BRUCE CODDINGTON, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN STAAB ALSO KNOWN AS JACK STAAB, APPELLEE
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Appellant Coddington appealed the trial court's judgment on the pleadings dismissing his trespass complaint. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the complaint adequately states a cause of action for trespass to both real and personal property, though it limited recovery to proper trespass damages and excluded emotional distress damages.
The court held that the complaint adequately states a cause of action for trespass because it sufficiently alleges unauthorized entry, ransacking of personal property, and deprivation of use. However, the court limited recovery to proper trespass damages (loss of use and enjoyment for real property and value of chattels for personal property) and excluded recovery for emotional distress, as the complaint fails to state a separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
[1] A judgment on the pleadings is proper only when the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the admitted facts.
[2] A complaint states a cause of action for trespass when it alleges an unauthorized entry onto another's property.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Trespass to real property has been defined as 'an unauthorized entry onto another's property.'”
Establishes the legal definition of trespass to real property central to the holding that the complaint states a cause of action.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCoddington alleged that Staab entered his apartment without permission while Coddington was receiving psychiatric care, ransacked his personal propert…
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SHAHOOD, Judge.
This appeals arises from Final Judgment following entry of Judgment on the Pleadings. In his amended complaint for trespass, appellant seeks both compensatory damages and recovery for emotional distress. We reverse and remand with directions finding that the complaint states a cause of action for trespass.
In his amended complaint for trespass, appellant alleged that appellee entered his apartment without permission and authority while he was obtaining psychiatric care, ransacked his personal property, and deprived him of the use of his apartment. Appellant further alleged that although no physical contact took place between appellant and appel-lee, appellee’s actions caused him to suffer mental pain and anguish, an aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition, and a loss of earning capacity.
It is well settled that judgment on the pleadings may be granted only if, on the facts admitted for the purpose of the motion, the moving party is clearly entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMC-Truck, Inc., 693 So. 2d 602, 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Swim Indus. Corp. v. Cavalier Mfg. Co., 559 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); General GMC Truck Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Simm, 430 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(c).
We hold that the trial court erred in entering judgment on the pleadings, as the pleadings state a cause of action for trespass. Trespass to real property has been defined as “an unauthorized entry onto another’s property.” See Pearson v. Ford Motor Co., 694 So. 2d 61, 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Trespass to personal property is the intentional use of, or interference with, a chattel which is in the possession of another, without justification. See 55 Fla. Jur.2d Trespass § 3 (1984). Appellant’s complaint sufficiently alleges that appellee entered his apartment without his permission, ransacked his personal property, and deprived him of the use of his apartment and his personal property.
As to the recovery of damages, it appears from the complaint that appellant seeks either to recover damages for emotional harm, outside the scope of the proper measure of damages for trespass, or is attempting to plead a separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As the complaint is drafted, appellant is limited in his recovery of damages as the complaint fails to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Clemente v. Horne, 707 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), and appellant has failed to demonstrate that mental distress is an element of compensatory damages for trespass. Appellant relies upon Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961), cert. denied, 147 So. 2d 530 (Fla.1962), for his position that mental pain and suffering is a recoverable measure of damages for trespass. In Thompson, the court held that a complaint stated a sufficient cause of action for invasion of right to privacy for compensatory but not punitive damages where city police officers negligently broke into and searched premises with a negligent disregard for plaintiffs right to privacy, causing her great mental and physical pain and suffering. Thompson is inapplicable under the facts of this case as invasion of right to privacy has not been pled.
Generally, as to a lessee of real property, the proper measure of damages for trespass includes the lessee’s loss of use and enjoyment of the land. See Stockman v. Duke, 578 So. 2d 831, 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Where the injury consists in the wrongful taking of chattels from the possession of another, the measure of damages is the value of the goods at the time and place of the wrongful taking and removal. See 55 Fla. Jur. 2d Trespass § 17.
We accordingly hold that appellant’s amended complaint sufficiently states a cause of action for trespass. However, on remand, we direct the trial court to limit appellant’s recovery to those measure of damages permitted for trespass and to strike any reference to recovery for emotional distress. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
WARNER, J., and BRYAN, BEN L., Associate Judge, concur.
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Khalil Burshan, M.D. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. OF Pittsburgh, 805 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…use a bank account is not a chattel which can be the subject of a trespass. “Trespass to personal property is the intentional use of, or interference with, a chattel which is in the possession of another, without justification.” Coddington v. Staab, 716 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). The word “chattels” is defined as: Every species of property, movable or immovable, which is less than a freehold. * * * Personal chattels are properly things movable, which may be carried about by the owner; such as anima…
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Archbishop Coleman F. Carroll High Sch., Inc. v. Maynoldi, 30 So. 3d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…out authorization by the school. . Wallace v. Dean, 970 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). This was the district court opinion reviewed by our Supreme Court in 2009. . Unauthorized entry onto real property is a trespass. See Coddington v. Staab, 716 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).…
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Daniel v. Morris, 181 So. 3d 1195 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…he unauthorized entry onto another’s real property. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (Am. Law Inst. 1965). The injury caused by trespass to real property is the loss of the use and enjoyment of the land or injury to the land. Coddington v. Staab, 716 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); State v. Sarantopoulos, 604 So. 2d 551, 555 n. 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (“As to civil trespass, a trespass to real property is an injury to or use of the land of another by one having no right or authority.” (citing Brown v. So…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Thompson v. City OF Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)
- Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac Gmc-Truck, Inc., 693 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- McKAY v. State, 694 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Vivienne Clemente and Jose Louis Herrada v. Horne, 707 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- City of Jacksonville v. Thompson, 147 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1962)
- Ins. Co. of the S. v. ELY & Kennedy, 147 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1962)
- Swim Indus. Corp. v. Cavalier Mfg. Co., Inc., 559 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Gen. GMC Truck Sales & Serv., Inc. v. J.D. Simm and Rosemary Simm, 430 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Stockman v. A.W. Duke, 578 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)