STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ERIC JAMES GOEBEL, APPELLEE
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The State appealed the trial court's grant of a motion to suppress evidence from a vehicle stop. The appellate court reversed, holding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Goebel's vehicle based on his proximity to a recent robbery, matching physical description, and suspicious behavior.
The court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. Considering the Hunter factors—length of time and distance from offense, route of flight, specificity of description, and source of BOLO information—all factors supported reasonable suspicion, particularly given the proximity in time and location to the robbery, the specific matching description, the late hour with minimal traffic, and Goebel's suspicious behavior.
[1] A police officer may stop a vehicle based on a "be on the lookout" (BOLO) if the stop is supported by reasonable suspicion that the occupant has committed or is about to…
[2] Factors relevant in assessing the legitimacy of a vehicle stop pursuant to a BOLO include the length of time and distance from the offense, route of flight, specificity o…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the question is whether, given the foregoing facts, the police officer had a reasonable suspicion that justified the stop of Goebel's vehicle for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior”
Establishes the legal standard to be applied on appeal—whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify the stop.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAt approximately 2:30 a.m. on March 17, 2001, a Sprint store was robbed. A BOLO was issued describing a white male, tall, thin build, blond hair, blue…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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COBB, J.
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order granting a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the stop of Goe-bel’s vehicle. We reverse.
The facts as found by the trial court are not in dispute:
At approximately 2:30 in the morning, of March 17th, 2001, the Sprint store (a gasoline and convenience store), on Anastasia Boulevard, was robbed. Based upon the 911 call, a be on the lookout (BOLO) was issued for a white male, tall, with a thin build, blond hair, blue eyes, wearing a dark colored shirt, and blue jean shorts. No direction of travel was given, nor was any description of an automobile given. At that time, Deputy Tony Matuse was traveling northbound on A1A, from Ocean Trace Road in St. Augustine Beach. When Deputy Matuse crossed SR-312, he observed a vehicle coming southbound on Anastasia Boulevard, also known as A1A and SR 3. He shined his flashlight into the vehicle and saw that it was occupied by a white male, wearing a white baseball cap and a dark shirt. Deputy Ma-tuse observed the male to lean back into the seat as if concealing himself. Deputy Matuse then turned to follow the vehicle and stopped the vehicle after it turned onto SR-312. Upon approaching the vehicle, he observed that the individual in the vehicle was wearing a pair of blue jean shorts; then he called for back up. The witnesses from the robbery were called and identified the defendant, Eric Goebel, as being the robber. The question is whether, given the foregoing facts, the police officer had a reasonable suspicion that justified the stop of Goebel’s vehicle for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior. See J.L. v. State, 727 So. 2d 204 (Fla.1998), affirmed, 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000); State v. Hunter, 615 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 626 So. 2d 205 (Fla.1993).
In Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1128, 116 S.Ct. 946, 133 L.Ed.2d 871 (1996), the Florida Supreme Court noted that factors relevant in assessing the legitimacy of a vehicle stop pursuant to a BOLO included: (1) the length of time and distance from the offense; (2) route of flight; (3) specificity of the description of the vehicle and its occupants; and (4) the source of the BOLO information. Hunter at 248.
The state contends that all of these enumerated factors militate against the ruling of the trial court. The state’s brief argues:
The length of time and distance from the offense were both short. Less than ten minutes after the robbery, and within minutes of hearing the BOLO, the deputy saw Appellee’s vehicle a short distance from the robbery scene. (R. 15, 35) The vehicle was heading away from the robbery scene. The description of the robber was very specific in physical and clothing details, and Appel-lee matched the description. The source of the BOLO information was the victims of the robbery, a store clerk and her teenage daughter, who had an ample opportunity to view and describe the robbery. Additional factors which support the reasonable suspicion are the fact that the crime occurred at 2:30 a.m. Appellee’s vehicle was the only car on the road. His behavior also added to the reasonable suspicion; he leaned back in his seat in an effort to conceal himself, and he acted scared and surprised.
Under the factual circumstances as found in this case, we agree with the state that the motion to suppress should have been denied. See Bailey v. State, 717 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); State v. Vance, 692 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Freeman v. State, 450 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); State v. Jones, 417 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In this case the deputy saw Goebel within minutes of the robbery, driving away from the scene late at night in the only car in the area. Additionally, he appeared to “lean back as if concealing himself.”
REVERSED.
HARRIS and ORFINGER, R.B., JJ., concur.
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State v. Gelin, 844 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…t the BOLO provided Detective King, a Miami Beach police officer, and his colleagues with the reasonable suspicion necessary to follow and ultimately stop the defendants. See Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 249 (Fla.1995); see also State v. Goebel, 804 So. 2d 1276, 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). The Florida Supreme Court has previously outlined several factors relevant in assessing the legitimacy of a vehicle stop pursuant to a BOLO, including: “(1) the length of time and distance from the offense; (2) route of fl…
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State v. Outler, 20 So. 3d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…suspicious sojourn down the Palmetto Expressway. Defendants erratic and evasive driving— which apparently coincided with his realization he was being tailed — only served to increase the reasonableness of the officers suspicion. See State v. Goebel, 804 So. 2d 1276, 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (evasive driving may serve as one factor among many in a finding of reasonable articulable suspicion); accord State v. Smith, 529 So. 2d 1226, 1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Harrison v. State, 442 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 5th DCA 19…
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Goebel v. State, 848 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…However, no motions were filed by Goebel’s counsel, nor was an answer brief filed. On January 25, 2002, this court reversed the trial court’s order, finding that there was reasonable suspicion justifying the stop of the vehicle. See State v. Goebel, 804 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). No motion for rehearing was filed by Goebel’s counsel. After the case was remanded, the State filed a second information, charging Goe-bel with attempted burglary of a structure or conveyance and possession of burglary tools. G…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266 (U.S. 2000)
- Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1995)
- J.L. v. State, 727 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1998)
- State v. Jones, 417 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Harris v. State, 615 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Simmons v. Pennsylvania, 516 U.S. 1128 (U.S. 1996)
- Hunter v. Florida, 516 U.S. 1128 (U.S. 1996)
- Bailey v. State, 717 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Freeman v. State, 450 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- State v. Vance, 692 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)