MICHAEL W. BROMSON, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND DONNA CANTWELL, APPELLEES
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In this paternity case, the trial court determined that the father's actual income exceeded what he claimed and awarded child support based on the higher amount. The father appealed arguing the court failed to make required findings for imputing income, but the appellate court held that determining actual income is distinct from imputing income and affirmed the support award while reversing the life insurance requirement on a separate issue.
The trial court's determination of the father's actual income does not constitute imputing income under section 61.30(2)(b) but rather is a factual determination of actual income under section 61.30(2)(a). While section 61.30(2)(a) does not require specific findings, explanations facilitate appellate review and support reversal when lacking.
[1] A trial court may determine a parent's actual income based on evidence of their financial circumstances, rather than imputing income due to voluntary unemployment or unde…
[2] While section 61.30(2)(a), Florida Statutes, does not mandate specific findings of fact when determining a parent's net income, such explanations facilitate appellate rev…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“this is not imputing income under section 61.30(2)(b), but is simply making a factual determination of the parent's actual income under section 61.30(2)(a)”
Establishes the legal distinction between imputing income and determining actual income, which is central to resolving the father's argument
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe father, who was self-employed, claimed monthly earnings of only $1,600, but his living expenses for himself, his fiancée, and their daughter excee…
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KLEIN, Judge.
In this paternity action the trial court concluded that the father had greater earnings than he was admitting. The court awarded guideline support based on the higher amount, and the father appeals arguing that the court failed to make findings of fact required for “imputed” income.
Under section 61.30(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), in order to “impute” income to a parent, the trial court must find that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. However, the court did not find that the appellant was unemployed or underemployed, but rather that his earnings were greater than he represented them to be. As the third district explained in Silberman v. Silberman, 670 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) this is not imputing income under section 61.30(2)(b), but is simply making a factual determination of the parent’s actual income under section 61.30(2)(a).
Although section 61.30(2)(a) does not require trial courts to make specific findings, other than the amount of net income attributable to each parent, an explanation does facilitate appellate review. These cases are very different from cases in which the income of parents is undisputed, because the amount of income on which support is set is inferred by the trial judge. Because the number which the trial judge ultimately chooses has such a substantial impact on the lives of both parents and children, appellate judges naturally want to satisfy themselves in both underemployment and misrepresentation of income eases that there is evidence to support the numbers. When trial judges explain their reasoning, appellate judges can feel more comfortable about affirming in close cases. Conversely, the lack of an explanation can increase the odds of reversal. See, e.g., Bimonte v. Martin-Bimonte, 679 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Alon v. Alon, 665 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Viscito v. Menditto, 644 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Jones v. Jones, 636 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
The trial judge did exactly that in this case. In the judgment she pointed out that the father, who was self-employed, claimed he was only earning $1,600 a month, while the living expenses for him, his fiance, and their daughter were over $4,000 a month. He claimed he was receiving help from his mother, but produced no evidence to support his claim. His rent and vehicle payments alone were in excess of what a person with an income of $1,600 a month can afford. These were some, but not all, of the findings of the court, which assisted us in performing our review function. The findings are supported by the evidence and we therefore affirm the amount of child support. Appellee has conceded that the trial court erred in its failure to authorize that the life insurance it required be a decreasing term policy commensurate with the father’s child support obligation. Hedendal v. Hedendal, 695 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). We therefore reverse and remand on that issue. We have considered the remaining issues and find them to be without merit.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.
WARNER and FARMER, JJ., concur.
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Child v. Child, 34 So. 3d 159 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…come was greater than he reported. See Tomaszewski v. Tomaszewski, 793 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Beniaminov v. Beniaminov, 789 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Johnson v. Johnson, 725 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Bromson v. Dep’t of Revenue, 710 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Silberman v. Silberman, 670 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Ugarte, 608 So. 2d at 838. Based on this evidence, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. We find merit, however, in the husband’s argument that the record lacks competen…
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Nadrich v. Nadrich, 936 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…umentation of the unexplained cash flow. For a four-month period that Bush gave as an example, the husband had unexplained income of $9,622 and no documentation to suggest that his debt increased by that amount. In Bromson v. Department of Revenue, 710 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), a similar situation occurred. The husband was self employed and claimed he earned a certain amount, which was much lower than his living expenses reflected. Id. at 155. He did not substantiate his additional income. Neverth…
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Burnstine v. Townley, 976 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)….22 from its nine-month financial statement. Therefore, it awarded Townley monthly child support of $1300.68. It rejected any need to make written findings to support the income it attributed to Burnstine because, citing Bromson v. Dep’t of Revenue, 710 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), and Silberman v. Silberman, 670 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), it was not imputing income to Burnstine because he was not unemployed or underemployed. Burnstine filed timely exceptions to the general magistrate’s report, and r…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jones v. Jones, 636 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Hedendal v. Hedendal, 695 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Bimonte v. Martin-Bimonte, 679 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- F.W.M. v. State, 644 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Alon v. Dina Alon, 665 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Silberman v. Lesli Kim Silberman, 670 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)