NANA GEBAUER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, BY AND ON BEHALF OF ROGER P. HURLBURT, JR., APPELLEE
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A Florida appellate court reversed the denial of a mother's petition to reduce child support obligations, holding that while subsequent children are generally not grounds for deviation from guideline support, an exception exists when special circumstances—such as a subsequent child's serious disability requiring significant financial support—are present.
The court reversed and remanded, holding that while Florida Statutes section 61.30(12) provides that subsequent children should not "as a general rule" be considered as a basis for deviating from guidelines, the statute's language indicates the rule is not inflexible and exceptions exist for special circumstances such as a subsequent child's disability requiring greater than normal financial support.
[1] Subsequent children are not a general reason for courts to depart from guideline child support.
[2] The legislature's use of "as a general rule" in child support statutes indicates that the rule is not inflexible.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The existence of such subsequent children should not as a general rule be considered by the court as a basis for disregarding the amount provided in the guidelines”
Statutory language establishing the general rule while indicating through "as a general rule" that exceptions are contemplated
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant mother's original child support obligation was based on her ability to earn $23,000 annually. After that determination, her subsequent d…
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KLEIN, Judge.
This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for downward modification of child support. The appellant mother argues, and we agree, that this case presents an exception to the general rule that subsequent children are not a reason for courts to depart from guideline child support.
Appellant’s original child support was grounded on her ability to' earn $23,000 a year. Following that determination there was a change in the health of her subsequent daughter who had rheumatoid arthritis. Her daughter’s condition became so serious that the child is required to take steroids and chemotherapy treatments which have the side effect of suppressing the child’s immune system.
Appellant offered proof that her daughter’s physical condition has severely worsened, preventing her from attending school or daycare, that the needs of her child are so compelling that she is unable to work, that her daughter has been determined to be disabled for purposes of social security benefits, and that she and her husband had income of $7,652 for 1995 and have been receiving food stamps and other welfare assistance.
Section 61.30(12), Florida Statutes (1993) does not prohibit consideration of subsequent children, but rather provides that:
The existence of such subsequent children should not as a general rule be considered by the court as a basis for disregarding the amount provided in the guidelines, (emphasis added). '
In Robinson v. Robinson, 657 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), the first district reversed a trial court for deviating from the child support guidelines because the father had a baby with his new wife, but explained:
We therefore, hold that absent some special circumstance, the presence of a subsequent child will not justify a deviation from support guidelines.3
By placing the words “as a general rule” in the statute, the legislature indicated that the rule was not inflexible. The first district recognized that in Robinson, and this case fits precisely within the exception contemplated in the Robinson opinion. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FARMER, and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. For instance, a disability or other circumstance which would require greater than normal financial support for the subsequent child, [footnote in original]