RAUL ORTEGA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Raul Ortega appeals an order declaring him a sexual predator under Florida's Sexual Predator Act, arguing it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court affirms, holding that the registration requirement was substantially re-enacted from the original statute in effect at the time of the crime, and that registration provisions are regulatory rather than punitive.
The court held that requiring Ortega to register as a sexual predator does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the registration requirement was substantially re-enacted from provisions existing at the time of the crime, and registration provisions are regulatory rather than punitive. The court did not address community notification provisions because the state specified Ortega would not be subject to them.
[1] The re-enactment of substantially similar provisions from a repealed statute means those provisions are deemed to have been in continuous operation since their original e…
[2] Registration provisions in sexual predator statutes are generally considered regulatory, not punitive, and therefore do not violate ex post facto laws.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where a statute has been repealed, but provisions of the repealed statute have been substantially re-enacted, the 're-enacted provisions are deemed to have been in operation continuously from the original enactment.'”
Establishes the legal principle that the registration requirement in the 1995 Act was continuous from the original statute, avoiding ex post facto violation.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOrtega was charged with sexual activity with a child occurring in September 1994. He pled guilty and was sentenced in March 1995. The state then moved…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Ex Post Facto Violation cases and more on FLexlaw
KLEIN, Judge.
Appellant was charged with sexual activity with a child which-was alleged to have occurred in September 1994.- He pled guilty and was sentenced in March 1995. He appeals an order granting the state’s motion to have him declared a sexual predator, arguing that it is unconstitutional as an ex post facto violation. We affirm.
In Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), the second district went through the history of the Florida Sexual Predator’s Act, codified at section 775.21-.23, Florida Statutes (1993) and the changes made to the 1993 legislation in 1995 and 1996. As the second district pointed out, all three versions of the law require registration. Where a statute has been repealed, but provisions of the repealed statute have been substantially re-enacted, the “re-enacted provisions are deemed to have been in operation continuously from the original enactment.” McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So. 2d 48, 53 (Fla. 1974); Collie, 710 So. 2d at 1007. Because the registration requirement in the 1995 Act, which the state asserted was applicable to appellant, was contained in the statute as it existed at the time of this crime, requiring appellant to register was not an ex post facto violation.
In addition, courts have almost universally recognized that the registration provisions in sexual predator statutes are regulatory, not punishment, and are thus not ex post facto violations. Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), rev. denied, 707 So. 2d 1124 (Fla.1998) and cases cited therein.
Appellant also argues that the community notification provisions of the sexual predator statute are more than regulatory and constitute an increased penalty, which is an ex post facto violation. In its motion to have appellant found a sexual predator; however, the state specified that, because of the date on which the triggering offense was committed, appellant would not be subject to the community and public notification provisions of the 1995 version of the statute. See also Collie, 710 So. 2d at 1005. (offenders whose offenses occurred between October 1, 1993 and October 1,1995 are not subject to community and public notification, citing section 775.21(4)(a), Florida. Statutes (Supp.1996)).1 Accordingly, we need not reach that issue.
Affirmed.
WARNER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. . The legislature again amended the statute in 1997, and it now provides for community and public notification "in a manner deemed appropriate by the sheriff or the chief of police,” even for offenses committed between October 1, 1993 and October 1, 1995. § 775.21(4)(a)l.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Mitchel Westerheide v. State, 767 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…n, not to civil proceedings. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997); Rowe v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 714 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); rev. denied, 727 So. 2d 910 (Fla.1999); see also Ortega v. State, 712 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 722 So. 2d 192 (Fla.), and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1058, 119 S.Ct. 624, 142 L.Ed.2d 563 (1998); Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), rev. denied, 707…
-
Kelly v. State, 795 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…e v. State, 753 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 773 So. 2d 56 (Fla.2000); Burkett v. State, 731 So. 2d 695, 698 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 719 So. 2d 892 (Fla.1998); Rickman v. State, 714 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Ortega v. State, 712 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 722 So. 2d 192 (Fla.) and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1058, 119 S.Ct. 624, 142 L.Ed.2d 563 (1998); Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), rev. denied, 707 S…
-
Burgos v. State, 765 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…4th DCA 1998) (“The sexual predator designation ‘is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting from the conviction of' certain crimes.’ ”) (quoting Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)); Ortega v. State, 712 So. 2d 833, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding application of successor statute regarding registration of sexual predator was regulatory and not an ex post facto violation); State, Dep’t of Corrections v. Goad, 754 So. 2d 95, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (discussing s…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McKIBBEN v. Mallory, 293 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1974)
- Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)