E.B., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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E.B., a juvenile, appealed a delinquency adjudication for battery and disorderly conduct, challenging the trial court's reservation of jurisdiction for restitution and the maximum period of commitment. The appellate court affirmed the adjudication but remanded for correction of the commitment period and clarification that E.B. was tried rather than pleaded guilty.
The restitution challenge was premature because the trial court had only reserved jurisdiction pending a later factual determination of damages; it is the trial court's duty to determine whether and to what extent the victim suffered damages. The trial court erred in failing to set maximum commitment periods of one year for battery and sixty days for disorderly conduct as required by statute.
[1] A challenge to a restitution order is premature when the trial court has merely reserved jurisdiction to determine at a later hearing whether restitution should be ordere…
[2] An appellate court will not review the propriety of a restitution order until the trial court has made a factual determination regarding the victim's damages caused by th…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is the duty and responsibility of the trial court, not the appellate court, to make a factual determination whether, and to what extent, the victim has suffered any damages caused by appellant's conduct.”
Establishes that restitution challenges are premature at the appellate level before the trial court determines actual damages.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceE.B. was charged with two counts of battery and one count of disorderly conduct arising from two separate school incidents involving the same victim. …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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TAYLOR, J.
E.B., a juvenile, appeals from a disposition order adjudicating him delinquent on charges of battery and disorderly conduct. Appellant was charged with two counts of battery and one count of disorderly conduct as a result of two separate school incidents involving the same victim. The court found that appellant committed a battery upon the victim in the first incident but found that the battery alleged in the second incident was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in reserving jurisdiction to order restitution since the court found that appellant committed a battery only during the incident wherein evidence showed that appellant merely pushed or shoved the victim but did not injure him. We disagree and find that appellant’s restitution challenge has been made prematurely. The trial court merely reserved jurisdiction to determine at a later hearing whether restitution should be ordered, and, if so, in what amount. It is the duty and responsibility of the trial court, not the appellate court, to make a factual determination whether, and to what extent, the victim has suffered any damages caused by appellant’s conduct. Only after such a determination has been made by the trial court does the issue of the propriety of a restitution order become ripe for review. See § 39.054(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (1995); J.O.S. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1997); In the Interest of B.M., 580 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
As to appellant’s second issue on appeal, the state concedes, and we agree, that the trial court erred in failing to set a maximum period of commitment of one year for the battery offense and sixty days for the disorderly conduct offense. §§ 39.054(4), 784.03(1), 877 .03, 775.082(4)(a), 775.082(4)(b) Fla. Stat. (1995).
Additionally, upon review of the record on appeal, it appears that the disposition order erroneously states “entry of a plea of guilty” rather than “trial.”
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court and remand only for correction of the order of commitment to reflect that the commitment is for a maximum period of no more than one (1) year for the battery and sixty days for the disorderly conduct, and that E.B. did not enter a guilty plea but was tried and adjudicated delinquent.
AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED.
POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
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Ledoux-Nottingham v. Downs, 163 So. 3d 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…dparents make up visitation or time-sharing. Rather, the trial court specifically reserved jurisdiction to consider Grandparents’ motion for enforcement/contempt and make-up visitation. Therefore, the issue is not ripe for appeal. See E.B. v. State, 724 So. 2d 140, 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (finding that the issue was not ripe for appeal as “[t]he trial court merely reserved jurisdiction to determine at a later hearing ... ”). On remand, the trial court is directed to promptly address Grandparents’ motion for m…
Authorities Cited
- J.O.S. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1997)
- In the Interest of B.M., 580 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)