JEFFERY RINN FINCH, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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A petition for belated appeal is denied if the underlying claim for postconviction relief is time-barred.
Petitioner sought a belated appeal, alleging his attorney failed to file a notice of appeal after his 1992 conviction. He learned of the failure after…
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PER CURIAM.
Jeffery Rinn Finch petitions this court for a belated appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(j)(l). We deny the petition because it is time-barred.
Finch alleges he was convicted and sentenced in 1992 of DUI Manslaughter and that he requested his trial attorney to file a notice of appeal. Further, Finch states that when he learned the appeal had not been taken, the 30 day period for noticing the appeal had expired.
In State v. District Court of Appeal, First District, 569 So. 2d 439 (Fla.1990), the court announced that thereafter claims for belated appeal on grounds such as those presented here should be made in the trial court through a motion for posteonviction relief. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b), Finch had two years to file his motion for posteonviction relief and, when he did not do so, the claim was time-barred sometime in 1994.
The promulgation of Rule 9.140®, effective January 1, 1997, superseded State v. District Court. See Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 685 So. 2d 773, 807 (Fla.1996) (Committee Notes). However, there is no basis to conclude that the new rule revived State v. District Court claims which were time-barred under Rule 3.850(b). Accordingly, we find this petition for belated appeal is time-barred and, for that reason, it is denied.
PETITION DENIED.
WOLF, LAWRENCE and DAVIS, JJ., concur.
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Lynn v. State, 719 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…v. State, 707 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). However, we find no basis to conclude that the new rule revived. State v. District Court claims such as Lynn’s that were already time-barred under Rule 3.850(b). Finch v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2020, 717 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (promulgation of new Rule 9.140(j) did not revive appellant’s “belated appeal” claim that was already time-barred in 1994 under the two-year timetable set forth in Rule 3.850(b)). APPEAL DISMISSED. BARFIELD, C.J., and DAVIS,…
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Horton v. State, 734 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…PER CURIAM. DENIED. Lynn v. State, 719 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) and Finch v. State, 717 So. 2d 1070, 23 Fla. L. Weekly 2020 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). KAHN and DAVIS, JJ., and SHIVERS, DOUGLASS B., Senior Judge, concur.…
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Edwards v. State, 745 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…j)(3)(C) provides that “[t]ime periods under this subdivision shall not begin to run prior to the effective date of this rule.” Thus, the instant petition, which was filed in July of 1998,1 was [*1061] timely. The state’s reliance on Finch v. State, 717 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) is misplaced because there, unlike the instant case, the time for raising the claim pursuant to Rule 3.850 had expired prior to Rule 9.140(j) becoming effective. Petitioner has made a showing of entitlement to relief, State v.…
Previewing 3 of 21 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 685 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1996)
- State v. Dist. Court of Appeal of Fla., 569 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1990)