STATE, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE ON BEHALF OF LENNETTA A. PRUNO, APPELLANT,
v.
MALCOLM WILLIAMS, JR. AND PASCO COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1998-07-31
No. 97-04616
PARKER, C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.
714 So. 2d 1176 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1998) Negative Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Holding

The trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to a volunteer attorney ad litem when the appointment order only allowed for cost reimbursement.


Facts & Procedural History

A volunteer attorney ad litem was appointed to represent a minor's best interests. The appointment order specified reimbursement for costs but did not…

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Opinion of the Court
FRANK, Judge.

FRANK, Judge.

The Department of Revenue challenges an order requiring it to pay attorney’s fees for a volunteer attorney/guardian ad litem appointed by the trial court pursuant to Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla.1993). We reverse.

On September 12, 1994, the trial court appointed Dave Schrader “as a volunteer Attorney ad Litem to represent the best interests of the minor ehild(ren).” The order provides that Mr. Schrader is entitled to recover his costs up to $300.00, but does not mention attorney’s fees.

On October 14, 1997, the trial court entered an order that finds that a reasonable attorney’s fee for Mr. Schrader’s services is $300.00 and orders the Department of Revenue to pay him that sum. Because the trial court’s order appointing Mr. Schrader specified that he was appointed as a volunteer attorney ad litem and provided for reimbursement of costs only, the trial court had no authority to award Mr. Schrader an attorney’s fee.

Reversed.

PARKER, C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Chaney, 744 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
    ….S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), “eliminated the reasonableness inquiry regarding an officer’s stop of a vehicle and substituted a strict objective test which asks only whether any probable cause for the stop exists.” State v. Thomas, 714 So. 2d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).1 We reverse the order granting the motion to suppress. On appeal, Chaney offers several other grounds to support the [*596] suppression. Because the circuit court never ruled on these other contentions, we remand for fur…
  • State v. Battle, 232 So. 3d 493 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)
    …uld be reversed, we are constrained to review the record under the objective test of Whren. When applying the objective test, generally the only determination to be made is whether probable cause existed for the stop in question.”); State v. Thomas, 714 So. 2d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“The United States Supreme Court in Whren eliminated the reasonableness inquiry regarding an officer’s stop of a vehicle and substituted a strict objective test which asks only whether any probable cause for the stop exists…

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