STEPHANIE BENTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed convictions for felony fleeing and reckless driving, rejecting constitutional vagueness and due process challenges to the high-speed vehicle chase law, but struck certain fines and probation conditions that lacked oral pronouncement.
The high-speed vehicle chase statute is constitutional and does not violate vagueness or substantive due process principles.
[1] Fines and probation conditions imposed without oral pronouncement must be stricken from a sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStephanie Benton was convicted of felony fleeing to elude under section 316.1935(2) and reckless driving under section 316.192(1) after pleading nolo …
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FRANK, Acting Chief Judge.
Stephanie Benton has appealed from her convictions for felony fleeing to elude, a violation of section 316.1935(2), Florida Statutes (1995), and reckless driving, a violation of section 316.192(1), Florida Statutes (1995). She pleaded nolo contendere, specifically reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to dismiss, which challenged the constitutionality of the “high speed vehicle chase” law.
We affirm her convictions on the basis that the constitutional vagueness challenge has been rejected by this court in State v. Barnes, 686 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), the reasoning of which has been adopted by the First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal in Travis v. State, 700 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and Fox v. State, 700 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Benton’s additional substantive due process arguments are equally meritless. The curtailment of high-speed pursuits and of criminals attempting to flee law enforcement bears a reasonable and substantial relation to the public health, welfare, and safety.
We must, however, strike a fine and cost that were imposed without oral pronouncement. These include a $44.77 fine pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes (1995), and a surcharge of $2.23 pursuant to section 960.25, Florida Statutes (1995). See Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Furthermore, that portion of condition (8) of Benton’s probation, which requires her to pay for random testing for alcohol and controlled substance use, was not orally pronounced and must be stricken. See Diaz v. State, 691 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
PATTERSON and WHATLEY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Munro v. State, 714 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…ev. denied, 707 So. 2d 1128 (Fla.1998), Fox v. State, 700 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), rev. denied, 705 So. 2d 901 (Fla.1998), or that it bears no reasonable and substantial relation to the public health, welfare, and safety, see Benton v. State, 708 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). We do not reach the question whether a person may be convicted of fleeing and eluding, reckless driving, and resisting a law enforcement officer where the convictions arise out of the same conduct, because, in the instant case, t…
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Altman v. State, 36 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…. 2d 1124, 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“Because the surcharge is mandatory, the trial court was not obligated to announce it orally to include it in the written sentence.”), quashed on other grounds, 712 So. 2d 380 (Fla.1998); but see Benton v. State, 708 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (striking surcharge that was imposed without oral pronouncement). However, the circuit court must enter a corrected written sentence reflecting that the $2,500 surcharge was imposed pursuant to section 938.04, Florida Statut…
Authorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- State v. Barnes, 686 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Kemrick Travis v. State, 700 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Diaz v. State, 691 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- FOX v. State, 700 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)