DAVID C. WALKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the sexual predator designation is a status resulting from conviction, not a punishment, and can be sought post-sentencing under the statute.
[1] A sexual predator designation is a status resulting from conviction of certain crimes, not a sentence or punishment.
[2] A trial court may designate an offender as a sexual predator after sentencing for the current offense if the offense was committed between October 1, 1995, and October 1,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavid C. Walker was charged with sex crimes and pleaded guilty, receiving a sentence. After sentencing, the state sought to have him declared a sexual…
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PER CURIAM.
David C. Walker appeals a post-sentencing order declaring him to be a sexual predator pursuant to section 775.21, Florida Statutes (Supp.1996). We affirm.
Walker was charged in October of 1996, with two counts of lewd assault and one count of sexual battery on a person less than twelve years of age, all crimes allegedly taking place between July 19,1996, and September 9, 1996. Shortly thereafter the state filed its notice of intent to have Walker declared a sexual predator. Walker subsequently pled guilty to the charges and was sentenced to eight years incarceration followed by ten years probation.
Several months after Walker was sentenced the state filed a second notice of its intent to have Walker declared a sexual predator. In opposition to the motion, Walker argued that because he was not declared a sexual predator at the time of sentencing, the 1996 amendment to section 775.21 allowed the state attorney to bring the issue to the court’s attention only if Walker was improperly registered as a sexual predator by the Department of Corrections, the Department of Law Enforcement, or another law enforcement agency. The trial court granted the state’s motion and this appeal followed.
We affirm the order designating Walker a sexual predator, rejecting Walker’s contention section 775.21 is penal in nature and must be construed in favor of the defendant. The sexual predator designation “is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes.” Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Section 775.21(4)(b)2, Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), like section 775.21(4)(a)2, allows trial courts to designate offenders who committed their current offenses between October 1, 1995, and October 1, 1996, as sexual predators after they have been sentenced for the current offense. See Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Therefore, the order on appeal is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
WARNER, POLEN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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Renoit Saintelien v. State, 990 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 2008)…punishment, it cannot be challenged by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence in criminal court. Rather, it held that such challenges [*496] must be raised in separate civil proceedings. Saintelien, 937 So. 2d at 235 (citing Walker v. State, 718 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Connor v. State, 773 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). In so holding, the Fourth District certified conflict -with the Second District’s decision in King and the Fifth District’s decision in Kidd. DISCUSSION At the outset, we…1 / 2
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Cabrera v. State, 884 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…nstitutional principles of separation of powers or procedural due process either pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(D) or by way of certiorari. Id. at 1168 n. 1 (citation omitted). Another analogous case is Walker v. State, 718 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), wherein the defendant was designated a sexual predator after he was sentenced. The court upheld the designation and stated: The sexual predator designation "is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting f…
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Burgos v. State, 765 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…he definition of criminal conduct and does nof constitute punishment.” Id. We noted that we had previously found section 943.0435 to be regulatory and “[rjegulatory statutes do not constitute punishment.” Id. (citation omitted). See Walker v. State, 718 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“The sexual predator designation ‘is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting from the conviction of' certain crimes.’ ”) (quoting Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)); Ortega…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)