GUY HAMMOND, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1999-01-15
No. 97-01835
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and GREEN, J., Concur.
727 So. 2d 979 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1999) Negative Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

Guy Hammond appeals his convictions for capital sexual battery and lewd and lascivious acts against two minor children. The appellate court affirms the convictions, holding that Hammond failed to preserve for appeal his argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike a juror for cause.


Holding

No. Hammond failed to preserve the issue because he did not inform the trial court that his request for additional peremptory challenges was to replace the challenge he was forced to use on Mulligan. Instead, he grounded his request for additional challenges on a different legal theory—the discretionary authority to grant more challenges based on the number of counts charged.


Headnotes

[1] To preserve an error in the denial of a motion to strike a juror for cause, a defendant must use all peremptory challenges, request an additional challenge, and identify…

[2] A defendant must state the specific legal grounds for an objection to preserve the issue for appellate review.

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Key Quotes

“In order to preserve such an error, the defendant must use all his peremptory challenges, request an additional challenge, and identify the objectionable juror he would strike.”

Establishes the three-part test required to preserve a cause challenge error for appeal.

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Facts & Procedural History

During jury selection, potential juror Ms. Mulligan disclosed employment at the Child Protection Center, where two of the State's witnesses also worke…

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Opinion of the Court
NORTHCUTT, Judge.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Guy Hammond raises five issues in this appeal of his convictions for capital sexual battery and lewd and lascivious acts committed on two minor children. We affirm, but we address Hammond’s argument that the circuit court should have stricken a juror for cause. We find no merit in his other points on appeal, and do not discuss them.

During jury selection one of the potential jurors, Ms. Mulligan, disclosed that she was employed by the Child Protection Center. Two of the State’s witnesses, Genie O’Brien and Dr. Katherine Keeley, also worked with this agency and had interviewed the children Hammond allegedly abused. Ms. Mulligan knew both witnesses, and she had actually typed Dr. Keeley’s report in this ease. When the prosecutor initially asked how she felt about being a juror in a child abuse case, she responded “I think I could be impartial.” When the State informed her that Dr. Keeley would be a witness at trial, she again stated “I mean I think I could be impartial.” Hammond moved to strike Ms. Mulligan from the jury, but the court denied his request. He used a peremptory strike to remove her. We cannot reach the issue of whether the circuit court erred in refusing to strike the potential juror for cause because we find that Hammond failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. In order to preserve such an error, the defendant must use all his peremptory challenges, request an additional challenge, and identify the objectionable juror he would strike. See Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla.1990).

Hammond did request additional peremptory challenges and identify jurors he would strike, but his basis for doing so was not the court’s denial of his request to strike Ms. Mulligan. Instead, he argued that the court had discretion to award more peremptory challenges because the information charged six counts, five of which were capital crimes. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.350. The court did not grant any additional challenges.

We have found no decisions requiring a defendant to specifically state that he is requesting an additional peremptory challenge because the court did not grant his motion to strike a particular juror for cause. But we believe preservation of this type of error is analogous to preservation of error at trial. To obtain appellate review of such error, a party must object and state the specific legal grounds for the objection. See Bertolotti v. Dugger, 514 So. 2d 1095, 1096 (Fla.1987); Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982). One purpose of this rule is to place the trial court on notice that it may have committed error, thereby providing an opportunity to correct it. See Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla.1978).

We think the same purpose applies to a request for additional peremptory challenges. If Hammond had informed the court that he sought an additional challenge to replace the one he was forced to use on Ms. Mulligan, the court would have had an opportunity to reconsider its earlier ruling. Instead, he gave a completely different reason why he should be granted more peremptory challenges. Again analogizing to the contemporaneous objection rule, when a defendant raises an appellate issue founded on an objection at trial, his argument must be based on the specific contentions asserted as grounds for the objection below. See Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493, 499 (Fla.1992); Steinhorst, 412 So. 2d at 338. Because Hammond did not mention Ms. Mulligan when he asked for extra peremptory challenges, he failed to preserve any error in the court’s refusal to strike her for cause.

Affirmed.

THREADGILL, A.C.J., and GREEN, J., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • COX v. State, 764 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
    …on in denying his request for additional peremptory challenges. See Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 834, 114 S.Ct. 109, 126 L.Ed.2d 74 (D.Fla.1993); Parker v. State, 456 So. 2d 436, 442 (Fla.1984); Hammond v. State, 727 So. 2d 979, 980 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), pet. for review dismissed, 752 So. 2d 559 (Fla.2000). Therefore, appellant cannot prevail on this issue. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and sentence for sale of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, and remand this…
  • Cason v. State, 760 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …procedure must be followed in order to raise the denial of a cause challenge on appeal. See Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677 (Fla.1995); Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla.1990); Dobek v. Ans, 560 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Hammond v. State, 727 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Whether defense counsel properly preserved the issue is questionable under the “scenario” presented in this case, wherein the trial judge led defense counsel to believe that he would not grant any additional peremptory challenge…
  • Hernandez v. State, 763 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …peremptory, and identifying the objectionable juror who remained [*1145] seated on the jury. See Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876, 118 S.Ct. 197, 139 L.Ed.2d 134 (1997). We disagree with Hammond v. State, 727 So. 2d 979, 980 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. dismissed, No. SC 94780 (Fla. Jan. 6, 2000), that counsel must also remind the court of the denied challenge for cause when requesting additional peremptories. Although properly preserved, we affirm on the merits. Appellant…

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