REGINALD A. KIT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Reginald Kit appeals a trial court order assessing attorney's fees and costs incurred during his postconviction motion representation. The court reverses because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the fee order after Kit had filed his notice of appeal.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to assess the attorney's fees and costs because the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to assess fees and costs unless the trial court reserved jurisdiction to do so before the appeal was filed.
[1] A trial court is divested of jurisdiction to assess fees and costs when a notice of appeal is filed, unless jurisdiction is expressly reserved.
[2] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to award attorney's fees and costs after a notice of appeal has been filed.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to assess fees and costs and that these fees and costs cannot be reassessed unless the trial court reserved jurisdiction to do so at the sentencing hearing”
Establishes the core jurisdictional rule that bars post-appeal fee assessments absent prior reservation of jurisdiction
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court appointed attorney Mara Mandell to represent Kit on a postconviction motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Afte…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
PARKER, Chief Judge.
Reginald A. Kit appeals the final judgment assessing attorney’s fees and costs. We reverse because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter the order. The trial court appointed Mara Mandell to represent Kit on his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Mandell represented Kit at an evidentiary hearing. Kit specifically requested that Mandell be appointed in this case. At the hearing, the trial court did not expressly reserve jurisdiction to enter a judgment for fees and costs. After the trial court denied Kit’s postconviction motion, he appealed.
While Kit’s case was on appeal, Mandell filed a petition for attorney’s fees and costs with itemized expenditures relating to the representation of Kit. The County Attorney’s Office was noticed, but there is no indication on the motion that Kit was noticed.
The trial court signed an order authorizing payment of attorney’s fees and costs, noticing Mandell and the County Attorney’s Office, but not Kit. The final judgment assessing attorney’s fees and costs was signed on the same day. Mandell, the County Attorney’s Office, and Kit received notice of the judgment. Kit subsequently requested a hearing on his objection to the final judgment assessing attorney’s fees and costs. A telephone hearing was held on Kit’s objection to the assessment of fees and costs due Mandell. Thereafter, the trial court signed an order denying Kit’s objection to the final judgment for fees and costs.
In Sewar v. State, 640 So. 2d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), this court concluded that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to assess fees and costs and that these fees and costs cannot be reassessed unless the trial court reserved jurisdiction to do so at the sentencing hearing. In this ease, the trial court did not reserve jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees and costs. Mandell filed the petition for attorney’s fees and costs after Kit filed his notice of appeal.
Accordingly, under Sewar, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose the costs and fees and cannot, on remand, reimpose them. See Gatlin v. State, 618 So. 2d 765, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (trial court without jurisdiction to impose fees and costs and could only impose fees and costs on remand if jurisdiction had been reserved).
We note that Sewar is in conflict with Wyatt v. State, 652 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), and certify conflict.
Reversed and remanded.
CAMPBELL and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Wilson v. State, 814 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…luding a ruling on Wilson’s subsequently filed motion to "withdraw his plea. While there are exceptions to the general rule that filing a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction, those exceptions do not apply here. See Kit v. State, 705 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Clark v. State, 720 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). This court on direct appeal cannot take jurisdiction over a challenge to the voluntariness of a plea unless the defendant has first filed in the trial court a motion to withdra…
-
Woods v. State, 879 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…ion remains with the trial court. See Lee v. State, 785 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Wyatt v. State, 652 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The Second District Court adopts the view that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction. See Kit v. State, 705 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Sewar v. State, 640 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We adopt the view espoused by the Second District Court as the better-reasoned approach and hold that the trial court loses jurisdiction to conduct a fee hearing and render an o…
Authorities Cited
- Gatlin v. State, 618 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Sewar v. State, 640 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Wyatt v. State, 652 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)