STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
BRIAN E. LADRIG, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1998-02-20
No. 97-01452
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.
707 So. 2d 819 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Florida appeals a trial court's dismissal of drug possession charges against Ladrig based on insufficient evidence of knowledge. The appellate court reverses, holding that knowledge of contraband is typically a jury question unsuitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss.


Holding

The court held that the factual issue of whether Ladrig knew the package contained a controlled substance was a question for the jury to decide and not properly subject to dismissal under the motion to dismiss rule.


Headnotes

[1] A traverse filed by the state in response to a motion to dismiss under Rule 3.190(c)(4) must dispute the defendant's factual allegations by alleging additional facts that…

[2] A trial court errs in granting a motion to dismiss if the state's traverse alleges additional facts that place the defendant's knowledge of the contraband's presence in d…

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Key Quotes

“A factual issue was raised as to whether the appellee had the requisite knowledge that the package he accepted contained contraband.”

Establishes that knowledge is a factual question for the jury in drug possession cases

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Facts & Procedural History

An informant in Texas revealed that a package containing marijuana would be delivered to Ladrig's address under the name 'Tom Robbins' via UPS. When a…

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Opinion of the Court
GREEN, Judge.

GREEN, Judge.

The state appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss filed by the appellee, Brian E. Ladrig. Appellee was charged with possession of marijuana exceeding twenty grams, possession of parapherna lia, and possession of marijuana, less than twenty grams. Appellee moved to dismiss the information pursuant to Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.190(e)(4). The state filed a traverse. A hearing was held and the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Since the issue of knowledge of the presence of a drug was a question for the jury, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The following factual allegations were adduced at the hearing: the Pinellas Country Sheriffs Office received information from agent Richard Estipinol, U.S. Customs Service, that an informant in Brownsville, Texas, revealed that a package containing marijuana would be delivered to the appellee. Agent Estipinol stated that the package was to be delivered via United Parcel Service and was addressed to Detail Supply, Inc., do Tom Robbins, at appellee’s home address.

When delivery was made by an undercover officer to appellee’s residence, the officer asked appellee if he was expecting a package from Brownsville, to which the appellee replied yes. Appellee was then asked if he was Mr. Robbins, to whom the package was addressed. Appellee answered that he was Mr. Robbins, despite the fact that appellee’s last name is Ladrig.

Approximately fifteen minutes later, appel-lee departed his residence and placed the package in his vehicle. At this point,- appel-lee was arrested. A search warrant was obtained and the package revealed twenty eight pounds of marijuana. An additional search warrant was obtained for the appel-lee’s residence.

The trial court granted the appellee’s motion to dismiss based solely on the fact that there was not "sufficient indicia of knowledge to take this case to a jury.” The state filed a timely notice of appeal.

A factual issue was raised as to whether the appellee had the requisite knowledge that the package he accepted contained contraband. The issue of knowledge of the presence of a drug is usually an ultimate question that the jury must decide on factual inferences and is not subject to a motion to dismiss under Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.190(c)(4). See State v. Duran, 550 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); see also State v. Dickerson, 634 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). This case presented no exceptional facts that would make this general rule inapplicable. Therefore, the factual issue as to whether appellee knew the package contained a controlled substance was one for the jury to decide.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent herewith.

Reversed and remanded.

THREADGILL, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Nedd v. State, 965 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …ss in detail Mr. Nedd’s remaining claims. However, concerning his acquittal argument, we note that ”[t]he issue of knowledge of the presence of a drug is usually an ultimate question that the jury must decide on factual inferences.” State v. Ladrig, 707 So. 2d 819, 820 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). We also observe that Mr. Nedd raised issues dealing with the sentence imposed after his 2004 trial. A postconviction court previously denied relief on motions filed pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.800 and…
  • Helms v. State, 38 So. 3d 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
    …only real question for the jury in this case was defendant’s state of mind. Whether the evidence sufficiently demonstrates a state of mind or establishes a specific intent is considered a question of fact for the jury to decide. See State v. Ladrig, 707 So. 2d 819, 820 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating “[t]he issue of knowledge [ ] is usually an ultimate question that the jury must decide on factual inferences”); see also Nedd v. State, 965 So. 2d 1287 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Accordingly, if the jury could reasona…

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