DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
J.R., A CHILD, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Department of Juvenile Justice appealed a trial court's order committing a juvenile to its custody but also directing placement at a specific facility. The court held that while trial courts may impose restrictiveness levels, they lack statutory authority to direct placement at a particular facility, which is the Department's responsibility.
The trial court lacked statutory authority to require placement at a particular facility. While courts may impose a restrictiveness level, the actual selection and placement of a juvenile at a specific facility is the exclusive responsibility of the Department of Juvenile Justice under Florida law.
[1] A trial court lacks statutory authority to select the specific facility for placement of a juvenile committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice.
[2] The responsibility for selecting the facility for a committed juvenile rests with the Department of Juvenile Justice, not the court.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the choice of facility was legislatively mandated to be the responsibility of the Department”
Establishes that facility selection authority rests exclusively with the Department, not the trial court
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn November 17, 1997, J.R. was adjudicated delinquent for acts committed in August 1997 and was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice at res…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Juvenile Commitment cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
On November 17, 1997, J.R. was committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice, having been adjudicated delinquent for acts committed on August 8, 14, and 25, 1997. The trial court accepted the Department’s recommendation of commitment at restrictiveness level 6. The Department has appealed1 the trial court’s order and argues that the judge did not have the statutory authority to select the facility at which the juvenile would be placed. We agree that, having committed the juvenile to the custody of the department, the trial court lacked the statutory authority to require the department to place the juvenile at a particular facility, and therefore reverse.
As a matter of law, the trial court lacked the statutory authority to make this selection decision. "Under former chapter 392 it was well-established that the choice of facility was legislatively mandated to be the responsibility of the Department. See § 39.054, Fla. Stat. (1995); § 39.052, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996); R.L.B. v. State, 693 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(“ The court’s duty to impose a restrictiveness level and its discretion in regal’d to this duty are circumscribed by this statute, and there is no mention of court power in regard to actual program placement.”).
See also Florida Dep’t of Juvenile Justice v. E.W., 704 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (affirming commitment at restrictiveness level 8, but reversing portion of order requiring placement in a specific facility); Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. State, 616 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (“juvenile judge lacks authority under Chapter 39 to direct HRS to place any child committed to it[ ] in a specific facility, or to require HRS to spend its funds in any particular manner”); Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. R.W.K., 556 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (“the court does not have the statutory authority to place the child in a specific facility or program”).
Accordingly, we REVERSE the portion of the order requiring placement in a specific facility.
BARFIELD, C.J., DAVIS, J., and SHIVERS, DOUGLASS B., Senior Judge, concur. . This court has previously addressed the issue of the Department's standing in these proceedings. See Dep't of Juvenile Justice v. J.R., 710 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
. Now codified at chapter 985, Florida Statutes (1997). See §§ 985.23, 985.231, Fla. Stat. (1997).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Dep't OF Juv. Just. v. K.B., 784 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…985.03(43), Fla. Stat. (2000). Commitment and a probation program that is supposed to be in lieu of commitment are mutually exclusive. Moreover, a trial court cannot order DJJ to place K.B. in a specific facility. See Dep’t of Juv. Just. v. J.R., 716 So. 2d 872, 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that the trial court lacks the authority to place a juvenile in a particular facility); R.L.B., 693 So. 2d at 131 (“[Tjhere is no mention [in the statute] of court power in regard to actual program placement.”); Dep…
-
State v. E.R., 724 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…Court’s ruling in the DJJ’s previously filed and adjudicated petition for writ of prohibition did not address the issues presented in this appeal, and consequently does not bar review. As recently observed in Department of Juvenile Justice v. J.R., 716 So. 2d 872, 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998): As a matter of law, the trial court lacked the statutory authority to make this selection decision. Under former chapter 39 [Now codified at chapter 985, Florida Statutes (1997). See §§ 985.23, 985.231, Fla. Stat. (1997).]…
-
Bardo v. State, 804 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…he Department of Corrections and the Department of Children and Family Services. Such an assertion of control in the context of sentencing would have been impermissible, and the trial judge obviously recognized this. See Dep’t of Juv. Just. v. J.R., 716 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); see also Singletary v. Acosta, 659 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995). Accordingly, the judge committed no error in refusing to order evaluation and treatment. AFFIRMED. ERVIN, KAHN, and DAVIS, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. State, 616 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. R.W.K., 556 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 693 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- State v. E.W., 704 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Dep't OF Juv. Just. v. J.R., 710 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)