ROY WEBSTER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Roy Webster appeals his convictions and sentences for two counts of aggravated assault. The court affirmed his convictions but reversed and remanded the sentencing to strike a $10,000 fine and $600 in court costs imposed along with a habitual felony offender sentence, finding they were not statutorily authorized.
The court held that: (1) a fine under section 775.083 cannot be imposed in addition to a habitual offender sentence under section 775.084 because section 775.084 contains no authorization for such dual sentencing, unlike section 775.083 which permits fines in addition to section 775.082 sentences; and (2) court costs must be assessed per case, not per count, and must be supported by statutory authority clearly reflected in the written sentencing order.
[1] A fine cannot be statutorily imposed in addition to a habitual felony offender sentence when the legislature has not explicitly authorized such dual sentencing.
[2] Imposing both a habitual offender sentence and a fine without explicit statutory authority constitutes an illegal sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“nothing in section 775.084 authorizes that sentencing be imposed under that statute in addition to the punishment described in section 775.082.”
Establishes the statutory gap preventing imposition of fines alongside habitual offender sentences
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWebster was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and sentenced as a habitual felony offender to ten years' imprisonment with a mandatory mini…
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BLUE, Acting Chief Judge.
Roy Webster appeals his convictions and sentences for two counts of aggravated assault. Webster raises eight issues on appeal, however only the two issues relating to his sentences have merit. With regard to the remaining issues, we affirm Webster’s convictions without further discussion.
Webster was sentenced as a habitual felony offender under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1995), to ten years’ imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of five years for each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. In addition, he was ordered to pay a fine under section 775.088, Florida Statutes (1995), of $10,000 ($5000 per count), and to pay court costs of $600 ($300 per count). Webster asserts the $10,000 fine is not statutorily authorized when assessed in addition to a habitual felony offender sentence. He further asserts the $600 in costs must be stricken because the court did not cite any statutory authority for imposing these costs in either its oral pronouncement or written sentence, and in any event, costs must be assessed per case not per count.
Fines imposed pursuant to section 775.083 are authorized when assessed “in addition to any punishment described in s. 775.082.” § 775.083(1). However, there is no comparable authorization in either section 775.083 or section 775.084 that would allow a fine to be assessed in addition to punishment imposed under section 775.084, the habitual offender statute. In King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla.1996), the supreme court stated:
Both imprisonment under section 775.082 and a fine under section 775.083 may be imposed for a single offense because section 775.083 specifically provides that “[a] person who has been convicted of an offense other than a capital felony may be sentenced to pay a fine in addition to any punishment described in s. 775.082.” § 775.083(1), Fla. Stat. (1989); * * * * However, nothing in section 775.084 authorizes that sentencing be imposed under that statute in addition to the punishment described in section 775.082.
King, 681 So. 2d at 1139-40. The court went on to find that a sentencing judge may impose either a habitual offender sentence or a guidelines sentence, but not both. See id. at 1140.
On that basis, the trial court had no statutory authority to sentence Webster to both a habitual offender sentence under section 775.084 and a fine under section 775.083. The legislature has not specifically authorized the imposition of a fine in addition to a habitual offender sentence in the same way that it has authorized a fine to be imposed in addition to a guidelines sentence. Without explicit statutory authority, imposing both a fine and a habitual offender sentence exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by statute, and therefore constitutes an illegal sentence. As such, the $10,000 fine imposed by the trial court must be stricken.
The court also imposed $600 in costs without identifying any statutory authority in its oral pronouncement or written sentence. While a trial court may impose mandatory court costs without orally announcing the statutory authority at the sentencing hearing, the written order must reflect the statutory authority upon which the costs are imposed. See Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); see also Smith v. State, 686 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). In addition, statutory costs must be assessed per case, not per count. See Mills v. State, 672 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Rafael v. State, 679 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), approved, 688 So. 2d 335 (Fla.1997). Because the court failed to include the proper statutory authority for the assessment of costs in its written sentencing order, the $600 for costs must be stricken.
Webster’s convictions are affirmed, and his sentences are reversed in part and remanded to the trial court to strike the $10,000 fine and $600 costs.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to correct the sentences.
NORTHCUTT, J., and FICARROTTA, GASPER J., Associate Judge, concur.
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Brenton McNeil v. State, 215 So. 3d 55 (Fla. 2017)…th DCA 1994)); majority op. at 59-60 (citing Mills v. State, 672 So. 2d 873, 873-74 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)); see also McNeil, 162 So. 3d at 281 (Sawaya, J., dissenting) (citing Stickles v. State, 44 So. 3d 653, 654 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Webster v. State, 705 So. 2d 970, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Van Vorous v. State, 696 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Seeker v. State, 674 So. 2d 853, 853 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Neal v. State, 669 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Stephens v. State, 667 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla.…1 / 2
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Floyd v. State, 739 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…as fined $10,000. However, section 775.084 does not authorize any fines. Consequently, the imposition of the fine, in addition to the habitual offender sentence, exceeds the maximum allowed by the statute, and must be reversed. See Webster v. State, 705 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). On remand, the trial court is directed to strike the $10,000 fine. Floyd’s presence at the resentencing is not required. Reversed and remanded. THREADGILL, A.C.J., and FULMER and STRINGER, JJ., Concur.…
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Willits v. State, 884 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…ction 775.084 does not authorize any fines. The imposition of a fine in addition to the habitual offender sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by the statute and must be reversed. Floyd v. State, 739 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Webster v. State, 705 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). On remand, the trial court must strike the $268 fine plus the 5% surcharge. Willits’ presence at the resentencing is not required. Reversed in part; affirmed in part; and remanded. WHATLEY and VILLANTI, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1996)
- Smith v. State, 686 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Rafael v. State, 679 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Mills v. State, 672 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Rafael v. State, 688 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 1997)