ROBERT BAILEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence of weapons found on the defendant.
[1] A law enforcement officer may stop and temporarily detain an individual if the officer has a founded or reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, or is about to…
[2] Reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop is based on the totality of the circumstances, including the time, location, physical appearance, behavior, and reliability…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing a shooting incident, officers stopped a group of men, one of whom matched a suspect's description and fled. The defendant was apprehended, s…
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W. SHARP, Judge.
Bailey appeals from his judgment and sentences for carrying a concealed firearm and resisting arrest with violence.1 The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Bailey’s motion to suppress evidence of the weapons found concealed on his person after he was stopped, chased, ultimately subdued by police officers and searched. We affirm.
On October 25, 1996, two officers were fired upon during a traffic stop in Cocoa. The suspects, four black males, ran from the vehicle. Sergeant Matthias, Deputy McCarty and Deputy Stouch from the Brevard County Sheriffs Office were setting up a mobile perimeter when they noticed a group of four black males. Sergeant Matthias remained in the vehicle and sent the two deputies to cheek with these men to see if they had seen anything. As the deputies approached, Bailey separated himself from the other three men. While the deputies were talking to the three men, Bailey put his left hand in his jacket pocket, put his right hand in his pants pocket and continued working his way around behind the two deputies^
Sergeant Matthias obtained a description of one of the suspects over the radio as 5’7”, heavy build, wearing a gray jacket. Bailey was 5’8”, 180 pounds and was wearing a gray colored, denim jacket. As Sergeant Matthias yelled to Deputy McCarty, “[t]he man with the hand in his jacket, he fits the description,” Bailey broke away and ran behind the buildings. Bailey was ultimately subdued by the officers and searched. Officers found a loaded .38 caliber, semi-automatic weapon in Bailey’s left pocket and a loaded .32 caliber handgun in his right pants pocket. Bailey’s motion to suppress this evidence was denied.
Bailey argues that the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop because the officers only had a vague description that could apply to many people The record shows the deputies were involved in a eitizen/police encounter when they initially approached and spoke with the four men.
However, this encounter clearly escalated to a stop when Sergeant Matthias told the deputies to grab Bailey as he fit the description of one of the suspects. The totality of the circumstances appear sufficient to support this detention of Bailey: the group of men were only two to three blocks away from the shooting incident, they were in the direction where the suspects were seen running, they were encountered within an hour or so of the shooting, and the BOLO came from law enforcement officers. The description of a suspect as 5’9”, heavy build and wearing a gray jacket fit Bailey who was 5’8”, 180 pounds and wearing a gray denim jacket.
A law enforcement officer may stop and temporarily detain an individual if the officer has a founded or reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, or is about to commit a crime. Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1128, 116 S.Ct. 946, 133 L.Ed.2d 871 (1996); State v. Hunter, 615 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 626 So. 2d 205 (Fla.1993).
A founded or reasonable suspicion is a suspicion which has some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer, when those circumstances are interpreted in the light of the officer’s knowledge. Factors which reasonably suggest a suspect’s possible commission of a crime involve a consideration of the time, day of the week, location, physical appearance, behavior, appearance, operation of a motor vehicle, any incongruity and the reliability of the BOLO. Hunter, 615 So. 2d at 731. See also State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
In Hunter, the Florida Supreme Court noted that factors relevant in assessing the legitimacy of a vehicle stop pursuant to a BOLO included 1) the length of time and distance from the offense; 2) route of flight; 3) specificity of the description of the vehicle and its occupants; and 4) the source of the BOLO information. 660 So. 2d at 248.
Under these circumstances, the trial court was correct in denying Bailey’s motion to suppress. See State v. Vance, 692 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (officer had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle based on a BOLO radio alert which described the vehicle and its occupants and the officer spotted the vehicle near its expected location a short time after the BOLO was issued); Freeman v. State, 450 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (stop of the defendant was reasonable where the defendant matched the description of fugitives observed in the area, defendant was acting suspiciously and ran when approached by the officers); State v. Jones, 417 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (stop of defendant’s vehicle two to three miles away from scene of robbery about two to three minutes after officers had received a general description of the robbers was proper).
AFFIRMED.
COBB and GOSHORN, JJ, concur. . §§ 790.01(2), 843.01, Fla. Slat.
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McMASTER v. State, 780 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…support a stop.” Popple, 626 So. 2d at 186 (citing Carter v. State, 454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)); see also Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1128, 116 S.Ct. 946, 133 L.Ed.2d 871 (1996); Ramos; Bailey v. State, 717 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). This rule has been applied by the courts many times to investigatory stops of individuals in automobiles. See, e.g., Jaudon v. State, 749 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that evidence should have been suppressed where off…1 / 2
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Jones v. State, 806 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…which has some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer, when those circumstances are interpreted in the light of the officer's knowledge.” McMaster v. State, 780 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (quoting Bailey v. State, 717 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)). Whether an officer has a “founded suspicion” for a stop depends on the totality of the circumstances, interpreted in light of the officer’s knowledge and experience at the time of the stop. A mere "hunch” that criminal ac…
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State v. Goebel, 804 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…he leaned back in his seat in an effort to conceal himself, and he acted scared and surprised. Under the factual circumstances as found in this case, we agree with the state that the motion to suppress should have been denied. See Bailey v. State, 717 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); State v. Vance, 692 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Freeman v. State, 450 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); State v. Jones, 417 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In this case the deputy saw Goebel within minutes of the robbery, driv…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1995)
- State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- State v. Jones, 417 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Harris v. State, 615 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Simmons v. Pennsylvania, 516 U.S. 1128 (U.S. 1996)
- Hunter v. Florida, 516 U.S. 1128 (U.S. 1996)
- Freeman v. State, 450 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- State v. Vance, 692 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)