EDWARD M. WILLITS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2004-04-07
No. 2D03-5162
WHATLEY and VILLANTI, JJ., concur.
884 So. 2d 73 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2004) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that a sentence for armed robbery imposed under the habitual felony offender statute is illegal if it includes a fine, as the statute does not authorize fines.


Facts & Procedural History

Edward M. Willits was sentenced as a habitual felony offender for armed robbery, aggravated battery, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The sente…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
WALLACE, Judge.

WALLACE, Judge.

Edward M. Willits challenges the order of the trial court summarily denying his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Because the sentence imposed on Willits exceeds the statutory maximum, we reverse as to his first claim. We affirm without comment as to his second claim.

On March 30, 1994, pursuant to a plea of no contest, Willits was sentenced to a term of natural life with a minimum mandatory of three years for the armed robbery, thirty years with a three-year minimum mandatory for the aggravated battery, and thirty years for the possession of a firearm by a felon. He had been designated as a habitual felony offender pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1993). All sentences were to run concurrently. The sentencing documents for the armed robbery charge reflect that Willits was or dered to pay a fíne of $268 plus $13.40 as the 5% surcharge required by section 960.25, Florida Statutes (1993), as well as $273.45 plus other fees as ordered by the court as restitution.

Willits is correct in claiming that his sentence for armed robbery is illegal because section 775.084 does not authorize any fines. The imposition of a fine in addition to the habitual offender sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by the statute and must be reversed. Floyd v. State, 739 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Webster v. State, 705 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). On remand, the trial court must strike the $268 fine plus the 5% surcharge. Willits’ presence at the resentencing is not required.

Reversed in part; affirmed in part; and remanded.

WHATLEY and VILLANTI, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Dadds v. State, 946 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
    …95). Because the trial court did not make that pronouncement, the $500 fine and $25 surcharge cannot stand. Thus, we reverse the imposition of the $525 fine and surcharge and remand with directions that they be stricken. See, e.g., Willits v. State, 884 So. 2d 73, 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (remanding for trial court to strike fine and surcharge and noting that defendant’s presence at resen-tencing was not required). Relying on section 938.06, Florida Statutes (2004), the trial court also imposed a $20 mandator…
  • Baker v. State, 941 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
    …is illegal to impose a discretionary fine under section 775.083 in a case in which the rest of the sentence is imposed pursuant to the habitual offender provisions in section 775.084. See King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla.1996); Willits v. State, 884 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Webster v. State, 705 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). In Floyd v. State, 739 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), this court appeared to extend the holding in Webster to apply to a fine imposed under the 1991 version of section 893.13…
  • Rudolph v. State, 968 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …a facially sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his counsel’s failure to object to the sentence. There was a legitimate basis for counsel to object to the sentence based on the imposition of the fine, see Willits v. State, 884 So. 2d 73, 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (noting that “section 775.084 does not authorize any fines”), and Rudolph received an illegal sentence as a result of counsel’s deficiency. See Penn v. State, 941 So. 2d 466, 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“[T]he appellant raised a…

Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw