D.L.B., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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D.L.B., a juvenile adjudicated delinquent under Florida's affray statute, challenged both the statute's constitutionality and aspects of his disposition hearing. The court upheld the affray statute as not impermissibly vague but found error in the disposition hearing's conduct and the imposition of a fine after oral waiver.
The affray statute is not impermissibly vague as it sufficiently defines prohibited conduct for ordinary people to understand. The disposition hearing contained error regarding the court's failure to clarify sentencing terms between the two offenses and failure to specify the term of community control and maximum commitment term. The $50 fine must be stricken as it conflicts with the court's oral pronouncement of waiver.
[1] A criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it defines the offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited a…
[2] The common law meaning of affray, fighting in a public place to the terror of the people, is sufficiently definite to withstand a vagueness challenge.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to overcome a void-for-vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must define the offense 'with sufficient definiteness that ordinary [people] can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating constitutional vagueness challenges to statutes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceD.L.B. was found delinquent under Florida's affray statute (§ 870.01(1)) and another charge related to disrupting a school function. At the dispositio…
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CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant, a juvenile who was found to be delinquent under the affray statute (§ 870.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1995)), challenges the statute as unconstitutionally vague. He also maintains that the court erred by failing to conduct his delinquency disposition hearing properly, by imposing an indefinite term of community control and by imposing a fine after orally announcing that a fine would not be imposed. While we conclude that the affray statute is not impermissibly vague and that the delinquency disposition hearing was not properly conducted, we also conclude that thé sentence imposed must be clarified and the $50 fine must be stricken.
Florida has adopted the common law meaning of affray, which is that affray is fighting in a public place to the terror of the people. See O.A. v. State, 312 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). See also D.J. v. State, 651 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In order to overcome a void-for-vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must define the offense “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). Given the fact that readily available dictionaries define “affray” as a public fight or brawl, we conclude that the term “affray” is defined with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited. Moreover, we can conceive of no manner in which the affray statute would be arbitrarily or dis-criminatorily enforced due to the definition of the term “affray.” We conclude that the affray statute is not impermissibly vague.
The statute provides that, before committing the juvenile, the court must consider the restrictiveness level recommended by the Department. Here, after the court rejected the Department’s community control recommendation, it proceeded to impose a level six restrictiveness commitment, despite appellant’s counsel’s objection that the court had not requested a restrictiveness level recommendation from the Department. The First District has consistently held that it is error for a court to reject the Department’s non-commitment (community control) recommendation and commit a juvenile without considering a restrictiveness level recommendation from the Department. The court has held in this regard that community control is not a “restrictiveness level.” See R.A.M. v. State, 695 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1st DCA), reh’g granted, 698 So. 2d 1225 (Fla.1997); J.P.M. v. State, 688 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); S.R. v. State, 683 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
We disagree, however, with the First District’s interpretation of the statute. We do not believe the statute requires the court, once it has already rejected the Department’s non-commitment recommendation, to then ask the Department for a second recommendation. A request for a second recommendation would seem particularly unnecessary in view of section 39.052(4)(e)3., Florida Statutes (1995), the next paragraph of the statute, which allows the court to reject the Department’s restrictions level recommendation provided that the court state for the record the reasons for its deviation from the Department’s recommendation. For these reasons, we find ourselves in conflict with the First District in finding no error in the court’s refusal to request a second recommendation from the Department.
Additionally, since the court did not distinguish between appellant’s two offenses (affray and disrupting a school function) in pronouncing sentence, and did not specify the term of community control which was to follow the commitment or the maximum term of commitment, the sentence must be remanded for clarification. See A.J.Y. v. State, 687 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); S.D. v. State, 687 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Moreover, the commitment order should be amended to show that appellant was adjudicated delinquent pursuant to a nolo plea.
Finally, the written disposition order must be corrected to conform to the court’s oral announcement that the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund fine would be waived. See Wilcox v. State, 674 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
FRANK and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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State v. J.P.C., 731 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1999)…PER CURIAM. We have for review J.P.C. v. State, 712 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), based on conflict with D.L.B. v. State, 707 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 8(b)(3), Fla. Const. We quash J.P.C. J.P.C. pled nolo contendere to a charge of throwing a deadly missile (a rock) into a moving vehicle, and the Department of Juvenile Justice recommended communi…1 / 2
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State v. E.D.P., 724 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1998)…preponderance of the evidence why the court is disregarding the assessment of the child and the restrictiveness level recommended by the department. Id. (emphasis added). The Second District Court of Appeal addressed this issue in D.L.B. v. State, 707 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), wherein the trial court rejected the DJJ’s community control recommendation and imposed a level-six restrictiveness commitment. The Second District, in D.L.B., disagreed with the First District’s interpretation of the statute in…
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D.L.B. v. State, 720 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1998)…SHAW, Justice. We have for review D.L.B. v. State, 707 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), based on conflict with E.D.P. v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D348, — So. 2d -, 1998 WL 25483 (Fla. 1st DCA Jan.27, 1998), and other cases.1 We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We approve D.L.B. D.L.B. was found to…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1983)
- In the Interest of S.R. v. State, 683 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- R.A.M. v. State, 695 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- D.J. v. State, 651 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Delegge v. State, 687 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Wilcox v. State, 674 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- J.P.M. v. State, 688 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Reeder v. State, 688 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- O. A. v. State, 312 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- State v. Sprague, 687 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)