ROY COOPER, APPELLANT,
v.
BRICKELL BAYVIEW REAL ESTATE, INC., APPELLEE
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Roy Cooper appealed a trial court's calculation of attorney's fees and costs under Florida's offer of judgment statute. The trial court improperly calculated fees and costs from the date the offer was filed rather than the date it was served, contradicting the statute's plain language and purpose. The appellate court reversed and remanded for proper calculation.
The court held that fees and costs must be calculated from the date the offer was served, as expressly stated in section 768.79(6)(a), not from the date it was filed. The trial court's interpretation of the statute was absurd and contrary to both its express provisions and legislative purpose.
[1] Attorneys' fees and costs under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, are calculated from the date the offer of judgment was served, not from the date it was filed.
[2] A statute should not be interpreted in a manner that contravenes its express provisions or the purpose for which it was enacted.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 768.79(6)(a) provides that fees and costs shall be "calculated ... from the date the offer was served," [emphasis supplied]”
Establishes the plain language requirement for calculating fees and costs from the service date, not filing date
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant Brickell Bayview Real Estate, Inc. served a good faith $10,000 offer of judgment on plaintiff Roy Cooper under section 768.79, Florida Statu…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
Long after the defendant appropriately served, and the plaintiff ignored, a concededly good faith $10,000.00 offer of judgment under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995), the trial court sitting non-jury entered a judgment for the defendant which was affirmed by this court. See Brickell Bayview Real Estate, Inc. v. Cooper, 691 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Section 768.79(6)(a) provides that fees and costs shall be “calculated ... from the date the offer was served, ’’[emphasis supplied], and section 768.79(3) specifically provides that the offer may not be filed at all “unless it is accepted or unless filing is necessary to enforce the provisions of this section.” Notwithstanding, the trial judge, purportedly following section 768.79(1), assessed fees and costs only from the date that the offer was “filed” by defendant after it had won the case and had thus qualified for section 768.79 relief. On the defendant’s appeal, we reverse.
As everyone seems to acknowledge, the result below represents a reading of the statute as a whole which is no less than absurd since it contravenes both its express provisions and, more important, the entire reason it was enacted in the first place — to discourage the conduct of litigation after it could have been terminated by the acceptance of a good faith offer of settlement. Jordan v. Food Lion, Inc., 670 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).1 Since we are not permitted, much less obliged, to interpret a statute in such a manner, Jordan, 670 So. 2d at 140; State Dep’t of Public Welfare v. Bland, 66 So. 2d 59, 61 (Fla.1953); Curry v. Lehman, 55 Fla. 847, 855, 47 So. 18, 21 (1908); State v. Brigham, 694 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), the order under review is reversed and the cause remanded to award fees and costs from the “date the offer was served.” § 768.79(6)(a).
Reversed with directions.
. This case is another of a recent series in which trial courts, obviously indulging a perhaps understandable reluctance to add to the misery of a party which has already lost on the merits, have refused to enforce section 768.79 as written. E.g., Morejon v. Metropolitan Dade Co., 710 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. v. The Sunrise Club, Inc., 711 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). Unfortunately, however, a writ of rachmones, see Cerner v. Brin, 608 So. 2d 519, 520 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), does not lie, and a plea of “suffered enough” is insufficient to avoid the unambiguous requirements of the statute.
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Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…ortionment” in the unaccepted offer should not, and we therefore hold that it does not, impair the ability of the defendants here to recover under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995).1 See generally, Cooper v. Brickell Bayview Real Estate, Inc., 711 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). On this basis, the order denying the application for fees under § 768.79 is vacated. Since, as in Earnest & Stewart, Inc. v. Codina, 732 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)[24 FLW D388], the trial court did not rule on the validity of…
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Republic Fed. Bank, N.A. v. Doyle, 19 So. 3d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…ing money in the stock market. You know, unemployment is high. It’s just everybody knows that we are in a bad time right now and I hate to see anybody lose their home. . See also the term referred to in Cooper v. Brickell Bayview Real Estate, Inc., 711 So. 2d 258, 258 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).…
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Amisub (American Hospital) Inc. v. Hernandez, 817 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…tatute’s time requirements, and because the jury’s damage award was thirty-six percent greater than the $75,000.00 demand, Hernandez is entitled to attorney’s fees from the date he served the demand. See Cooper v. Brickell Bayview Real Estate, Inc., 711 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Mark C. Arnold Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Lumber Brokers, Inc., 642 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). However, we agree with the hospital that the trial court erred in applying a multiplier on the basis of a demand for judgment. Hernand…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Curry v. Lehman, 55 Fla. 847 (Fla. 1908)
- State v. Brigham, 694 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Jordan v. Food Lion, Inc., 670 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- State Dep't of Pub. Welf. v. Bland, 66 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1953)
- Pa. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. The Sunrise Club, Inc., 711 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Brickell Bayview Real Est., Inc. v. Cooper, 691 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Lerner v. Brin, 608 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Taylor v. Kirsten T. Malfara, 710 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)