DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, APPELLANT,
v.
K.B., A CHILD, AND STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida First District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's hybrid juvenile disposition that combined a Level Four residential commitment with a probation program requirement. The court held that trial courts lack statutory authority to impose such hybrid dispositions and cannot direct the Department of Juvenile Justice to place a child in a specific facility.
A trial court lacks statutory authority to impose a hybrid disposition combining commitment and probation, as these are mutually exclusive options under Florida law. Additionally, trial courts cannot order the Department of Juvenile Justice to place a child in a specific facility; that discretion belongs to DJJ alone.
[1] A trial court's discretion in ordering juvenile dispositions is circumscribed by statute.
[2] Probation and commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice are mutually exclusive dispositions.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Commitment and a probation program that is supposed to be in lieu of commitment are mutually exclusive.”
Establishes that the hybrid disposition combining commitment with probation violates statutory definitions that treat these as alternative options
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceK.B. pleaded nolo contendere to petit theft and battery on a school employee. The Department of Juvenile Justice recommended adjudication as delinquen…
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PER CURIAM.
In this juvenile case, KB. pled nolo con-tendere to one charge of petit theft and one charge of battery on a school employee. The Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) recommended that K.B. be adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation. The intervention plan anticipated by DJJ included completion of the Tallahassee Marine Institute Program, a probation program. See § 985.03(43), Fla. Stat. (2000) (defining probation and listing marine programs as day-treatment probation options). The trial court, however, ordered a Level Four commitment, which we assume to be a commitment to a low-risk residential program. See § 985.03(45)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000) (defining low-risk programs as residential programs that allow youths to have unsupervised access to the community). The trial court also ordered K.B. to attend and complete the Tallahassee Marine Institute probation program. DJJ appeared below and filed a motion for clarification of the disposition. DJJ now appeals the disposition and the denial of its motion.
The disposition ordered by the trial court is in the nature of a hybrid disposition, resembling a split sentence, by which the judge could order commitment, but suspend commitment and order the child to complete a probation program. The transcript suggests that the judge intended that if the child failed to complete, or otherwise violated, the probation program, DJJ would then immediately place the child in a residential commitment facility without the need for violation of probation proceedings. The disposition order actually provides that if K.B. fails to complete the probation program, she would be “transferred.”
Such a disposition, although creative, is not among the options provided by our Legislature in section 985.231, Florida Statutes (2000). Trial courts do not have unlimited discretion in ordering dispositions for juveniles. See R.L.B. v. State, 693 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (stating that the trial court’s discretion in imposing a restrictiveness level is circumscribed by statute). The statute defines probation as a legal status imposed “in lieu of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice.” § 985.03(43), Fla. Stat. (2000). Commitment and a probation program that is supposed to be in lieu of commitment are mutually exclusive.
Moreover, a trial court cannot order DJJ to place K.B. in a specific facility. See Dep’t of Juv. Just. v. J.R., 716 So. 2d 872, 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that the trial court lacks the authority to place a juvenile in a particular facility); R.L.B., 693 So. 2d at 131 (“[Tjhere is no mention [in the statute] of court power in regard to actual program placement.”); Dep’t of HRS v. State, 616 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (holding that a juvenile judge does not have the authority to place a child in a specific facility). The legislature affords DJJ the discretion to choose a particular facility. In re. K.A.B., 483 So. 2d 898, 898 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BARFIELD, C.J., KAHN, and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
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M.H. v. State, 69 So. 3d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…e analysis of determining why this disposition was better suited to serving the rehabilitative needs of C.M.H., in the least restrictive setting, and protecting the public from further acts of delinquency. See also Dep’t of Juvenile Justice v. K.B., 784 So. 2d 556, 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to provide the trial court an opportunity to enter an order in compliance with E.A.R., or, if the trial court cannot, impose the probation recommended by the DJJ. See M.K. v. State, 4 So.…
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C.M.H. v. State, 25 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…e analysis of determining why this disposition was better suited to serving the rehabilitative needs of C.M.H., in the least restrictive setting, and protecting the public from further acts of delinquency. See also Dep’t of Juvenile Justice v. K.B., 784 So. 2d 556, 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to provide the trial court an opportunity to enter an order in compliance with E.A.R., or, if the trial court cannot, impose the probation recommended by the DJJ. See M.K. v. State, 4 So.…
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M.A. v. State, 959 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice.” § 985.03(43), Fla. Stat. (2004). “Commitment!,] and a probation program that is supposed to be in lieu of commitment!,] are mutually exclusive.” Dep’t of Juvenile Justice v. K.B., 784 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). The cases M.A. relies upon are inappo-site, involving juveniles who were originally placed on probation or community control, in lieu of being committed. See B.S. v. State, 886 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“the court stayed…
Authorities Cited
- In the Interest of K.A.B. v. Hyson, 483 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. State, 616 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 693 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- King v. King, 716 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Dep't OF Juv. Just. v. J.R., 716 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)