SHORE MARINER CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., A FLORIDA NOT-FOR-PROFIT CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER,
v.
NASHAAT ANTONIOUS AND SOHEIR ANTONIOUS, HIS WIFE, RESPONDENTS
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Shore Mariner Condominium Association petitioned for a writ of prohibition to disqualify a trial judge who allegedly suggested strategic defenses to the opposing party during litigation over a motor vehicle easement access dispute. The appellate court granted the petition, holding that the judge improperly interjected himself into the case by suggesting the necessity defense to the defendant.
The court held that while the judge's encouragement of settlement negotiations was appropriate, his alleged instruction to the defendant to amend pleadings to include necessity defenses was legally sufficient grounds for disqualification, as it constituted improper strategic advice favoring one party and breached the principle that judges must avoid the appearance of favoring one party.
[1] A trial judge's suggestion to a party on how to amend pleadings to include specific defenses constitutes improper interjection into the litigation and warrants disqualifi…
[2] Trial judges must studiously avoid the appearance of favoring one party in a lawsuit.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Trial judges must studiously avoid the appearance of favoring one party in a lawsuit, and suggesting to counsel or a party how to proceed strategically constitutes a breach of this principle.”
Establishes the core legal standard for judicial disqualification based on improper strategic guidance.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceShore Mariner Condominium Association owned a pedestrian easement and sued the Antonious defendants over their construction of a garage requiring moto…
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PER CURIAM.
In its petition for writ of prohibition, Shore Mariner Condominium Association, Inc. (Shore) challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion to disqualify the sitting judge. We hold that the trial court interjected itself into the litigation improperly by suggesting an additional defense to the civil defendant and grant the relief requested.
For the most part, the claims advanced by Shore in its shotgun attack on the trial judge are legally insufficient. The litigation centers around the access the defendants (Antonious) require for a motor vehicle to reach a newly-constructed garage for their home which apparently violates the terms of a pedestrian easement owned by Shore. The trial judge suggested to the parties that they consider settling this dispute by arranging for Antonious to purchase a right-of-way, because if the matter proceeded to judgment, he cautioned, no such compromise was possible and there would be a “clear winner and loser.” Antonious points out that Shore’s sense of outrage about the trial judge’s suggestion for settlement is misplaced. For one, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200(a)(7) itself contemplates discussions between civil parties and the trial court about compromise settlements; additionally, most challenges, whether contested over the permitted uses of an easement or the distance of a footrace, are concluded by declaring an outright winner. We find nothing disturbing or inappropriate about the way the trial judge attempted to encourage a resolution of this dispute.
As well, Shore takes exception to comments the judge made about the impact a judgment for Shore would have on Antonious. At the time, the judge had heard two days of testimony, over a period of months, and these musings were nothing more than impressions of the case which the trial judge had formed during the presentation of evidence, which ease law properly recognizes is an inevitable byproduct of human decision-making. See Brown v. Pate, 577 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Mobil v. Trask, 463 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Shore alleges in its affidavits in support of its motion to disqualify the trial court that the judge instructed Antonious to amend his pleadings to include defenses associated with necessity. It is unrefuted that shortly after these comments were purportedly made, and at a time well after the trial had been under way, Antonious moved successfully to amend his pleadings to include these defenses. We hold that this allegation is legally sufficient, and that the trial judge should have granted the motion. Trial judges must studiously avoid the appearance of favoring one party in-a lawsuit, and suggesting to counsel or a party how to proceed strategically constitutes a breach of this principle. See Chastine v. Broome, 629 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (holding that a trial judge’s provision of strategic advice to a party during a trial demonstrated impermissible bias); see also J.F. v. State, 718 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (disapproving a trial judge who assisted with a delinquency prosecution by requesting the production of additional State’s evidence).
Petition for writ of prohibition granted.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and QUINCE and WHATLEY, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Great Am. Ins. Co. OF NEW York v. 2000 Island Boulevard Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 153 So. 3d 384 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…837, 838 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“We grant relief in connection with the trial court’s order that denied disqualification as the trial court provided Blackpool/Kevin Murphy with legal advice and suggestions.”); Shore Mariner Condo. Ass’n v. Antonious, 722 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“Trial judges must studiously avoid the appearance of favoring one party in a lawsuit, and suggesting to counsel or a party how to proceed strategically constitutes a breach of this principle.”); Leigh v. Smith, 503 So. 2d 9…
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State v. Ambrose Dixon and Johan Matienzo, 217 So. 3d 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…the judgment. “Trial judges must studiously avoid the appearance of favoring one party in a lawsuit, and suggesting to counsel or a party how to proceed strategically constitutes a breach of this principle.” Shore Mariner Condo. Ass’n v. Antonious, 722 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). [*1127] (3) Comments demonstrating hostility and/or bias against the State The trial judge accused the State of having a “lackadaisical bureaucratic attitude” and of “negligence, or dereliction, or plain out bureaucratic la…
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Digiovanni v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 226 So. 3d 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…T.W., 846 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). A judge should “never suggest or advise counsel how to try his or her case.” Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Marquez, 180 So. 3d 219, 221 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (citing Shore Mariner Condo. Ass’n v. Antonious, 722 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), for the proposition that “[t]rial judges must studiously avoid the appearance of favoring one party in a lawsuit, and suggesting to counsel or a party how to proceed strategically constitutes a breach of this principle”). H…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kirby Lynn Chastine v. The Honorable Va. Gay Broome, 629 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- J. F. v. State, 718 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Lapinell Mobil & Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. The Honorable David L. Trask, 463 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Brown v. Pate, 577 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)