstantial or direct, to support a conviction for possession with intent to sell or deliver. We agree. In Scarlett v. State, 704 So. 2d 615, 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), review denied, 717 So. 2d 537 (Fla.1998), this court held that a police officer, when properly qualified as an expert, may testify regarding whether drugs were intended for personal use or for sale, based on the amount and…

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