DANIEL WOODS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Daniel Woods pleaded guilty to multiple sex crimes against a male child and was sentenced to ten years in prison plus probation with various conditions. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence but reversed and remanded certain probation conditions as improper or overly broad.
The court affirmed Woods's guilty plea and conviction, including the addition of forty victim injury points. However, the court reversed and remanded several probation conditions: (1) the $25 monthly supervision cost lacked statutory authority; (2) restitution amount must be determined on remand; (3) the blanket prohibition on contact with children under seventeen must be narrowed to prohibit only 'intentional, unsupervised contact'; and (4) the condition on contact with children under sixteen must be modified to require 'intentional' contact.
[1] A defendant cannot challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea if they failed to move to withdraw the plea in the trial court.
[2] Victim injury points may be added to a score sheet for injury based upon fellatio.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Woods cannot now successfully challenge the voluntariness of his plea in the circumstance where he failed to move before the trial court to withdraw it.”
Establishes that Woods waived his right to challenge his plea by not moving to withdraw it in the trial court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDaniel Woods committed lewd and lascivious acts and sexual battery against a male child. Woods voluntarily disclosed the conduct to the child's parent…
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FRANK, Acting Chief Judge.
Daniel Woods was charged with multiple sex crimes involving a male child. Ultimately, the state nolle prossed several of the criminal charges retaining one count of a lewd and lascivious act, one count of sexual battery and one count of attempted lewd and lascivious behavior. The criminal conduct came to light after Woods told the child’s parents of its occurrence and the child confirmed the events. Woods insisted on pleading guilty.
Following the trial court’s acceptance of Woods’s plea, he was sentenced to ten years in prison followed by five years of probation on the two second degree felony counts. On the third degree count, the trial court sentenced him to a five-year concurrent sentence with no probation. Mandatory court costs and restitution for out-of-pocket expenses were orally ordered. Woods was to have no contact with children under seventeen until after completion of an outpatient sex offender program. After the program was completed, his unsupervised contact with children under the age of sixteen was subject to the permission of his probation officer. We have considered and assessed each of the issues Woods has presented for our consideration.
In sum, Woods cannot now successfully challenge the voluntariness of his plea in the circumstance where he failed to move before the trial court to withdraw it. See Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla.1979).
Moreover, it was not error to add forty victim injury points to his score- sheet for injury based upon fellatio. See Dickinson v. State, 693 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
We do, however, find some of the probation conditions improper. The condition assessing $25 per month for the cost of supervision must be condemned because the order does not reveal the statutory authority for that obligation. See Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
The restitution aspect of the order must also be reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to determine the amount of restitution. See Bryant v. State, 600 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
The condition prohibiting Woods from any contact with children has been held to be too broad; it may result in an unintentional violation. See Rowles v. State, 682 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Graham v. State, 658 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
On remand, the trial court should conform the written order to the oral pronouncement, see Jackson v. State, 674 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), and the condition should be modified to prohibit “intentional, unsupervised contact with children under the age of seventeen where no adult is present until Woods has successfully completed an outpatient sex offender program.” See Rowles; Graham.
Moreover, in light of Rowles and Graham, the condition limiting contact with children under the age of sixteen without parental consent should also be modified to prohibit “intentional” contact with children under the age of sixteen.
The condition barring Woods from firearms without the consent of his probation officer is appropriate, see Houston v. State, 701 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), and the condition prohibiting Woods from using alcohol and drugs is authorized for offenses, such as here, occurring on or after June 15, 1995. See Johnson v. State, 701 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
QUINCE, J„ and DOYEL, ROBERT L„ Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Lowman v. State, 720 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…, however, contains evidence of a completed act of oral sex involving ejaculation into the victim’s mouth. After the trial court’s ruling, both this court and the Fifth District held that fellatio could be scored as penetration. See Woods v. State, 711 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Dickinson v. State, 693 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (Antoon, J., dissenting). Judge Antoon’s dissent in Dickinson argued that fellatio can be an act of “union” and not penetration. In this case, we need not decide whether Judge…
Authorities Cited
- Gissendanner v. State, 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979)
- Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979)
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Matos v. Budget Rent A CAR Sys., Inc., 658 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Rowles v. State, 682 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Navarrion Johnson v. State, 701 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Houston v. State, 701 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Bryant v. State, 600 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Garvin Jackson v. State, 674 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)