TRICIA WOLFE, APPELLANT,
v.
ELIZABETH NAZAIRE, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed and remanded an attorney's fee award because the trial court failed to make required findings of hours and rates, though it correctly held that a contractual fee cap does not limit court-awarded fees under the prevailing party statute.
A trial court is not bound by a contractual cap on attorney's fees when awarding fees to a prevailing party under statute, but must make explicit findings of reasonable hours and rates.
[1] A contractual ceiling on attorney's fees does not limit a trial court's authority to award fees to a prevailing party under statute when the fee agreement provides that c…
[2] A trial court awarding attorney's fees must make explicit findings of the reasonable hours expended and the reasonable hourly rate to be applied.
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is no logical way to distinguish the instant case. The only difference is that an hourly rate is utilized instead of a contingency as the alternative basis.”
Court explaining why the Kaufman precedent applies to hourly rate caps as well as contingency fee caps.
Tricia Wolfe sued Elizabeth Nazaire for negligence and lost at trial. Nazaire's attorney fee contract provided for compensation at $85 per hour or wha…
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BRYAN, BEN L., Associate Judge.
Tricia Wolfe, plaintiff in a negligence action that resulted in a defense verdict, timely appealed the trial court’s order awarding the defendant, Elizabeth Nazaire, $7,500 in attorney’s fees. The contract between Nazaire and her attorney provided for a fee to be based on an hourly rate of $85 or whatever may be awarded by the trial court, whichever is higher.
Appellant argued that the fee could not exceed a ceiling of $4,318 based on 50.8 hours times the $85 agreed. In Kaufman v. MacDonald, 557 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla.1990), the Florida Supreme Court, responding to a certified question from this court, approved an attorney’s fee that was higher than the contingent fee set out in the contract where the contract provided that the attorney’s compensation would be either a specific percentage of the recovery or the amount awarded by the court under the prevailing party statute, whichever yielded the higher fee. There is no logical way to distinguish the instant case. The only difference is that an hourly rate is utilized instead of a contingency as the alternative basis.
The trial court did not err in its determination that it was not bound by the “cap.”
Appellant asserts correctly that the trial court erred in failing to set out in the order the hours reasonably expended and the reasonable rate to be applied to those hours. See Kelly v. Tworoger, 705 So. 2d 670, 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Accordingly, the case is reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded after making the required findings.
WARNER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.'
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Trishia Wolfe v. Nazaire, 758 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…SHAHOOD, J. This is an appeal from an order taxing attorney’s fees in favor of appellee, Elizabeth Nazaire, following this court’s mandate in Wolfe v. Nazaire, 713 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (Wolfe I). We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in [*732] enhancing the fee it awarded where it failed to state the grounds for enhancement and additionally did not have sufficient evidence before it to support such…
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Zucker v. Zucker, 774 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…we reverse the attorney’s fee award and remand for the trial court to redetermine the amount of fees to be awarded after making the required findings, with leave to enter the same award if the Rowe factors justify the amount. See Wolfe v. Nazaire, —713 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).2 Finally, appellee has failed to demonstrate reversible error or an abuse of discretion in the points raised on cross-appeal. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED. DELL, STEVENSON and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. .…
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First Baptist Church OF Cape Coral v. Compass Constr., Inc., 115 So. 3d 946 (Fla. 2013)…“not violate Rowe because a reasonable fee does not expose the party required to pay to being victimized by having to pay an excessive fee, which was the possible harm envisioned in Rowe ”). The Fourth District recognized this in Wolfe v. Nazaire, 713 So. 2d 1108, 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (Wolfe I), where it relied on our decision in Kaufman, 557 So. 2d 572, to recognize the validity of an alternative fee recovery clause in the defendant’s fee agreement that “provided for a fee to be based on an hourly rate…
Authorities Cited
- Kaufman v. MacDONALD, 557 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1990)
- Ines Collia Kelly v. Tworoger, 705 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)