TIMOTHY D. CLARK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1998-09-23
No. 98-02154
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and FULMER and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur.
720 So. 2d 1097 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1998) Caution
Cited by 9 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Timothy Clark appealed the trial court's summary denial of his postconviction 3.850 motion based on alleged lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court retained jurisdiction to consider Clark's ineffective assistance of counsel claims even though a separate appeal from his sexual predator designation was pending.


Holding

The trial court retains jurisdiction to consider a rule 3.850 motion because the subject matter is unrelated to the appeal of the sexual predator designation. The trial court can address the merits of ineffective assistance of counsel claims without interfering with the appellate court's review of the sexual predator appeal.


Headnotes

[1] A pending appeal of a sexual predator designation does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to consider a postconviction motion raising ineffective assistance of co…

[2] The trial court has jurisdiction to consider a postconviction motion when its subject matter is unrelated to an appeal pending before an appellate court.

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Key Quotes

“the trial court has jurisdiction to hear Clark's rule 3.850 motion because its subject matter is unrelated to the appeal of his sexual predator designation”

Establishes the controlling principle that jurisdiction depends on whether the issues are related, not merely whether an appeal is pending.

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Facts & Procedural History

Clark was convicted of capital sexual battery in 1995, with the conviction becoming final in October 1997. In January 1998, he filed a rule 3.850 moti…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

[*1098] PER CURIAM.

Timothy Clark appeals the summary denial of his postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction because Clark had an appeal pending before this court. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand this cause for the court to consider Clark’s motion on the merits.

Clark was convicted in 1995 of capital sexual battery, which conviction became final in October of 1997.

On January 12,1998, Clark filed a rule 3.850 motion collaterally attacking his conviction which raised various ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

On January 28, 1998, the state attorney filed a “Notice of Intent to Declare Defendant a Sexual Predator,” pursuant to section 775.21, Florida Statutes (1997).

In April 1998, while Clark’s 3.850 motion was pending in the trial court, a hearing on the State’s sexual predator notice was held.

The trial court determined that Clark met all of the relevant criteria of section 775.21 and entered an order finding him to be a sexual predator. Clark filed a timely notice of appeal of this designation. See Downs v. State, 700 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that an order designating a defendant a sexual predator is appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(C)).

In May 1998, the trial court considered Clark’s rule 3.850 motion while Clark’s appeal from the sexual predator designation was pending before this court.

The trial court concluded that Clark’s appeal divested it of jurisdiction to consider his rule 3.850 motion, citing First v. State, 677 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that trial court had no jurisdiction over a rule 3.800(a) motion challenging the illegality of a sentence when a plenary appeal of that sentence and the underlying judgment was pending).

We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction. Initially, after the 1996 amendments to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(d), First has lost its vitality. See Denson v. State, 711 So. 2d 1225, 1226 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). More significantly, the trial court has jurisdiction to hear Clark’s rule 3.850 motion because its subject matter is unrelated to the appeal of his sexual predator designation. His rule 3.850 motion raises various ineffectiveness of counsel claims associated with his conviction for capital sexual battery.

The trial court could consider the merits of Clark’s rule 3.850 motion without passing judgment on any of the issues this court would need to consider when reviewing Clark’s sexual predator designation on appeal. Since the issues involved are different, the trial court has jurisdiction. Cf. Montague v. State, 710 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (citing Bates v. State, 704 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), for the proposition that the appeal of a postconviction motion will not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over a subsequent postconviction motion unless the issues are similar).

Accordingly, we reverse and remand this 'cause for the trial court to consider Clark’s motion on the merits.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and FULMER and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Wilson v. State, 814 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
    …n to "withdraw his plea. While there are exceptions to the general rule that filing a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction, those exceptions do not apply here. See Kit v. State, 705 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Clark v. State, 720 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). This court on direct appeal cannot take jurisdiction over a challenge to the voluntariness of a plea unless the defendant has first filed in the trial court a motion to withdraw that plea and the trial .court has denied the moti…
  • Mitchell v. State, 846 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
    …the same case was pending in the appellate court); Keel v. State, 740 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)(holding that a court can rule on a rule 3.850 motion when an appeal is pending from the denial of an unrelated rule 3.800(a) motion); Clark v. State, 720 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)(holding trial court could consider merits of rule 3.850 motion, raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims, while appeal of sexual predator designation was pending). We note that if the trial court had denied resen-tencing,…
  • Ross v. State, 947 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
    …ase presents a different set of facts from those where a lower court had jurisdiction to consider a rule 3.850 motion while the defendant appealed a new sentence imposed after getting relief from a separate postconviction motion. Cf. Clark v. State, 720 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (Trial court could consider the merits of rule 3.850 motion, raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims, while appeal of sexual predator designation was pending.); Cross v. State, 930 So. 2d 863, 864-65 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“…

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