STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
DAVID R. MILLER, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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The State appealed the dismissal of an aggravated battery charge against David Miller. The court reversed the dismissal, holding that the trial court erred in sua sponte reconsidering and granting Miller's motion to dismiss after the State had filed a traverse denying the material factual allegations.
The trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. When the State files a traverse denying material factual allegations in a rule 3.190(c)(4) motion, the trial court must deny the motion and should not make independent factual determinations about whether the State can survive a motion for judgment of acquittal. The court should have required the State to proceed to trial with the available evidence.
[1] A trial court must deny a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) when the State files a traverse denying or disputing material…
[2] It is not the trial court's function to make factual determinations when ruling on a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4).
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Ordinarily, when the State files a traverse denying or disputing material factual allegations in a rule 3.190(c)(4) motion, the trial court must deny the motion.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for handling rule 3.190(c)(4) motions when the State files a traverse.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavid Miller was charged with aggravated battery for allegedly pushing Larry Green over a six-foot wall, causing Green to land on his head and become …
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BLUE, Acting Chief Judge.
The State appeals the dismissal of the one-count information charging David Miller with aggravated battery. Miller cross-appeals the trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine which permitted the admission at trial of a videotaped interview with the alleged victim. Because dismissal was not warranted, the granting of Miller’s motion to dismiss is reversed. Because the issue raised on cross-appeal is not related to the order on appeal, Miller’s cross-appeal is dismissed.
The State charged Miller with aggravated battery in violation of section 784.045, Florida Statutes (1995), for allegedly pushing Larry Green over a six-foot wall, causing Green to land on his head and become permanently disabled. Miller filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), asserting that the State’s two eyewitnesses could not identify Miller as the perpetrator of the crime. The trial court denied the motion after the State filed a traverse specifically denying Miller’s assertions. However, at a hearing on the date set for trial, the State reviewed the evidence it was prepared to present at trial. Based on this review, the court sua sponte reconsidered Miller’s motion and dismissed the information.
Ordinarily, when the State files a traverse denying or disputing material factual allegations in a rule 3.190(c)(4) motion, the trial court must deny the motion. See State v. Lukas, 652 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.190(d). It is not the trial court’s function to make factual determinations in this context. See State v. Diaz, 627 So. 2d 1314, 1315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). The trial court erred by granting Miller’s motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that the State would be unable to get past a motion for a judgment of aequittal with the available evidence. As a viable alternative to dismissal, the court could simply have required the State to proceed to trial with the evidence available.
With regard to Miller’s cross-appeal of the denial of his motion in limine, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(4) states in relevant part: “Review of cross-appeals before trial is limited to related issues resolved in the same order being appealed.” Miller’s cross-appeal is not authorized because the issue he raises is unrelated to the dismissal order on appeal.
The granting of Miller’s motion to dismiss is hereby reversed. Miller’s cross-appeal is dismissed; however, he is free to raise the issue again in any future appeal, assuming it is properly raised at trial and preserved in the record.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
NORTHCUTT and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur.
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State v. Ferris Michele Paleveda, 745 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…1996). Even if the trial court doubts the sufficiency of the State’s evidence, it cannot grant a motion to dismiss criminal charges simply because it concludes that the case will not survive a motion for a judgment of acquittal. See State v. Miller, 710 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d [*1028] DCA 1998). Furthermore, within the context of a motion to dismiss, it is not the function of a trial court to make factual determinations. Miller, 710 So. 2d at 687. Since the element of knowledge in a possession case is a question…
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State v. Figuereo, 761 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…ed in its favor. State v. Kalogeropolous, 758 So. 2d 110 (Fla.2000) (citations omitted; emphasis added); see State v. Paleveda, 745 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); State v. Bonebright, 742 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); State v. Miller, 710 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. Hart, 677 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); State v. Gutierrez, 649 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). In the present case, the defendant’s affidavit states that his former girlfriend Ivette was an employee of…
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State v. Dickerson, 811 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…s evidence, it cannot grant a motion to dismiss criminal charges simply because it concludes that the case will not survive a motion for a judgment of acquittal.” State v. Paleveda, 745 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); see also State v. Miller, 710 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). And “if the state’s evidence is all circumstantial, whether it excludes all reasonable hypotheses of innocence may only be decided at trial, after all of the evidence has been presented.” State v. Ortiz, 766 So. 2d 1137, 114…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Diaz, 627 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Singletary v. Thomas, 652 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)