B.L.N., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A minor (B.L.N.) was convicted of grand theft auto and ordered to pay $1200 restitution. The court reversed the restitution award because it was based on incompetent evidence—specifically, hearsay estimates that were properly objected to and testimony from a vehicle owner lacking personal knowledge of transmission repair costs.
The restitution award must be reversed because it was based on incompetent evidence. The written estimates were properly excluded as hearsay and did not qualify under the business records exception. The vehicle owner was not qualified to testify to repair costs because he had no personal knowledge of the transmission repair process or its costs.
[1] Restitution awards must be based upon competent evidence.
[2] Written repair estimates offered to prove the amount of restitution are inadmissible hearsay unless an exception applies.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“although a trial judge is afforded broad leeway when determining the amount of restitution, restitution must nonetheless be based upon competent evidence”
Establishes the governing standard that despite judicial discretion, restitution orders require competent evidentiary support
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant B.L.N. was convicted of grand theft auto for stealing a 1988 Chrysler LeBaron. At the restitution hearing, the State offered two written rep…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant was convicted of grand theft auto for stealing a 1988 Chrysler LeBaron. Appellant appeals the award of $1200 restitution, claiming that the figure was based upon incompetent evidence. We agree, and accordingly we reverse.
During the restitution hearing, the State attempted to enter into evidence two written repair estimates obtained by the owner. The public defender objected on hearsay grounds, and the trial judge sustained the objection. The owner, an engine mechanic with nine years experience, was then asked to testify as to his knowledge of the cost of replacing transmissions. He admitted that he had never repaired transmissions himself and that he was personally unable to assess the cost to repair his transmission. Appellant’s counsel objected due to the owner’s lack of personal knowledge of transmission repair. The trial judge overruled the objection and allowed the owner to testify. The owner testified that to his knowledge he had heard of transmission repairs costing anywhere from $600 to $2500, depending upon the vehicle. The State then asked the owner how much he was requesting to repair his vehicle, to which he replied “$1200,” which was the amount of the lower of the two estimates. The trial judge awarded $1200 in restitution.
The Florida Supreme Court has explained that although a trial judge is afforded broad leeway when determining the amount of restitution, restitution must nonetheless be based upon competent evidence. See Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 915-16 (Fla.1997). Appellant properly objected to the introduction of the written estimates as hearsay, because they were being offered into evidence to prove the matter asserted, the amount of restitution. The estimates do not qualify under section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes, which provides a hearsay exception for business records.
Moreover, the vehicle’s owner was not qualified to testify to the amount needed to repair his transmission because, by his own admission, he had no personal knowledge of the repair process and, accordingly, the cost of repair. In Branker v. State, 650 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), the defendant appealed a restitution order based upon fair market value estimates collected telephonically by the victim, who had purchased the defendant’s home after it was foreclosed. The trial court deemed the victim, who was a speculator, real estate broker, and home improvement salesman, competent to testify as to the value of items stolen by the defendant. The appellate court concluded that the victim’s experience did not qualify him to testify on the condition of the items stolen from the home because he had not owned the home long enough to gain personal knowledge of the items at the time of the theft. His testimony, the court found, was therefore based upon the knowledge of others and consequently he was incompetent to testify on the value and condition of the stolen items. See id. at 196. We agree with the Fourth DCA’s conclusions.
Accordingly, the restitution order is reversed and we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
MINER and LAWRENCE, JJ., and McDONALD, PARKER LEE, Senior Judge, concur.
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I.M. v. State, 958 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…he opinions of his vendors, who did not testify. On remand, written estimates may suffice, so long as they satisfy the requirements of business records under section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes (2005), or are uncontested. See, e.g., B.L.N. v. State, 722 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); C.S. v. State, 617 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Bonner v. State, 899 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Davis v. State, 707 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Also at the hearing below, the court deferred monthly payment of restit…
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Forlano v. State, 964 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…PER CURIAM. As the State concedes, the trial court erred in awarding restitution to the extent the award was based on hearsay evidence which was admitted over objection. See Herrington v. State, 823 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); B.L.N. v. State, 722 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); C.S. v. State, 617 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Williams v. State, 850 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The State offered competent proof of other elements of damage to the victim, but elicited only hearsay as to the cost of re…
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Craft v. State, 769 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…al court only had the victim’s testimony on that issue. We conclude that Craft’s testimony as to the estimates was hearsay, and it was therefore insufficient to support a finding that there was $9,000 worth of damage to the car. See B.L.N. v. State, 722 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that vehicle’s owner was not qualified to testify to the amount needed to repair his transmission where he had no personal knowledge of the repair process and, therefore, the cost of repair); Moore v. State, 694 So. 2d 8…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1997)
- Loraine Branker v. State, 650 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)