STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
GUY EDWARD CHANEY, JR., APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1999-11-17
No. 98-04641
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur.
744 So. 2d 595 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1999) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Holding

The court held that the officer had an objective basis to stop the defendant's truck, and therefore the circuit court erred in suppressing the drugs and statements.


Facts & Procedural History

The State challenged the circuit court's suppression of drugs found in the defendant's truck and statements made by the defendant. The suppression was…

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Opinion of the Court
NORTHCUTT, Judge.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

. The State challenges the circuit court’s decision to suppress drugs discovered in Guy Chaney’s pickup truck during a traffic stop, as well as incriminating statements Chaney made after the drugs were found. The court granted the motion based on the police officer’s testimony that he stopped the truck not because the driver had failed to stop at a stop sign, but because he thought some drug activity had occurred. This was error. The officer had an objective basis to stop Chaney. See Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla.1997) (noting that probable cause for a traffic stop exists when the vehicle fails to stop at a stop sign). The Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), “eliminated the reasonableness inquiry regarding an officer’s stop of a vehicle and substituted a strict objective test which asks only whether any probable cause for the stop exists.” State v. Thomas, 714 So. 2d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).1

We reverse the order granting the motion to suppress. On appeal, Chaney offers several other grounds to support the suppression. Because the circuit court never ruled on these other contentions, we remand for further proceedings to address these issues. See State v. Baldwin, 686 So. 2d 682, 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Reversed and remanded.

THREADGILL, A.C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur. . Chaney contends that the State did not properly preserve its argument based on Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). We have reviewed the record and reject this argument.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Robinson, 756 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
    …cause that Robinson committed a traffic infraction. Based on those objective facts, the stop was not illegal. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757 (Fla.1997); State v. Chaney, 744 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Covington v. State, 728 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); State v. Girard, 694 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). The subjective intent of the police officer who made the stop as whether the officer would have stopped another vehicle…
  • State v. Boston, 267 So. 3d 463 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)
    …ehicle for a traffic violation." Hurd, 958 So. 2d at 602. On at least one occasion, we have reversed a suppression order based on a driver's failure to stop at a stop sign, regardless of the officer's subjective suspicions. See State v. Chaney, 744 So. 2d 595, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ("The [trial] court granted the motion based on the police officer's testimony that he stopped the truck not because the driver had failed to stop at a stop sign, but because he thought some drug activity had occurred. Th…

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