JACK DANIELS, APPELLANT,
v.
EVELYN REEVES, APPELLEE
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks review of an order, entered after an order dismissing his third amended complaint with prejudice, directing him to pay attorney fees to appellee, apparently pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1995). Notwithstanding appellant’s argument to the contrary, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to address appellee’s renewed motion for attorney fees, filed sixteen days after entry of the order dismissing the action. See Ganz v. HZJ, Inc., 605 So. 2d 871 (Fla.1992). However, because the order awarding attorney fees contains no findings of fact, we are constrained to reverse. See, e.g., Glisson v. Jacksonville Transp. Auth., 705 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Fernandez v. Chiro Risk Management, Inc., 700 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Mickler v. Graham, 611 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). On remand, if the trial court again concludes that an award of attorney fees is appropriate, it shall recite in its order the facts upon which it bases that conclusion.
REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.
BARFIELD, C.J., and KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
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Evans v. State, 730 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…” The class of true split sentences has now been expanded to include sentences in which the entire in-carcerative term is suspended, see Powell, and sentences in which the probationary term is longer than the suspended jail term. See Szuba v. State, 712 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Although the opinion in Poore refers to the limits on a new term of “incarceration” following a revocation, the imposition of a true split sentence also precludes the trial court from placing a defendant on probation for a perio…
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Williams v. State, 747 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…ant’s original sentence was longer than the suspended portion of his incarceration, we interpret this original sentence to be, as urged by appellant, a true split sentence. Evans v. State, 730 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). See also Szuba v. State, 712 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. Powell, 703 So. 2d 444, 445 (Fla.1997) (“Given the different purposes of incarceration and probation, it is not obvious why the length of probation in a true split sentence must always equal the suspended portion of the…
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Regions Bank v. Sarwat M. GAD, 102 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…cause the portion of the order directing Appellant to pay Appellee’s attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105 contains no findings of fact to support the award, we are constrained to reverse this portion of the order. See, e.g., Daniels v. Reeves, 712 So. 2d 839, 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (reversing the award of section 57.105 attorney’s fees “because the order awarding fees contained] no findings of fact .... ”); Glisson v. Jacksonville Transp. Auth., 705 So. 2d 186, 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Mahaney v. Sumte…
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- Ganz v. HZJ, Inc., 605 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1992)
- Fernandez v. Chiro Risk Mgmt., Inc., 700 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Mickler v. Graham, 611 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- DiPAOLO v. THE Sch. Bd. OF Broward Cnty., 705 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Glisson v. Jacksonville Transp. Auth., 705 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)