DENISE DANIELLE CRAFT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court's determination of restitution amount was not supported by sufficient evidence.
The defendant pleaded nolo contendere to grand theft and other offenses, and was ordered to pay restitution for damages to the victim's car. The trial…
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WHATLEY, Acting Chief Judge.
Denise Danielle Craft appeals a trial court order directing her to pay restitution in the amount of $5,700. We conclude that the trial court’s determination of the amount of restitution is not supported by sufficient, competent evidence and, accordingly, reverse.
Craft pleaded nolo contendere to grand theft, driving while her license was suspended, and fleeing and eluding. As a condition of her probation, Craft was ordered to pay restitution for damages to the victim’s car. The trial court based the restitution order on its findings that the victim’s car was worth $5,700 before it was stolen and, when it was recovered, it was totaled. Craft argues on appeal that there was no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the car was totaled. We agree.
The victim testified that, at the time of the restitution hearing, she had spent approximately $5,000 for repairs to her car. In addition, she testified that she would have to pay $4,000 for other necessary repairs. We note that no documentary evidence was presented at the hearing regarding the $4,000 estimated repair cost. The trial court only had the victim’s testimony on that issue. We conclude that Craft’s testimony as to the estimates was hearsay, and it was therefore insufficient to support a finding that there was $9,000 worth of damage to the car. See B.L.N. v. State, 722 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that vehicle’s owner was not qualified to testify to the amount needed to repair his transmission where he had no personal knowledge of the repair process and, therefore, the cost of repair); Moore v. State, 694 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that hearsay evidence was inadmissible to prove the amount of restitution). Because no other evidence was introduced suggesting that the car was totaled, we reverse the restitution order and remand this cause for a new restitution hearing.
Reversed and remanded.
STRINGER and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.
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T.J.N. v. State, 977 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…L., 110 S.W. 3d 591, 595 (Tex.App.2003); see Williams v. State, 850 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (reversing restitution award which was based on hearsay evidence from the prosecutor regarding estimates for repair of a vehicle); Craft v. State, 769 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (reversing restitution award because it was based on hearsay testimony from the victim regarding estimate for repairs to her vehicle); see also Atkins v. State, 728 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (reversing restitution a…
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State v. Schuette, 782 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…, 688 So. 2d at 915. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying restitution and remand for a new hearing affording the state an opportunity to submit documentary evidence to prove3 the amount of the victim’s damages. See Craft v. State, 769 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Because the Triplett court did not recede from its prior opinion, however, we also certify conflict with Cheek. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS DECISION. WARNER, C.J., and SHAHOOD, J., c…
Authorities Cited
- Moore v. State, 694 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- B.L.N. v. State, 722 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)