RICHARD M. TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
KIRSTEN T. MALFARA, F/K/A KRISTEN TAYLOR, APPELLEE
RICHARD M. TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
KIRSTEN T. MALFARA, F/K/A KRISTEN TAYLOR, APPELLEE
710 So. 2d 233
Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1998)
Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases
Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.
We reverse the order finding the former husband in willful contempt for failure to pay court-ordered fees and costs. The findings in the order are materially different from the court’s oral pronouncement at the September 29 hearing, and must be reversed. See Leonard v. Leonard, 613 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Cooper v. Brickell Bayview Real Est., Inc., 711 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…nt series in which trial courts, obviously indulging a perhaps understandable reluctance to add to the misery of a party which has already lost on the merits, have refused to enforce section 768.79 as written. E.g., Morejon v. Metropolitan Dade Co., 710 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. v. The Sunrise Club, Inc., 711 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). Unfortunately, however, a writ of rachmones, see Cerner v. Brin, 608 So. 2d 519, 520 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), does not lie, and…
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Berkley Williams v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 957 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…t.”); Jordan v. Food Lion, Inc., 670 So. 2d 138, 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(“The statute [section 768.79] creates a mandatory right to attorney’s fees when the statutory prerequisites have been fulfilled.”). As in Morejon v. Metropolitan Dade County, 710 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) “[w]e find no cognizable basis for the denial of the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs under section 768.79.” Thus the order on cross-appeal is reversed.1 The cause is remanded solely to determine the recoverable am…
Authorities Cited
- Leonard v. Leonard, 613 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)