LUIS H. DIAZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a general condition of probation for drug and alcohol testing is valid even if unrelated to the crime, but special conditions requiring payment for testing and treatment, and unspecified court costs, are invalid if not orally pronounced at sentencing.
[1] General conditions of probation, such as random drug and alcohol testing, do not require a relationship to the defendant's present criminal conduct or future criminality.
[2] A special condition of probation that is not orally pronounced at sentencing is invalid.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLuis Diaz was sentenced for armed burglary, kidnapping, and robbery. He appealed several sentencing conditions, including mandatory drug testing, ment…
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PATTERSON, Acting Chief Judge.
Luis Diaz challenges his sentences for armed burglary, armed kidnapping, and armed robbery. He argues that the trial court erred in: (1) ordering him to submit to and pay for random drug and alcohol testing, (2) ordering him to pay for mental health evaluation and treatment, and (3) imposing costs without specifying which statute authorized the costs. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Diaz argues that the condition requiring random drug and alcohol testing is invalid because the record does not show that drugs or alcohol have any relevance to kidnapping, armed robbery, or armed burglary. In support of his argument, he cites Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla.1993) (condition of probation is invalid if it has no relationship to the crime, relates to conduct which is not criminal, and requires or forbids conduct .which is not reasonably related to future criminality). However, the Biller analysis only applies to special conditions of probation. Brock v. State, 688 So. 2d 909 (Fla.1997). The condition requiring random drug and alcohol testing is a general condition. § 948.03(l)(j)l, Fla.Stat. (1993). It need not be orally pronounced at sentencing, nor must it relate to the defendant’s present criminal conduct or future criminality. Thus, we affirm the imposition of that condition.
We strike the requirement that Diaz pay for the drug and alcohol testing because it was a special condition which was not pronounced at sentencing. See Curry v. State, 682 So. 2d 1091 (Fla.1996). We strike the condition requiring Diaz to pay for mental health evaluation and treatment for the same reason. Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla.1996). Finally, we strike the imposition of $269.75 in court costs because the trial court failed to cite statutory authority for the costs. See Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We affirm Diaz’s sentences in all other respects.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
QUINCE and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Ladson v. State, 955 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…onounce. The trial court denied relief stating: “Pursuant to 948.031(k), this request is DENIED as it is a standard condition.” The “submit to” portion of this condition is a standard condition that need not be orally pronounced. See Diaz v. State, 691 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). However, the “pay for” portion is a special condition that must be orally pronounced. See State v. Williams, 712 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla.1998). Such conditions have previously been stricken when challenged on appeal. See, e.g.,…
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Jones v. State, 846 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…ion which need not be orally pronounced at sentencing, the State concedes that the trial court’s failure to orally pronounce the requirement that Jones bear the cost of such testing was error. See § 948.03(l)(k)(l), Fla. Stat. (2000); Diaz v. State, 691 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). We agree and strike that portion of condition (8) requiring Jones to pay for random testing. Jones also argues that condition (41), requiring payment of $50 in restitution to the Polk County Sheriffs Office, was error. Because…
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Benton v. State, 708 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…o. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Furthermore, that portion of condition (8) of Benton’s probation, which requires her to pay for random testing for alcohol and controlled substance use, was not orally pronounced and must be stricken. See Diaz v. State, 691 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). PATTERSON and WHATLEY, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993)
- Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1996)
- Brock v. State, 688 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1997)
- Curry v. State, 682 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1996)